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Executive	  Summary	  
 
 
EURECIA: aims and objectives 
EURECIA is an international research project funded by the ERC as a CSA action 
(grant no 229286). Its overall aim is to develop and apply a novel conceptual 
framework and methodology to measure, attribute and assess the impact and 
outcomes of the ERC and its funding schemes.  
In a nutshell, EURECIA set out to develop a novel methodology for the study of the impact of 
research funding schemes on knowledge and its social conditions, and to apply this to 
investigate the impact (effects) of the ERC and its funding schemes on science. From the 
outset EURECIA was conceived as a project to explore novel approaches and 
methodologies to the study of the impact of funding and policy schemes and to collect 
preliminary data. 
EURECIA constitutes a departure from more traditional approaches in two important 
ways: a) by interrogating the relationship between research funding and the science 
system rather than the economy and society at large; and b) by broadening the 
‘impact’ question to include not only intended effects as read through the objectives 
but also other possibilities. 
EURECIA Results I: approach and methodology 
Conceptualisation of ‘impact’ 
• Impact here is defined as ‘a difference of B that can be fully or partially 
attributed to A’. This definition emphasises: a) the notion of impact as 
attributable change; b) the need to outline the object precipitating change; c) the 
necessity to outline the changing object(s); and d) the necessity to attribute 
change causally.  
• Two challenges of the study of impact are measuring change and uncovering 
the mechanisms that generate this change. 
• It is analytically useful to differentiate between four types of impact: ‘straight 
runs’ are intended and expected; ‘long shots’ are intended but not expected; 
‘collateral’ are the effects that are unintended but expected; and ‘accidentals’ are 
neither intended not expected. 
• Studies of impact mostly focus on capturing the ‘straight runs’; EURECIA went 
beyond the intentions and expectations of the stakeholders and included, to 
varying degrees, all types of impact. 
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Identification of ‘potentially affected aspects of the science system’ 
At a general level, the potential object of change in this case is science. Thus, 
potentially changing affected aspects of the science system at different level of social 
aggregation were identified for this study of impact. 
• Researchers were selected because they are markers for the selection practices of 
the ERC and because it is likely that they experience strong impact of being ERC 
grantees. 
• The content of research conducted by ERC grantees was selected to study the 
impact of the grant(s) on the production of knowledge. 
• Researchers’ careers were selected because to facilitate the independence of 
younger researchers is a stated objective of the ERC. 
• One of the ERC’s objectives is to support the move of research organisations to 
excellence; thus universities and research institutes were included as potential 
objects of impact. 
• The ERC is likely to have impact on national research funders and funding 
landscapes; and 
• The ERC is also likely to impact on the European research and funding 
landscape. 
Measuring and attributing impact 
Regarding measuring and attributing impact the following methodological choices 
were made: 
• Registering difference relies on multiple measurements. EURECIA mostly 
provides stage one measurement of the state of the changing objects.  
• Measuring difference is conditional on two kinds of comparison: a) between 
initial and later state of the object(s); and b) between the initial and later state of 
the objects and these of a control group. EURECIA used a control group of 
researchers who passed the quality threshold but did not receive ERC grants.  
• EURECIA employed a variety of data collection methods including a survey, 
interviews, analysis of documents and individual-level bibliometrics. 
• EURECIA studied the first cohorts of ERC grantees. 
• EURECIA approached attribution by identifying and describing the social 
mechanisms that links effects and the conditions created by properties of the 
ERC and its funding schemes. Attribution varies between potentially affected 
aspects of the science system and can never be ‘complete’. 
Potentially affected aspect of the science system and the dynamics of impact: a timeline 
Each aspect of the science system studied by EURECIA has a different timeline of 
impact depending on its specific characteristics. Thus: 
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• Early effects on researchers, research content and research careers may start to 
unfold at the time of project application (or slightly before that) but the full 
impact of an ERC grant is not likely to be apparent until well after the end of the 
grant. 
• Research organisations are likely to have started to experience the impact of the 
ERC (if at all) at the time of its establishment. 
• National and European research funders and funding landscapes are likely to 
have already been affected during the discussions around the establishment of 
the ERC.  
For the study of impact this means that findings are of three kinds: a) impact (effects); 
b) early effects; and c) conditions for effects to occur. Furthermore, these are in 
different combinations depending on the changing object. 
EURECIA Results II: Stage One findings 
Researchers 
Three sets of attributes were used to characterise (describe) researchers: demographic 
(age, gender, relationships and research field); ‘approach’ capturing risk-taking and 
creativity disposition and activities; and ‘standing’ to measure resource conditions and 
prestige in terms of organisational career, knowledge community position and features 
of the local and national research environment. Using these: 
1. Nineteen matching pairs of grantees and members of the control group were 
identified to inform stage two measurements (in three years) and the 
retrospective causal analysis. 
2. Analysis of grantees and controls by ‘approach’ and ‘standing’ types shows that 
these set a very high benchmark for ‘early career researchers’ but that still there 
is sufficient space for them to develop along the lines set out by the objectives of 
the ERC and the conditions of the grant. The ERC grant is expected to have 
some impact on grantees’ ‘approach’ and a large impact on their ‘standing’. 
3. ERC grantees and controls were similar at the time of the Stage One 
measurement in terms of their ‘approach’ and ‘standing’. If the ERC grant really 
makes a difference for researchers we would expect to register differences 
between the two groups in the future. 
Researchers – early reported impact 
The following were reported as early impact of the ERC grants: 
1. Increased reputation from writing the proposal and/or getting the grant, and 
‘halo’ effect; 
2. Possibility to start, maintain or expand the grantee’s research group; 
3. Improved ability to pursue their research agenda; 
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4. Less exposure to local research related politics; and 
5. Earlier and faster promotion and/or tenure. 
6. In some cases need to move since the organisation cannot support an ERC 
grant. 
Content of research 
The ERC grants had an impact on the research of grantees and, potentially, of their 
communities, by: 
1. Funding planned scientific innovations, which we defined as research findings 
that affect the research practices of a large number of researchers in one or more 
fields (i.e. choices of problems, methods or empirical objects);  
2. Funding planned answers to ‘big questions’, which we defined as questions that 
are significantly more general than a common research question of the social 
sciences and humanities and need to be answered on an exceptionally broad 
theoretical, methodological or empirical basis; and 
3. Funding research that would otherwise not be funded, or would at least have 
been difficult to fund from other sources. Most of the investigated projects had 
epistemic properties that required uncommon funding conditions. The time 
frame, amount of funding, and flexible use of funding provided by ERC grants 
as well as the explicit invitation to submit risky and unconventional projects 
made grantees perceive the ERC grants as the only possible source of funding 
for their projects. Some of the grantees turned ideas they had for quite some 
time into project proposals because with the ERC, they saw a chance of getting 
them funded for the first time. Others turned to the ERC after failing repeatedly 
with national research councils because their projects were deemed high quality 
but too risky. Yet another group of researchers developed new ideas for their 
proposals to the ERC.  
Researchers’ careers 
Despite some reported early impact on careers we found that: 
1. The most important effect, career change because of the results of the ERC 
funded research, has not yet happened. 
2. Generally, there has been little initial impact on careers because: a) grantees are 
already relatively autonomous and at a high level of their national career 
ladder; b) career systems are not sufficiently flexible to enable negotiations on 
the basis of the reputation of the grant except possibly systems based on early 
tenure and promotion such as those in the UK and the Netherlands; and c) 
organisational mobility is constrained by factors such as family arrangements 
and costs of moving laboratories. 
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Research organisations 
This study looked at the impact of the ERC on universities and research institutes. 
More specifically, it explored the effects on a) their performance; b) development of 
better strategies to establish themselves as more effective global players (i.e. 
organisational capabilities); and c) investing more in the support of promising new 
talent.  
The study found that: 
1. Impact is most pronounced in the research organisations that are just below the 
top research performers since the existence of the ERC as well as attracting 
some grants is used to overhaul the organisation and develop and implement 
the practices conducive to research excellence.  
2. The ERC and its funding schemes do not have (and cannot be expected to have) 
strong impact on top research performers and on research organisations that are 
lagging far behind these. More often than not, top performers are subjected to 
other pressures for change (national and global) and the ERC merely enhances 
and/or is used as part of rhetoric for particular developments. 
3. ERC grants attracted by second tier research organisations can generate 
organisational imbalances. 
4. In many research organisations change cannot be fully attributed to the ERC 
and its funding schemes – it contributes to the speed and scope of the changes, 
in some cases crucially. 
5. Impact can be found on various material levels like internal funding or 
organisational decisions, or career opportunities. One overall impact however is 
symbolic and strong for all kinds of organisations: ERC success is unanimously 
seen as a new quality marker for organisations across Europe, which in turn 
feeds back into actions of research and university leaders.  
National research funders and funding landscapes 
Four levels at which the impact of the ERC may be observed were outlined: a) the 
systemic level; b) the level of the structure of the funding organisation; c) the level of 
strategy, funding instruments and support principles; and d) the level of processes and 
their modalities. In a nutshell, we found the following. 
1. At the systemic level: 
a. In state-led systems with no funding councils, the ERC provided a 
general model of funding body and/or legitimacy for the creation of a 
funding council. 
2. At the level of the structure of the funding council: 
a. The ERC provided an organizational model for the newly established 
research councils. 
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3. At the level of strategy, funding instruments and support principles: 
a. The ERC reinforced the position of the Research Council systems in 
funding fundamental or bottom-up research or individual researchers.  
b. The ERC provided a model for the support of highly innovative, risky 
research (Reinhart Koselleck Projects, Germany). 
c. The ERC reinforced the Europeanisation of activities. 
4. At the level of processes: 
a. Some research councils subcontracted evaluation of applications to the 
ERC (Norway for OYI scheme). 
b. The ERC reinforced the importance of internationalisation in peer 
review, and overall, reinforced cross-European competition.  
European funding landscape 
We found that: 
1. EU research funding policy level: The ERC has brought about a number of 
principal changes. These include strengthening the importance of excellence on 
the ERA agenda, changes in traditional principles in EU support to research 
(support of individuals vs. organisations; no juste retour; no pre-allocation of 
funds to fields or specific areas; fundamental research vs. targeted research), 
modification of the definition of European value-added in research support (in 
addition to international collaboration, competition at European level), and 
providing an important case, the only programme allocating EU money only, 
where strategy formulation and the implementation of the strategy has been 
delegated to external stakeholders. The ERC has provided a test ground for 
simpler administrative procedures that will eventually be adopted in Horizon 
2020. 
2. European research funding organisations level: The ERC has brought about 
fewer changes, as the ERC has been defined in such a way that a full overlap 
does not exist with any other funding organisation in terms of strategy or 
funding schemes. Where there is overlap in instruments, as with the ESF-
EUROHORCs EURYI, the non-ERC instrument has been withdrawn (although 
there is no evidence that this was necessarily caused by the emergence of the 
ERC).  
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Introduction	  
At the start of the 21st century Europe embarked on a large-scale science policy project 
that was ideologically framed by the notion of the European Research Area (ERA)1 and 
politically supported by the Lisbon agenda. This included an overhaul of research, 
innovation and science policy rationales, structures and organisations. At policy level, 
there was a shift to incorporate as an objective the further integration of national 
research and science systems (COM (2000), 6, COM (2007) 161; Luukkonen and 
Nedeva, 2010) in addition to the co-ordination of national research effort; one specific 
expressions of this was the reframing of the statement of European added value to 
include ‘competition’ and ‘cooperation’ (Nedeva and Stampfer, 2012). Structurally, a 
number of instruments aiming to enable further alignment of national research and 
science systems were implemented, albeit with varying levels of success (ERA-NETs, 
Technology Platforms, Networks of Excellence, Integrated Projects etc.). And 
organisationally, new principles for science support at European level were developed 
and implemented. As part of these developments, a dedicated research funding 
agency to support investigator driven research, the European Research Council (ERC), 
was established. 
After years of intense political debate, the ERC was officially established in February 
2007; from the outset, the ERC had two sets of ambitious objectives. On the one hand, 
the ERC’s aim, as set out initially, was to ‘stimulate scientific excellence by supporting 
and encouraging the very best, truly creative scientists, scholars and engineers to be 
adventurous and take risks in their research’.2 On the other hand, the ERC was to 
‘create leverage towards structural improvements in the research system of Europe’3 
by ‘setting quality benchmarks’, ‘assisting strategic thinking’ of organisations and 
‘promoting interactions’ amongst organisations (ERC Work Programme, 2008).  
These objectives were initially pursued using two main funding instruments4. One of 
these, the Starting Independent Researcher Grant scheme (StG), is targeted at 
researchers at relatively early career stages; the other one, the Advanced Investigator 
Grant scheme AdG) is meant for stellar researchers at the forefront of their respective 
research fields5. Both schemes aim to support frontier research defined as ’the pursuit 
of questions at or beyond the frontiers of knowledge, without regard for established 
disciplinary boundaries’ (ERC Guide for Applicants, 2010). 
                                                
1 For more on the ERA please refer to Chapter 11 of this report. 
2 See http://erc.europua.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=12, last accessed 4 May 2011. 
3 See http://erc.europua.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=12, last accessed 4 May 2011. 
4 More recently the ERC has added two further schemes to its portfolio; these are the Synergy Grants (a pilot 
scheme for small groups of excellent researchers) and the Proof of Concept Grants allowing ERC grantees to take 
their research a step further towards establishing its innovative potential. EURECIA focused only on the StG and 
AdG schemes. 
5 For more information on the ERC, its practices, organisation and structure please refer to Annex 1. 
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From the outset, the members of the Scientific Council of the ERC recognised that as a 
new and ambitious organisation aiming to establish itself as a “world-leading 
institution for science funding” (ERC Work Programme, 2007, p. 15) it raises high 
expectations and that it needs to institute methods to assess progress towards its objectives. 
They also acknowledged that these methods ought to rely on “a broad ranging 
understanding of quality standards...and methodologies for assessing the qualitative 
and qualitative impacts of the ERC activities” (ERC Work Programme, 2007, p. 15). 
Consequently, three objectives of any future monitoring and assessment strategy were 
set out, namely to: a) assist in future strategy development; b) provide for ongoing 
improvements/refinement of the operations and quality assurance; and c) contribute 
to ex-post evaluation. 
Following that, and in line with it, the Scientific Council included in the first Work 
Programme for the ERC (ERC Work Programme, 2007) a provision for commissioning 
a first set of projects and studies to assist in the tasks around the development of the 
monitoring and assessment strategy. This portfolio of projects was to approach two 
separate but related tasks, namely ‘to understand the impact of the ERC based on 
exploratory, state-of the art, scholarly work on broadly defined areas and questions’ and 
prepare for ‘robust longer term monitoring and evaluation by building up sufficient 
evidence to enable an evaluation of the functioning, performance and processes of the 
ERC’ (ERC Work Programme, 2007, p. 16).  
The first call for proposals was issued in November 2007, just several months after the 
official establishment of the ERC and the announcement of the first call for proposals 
under the Starting Grants scheme (StG) the recipients of which started work in early 
2008. More specifically, under the first task, the call invited proposals for: 
• Exploratory and preparatory studies addressing the possible impacts of the 
ERC on the functioning and quality of the research environment in Europe, 
including on policy and research culture in European research, as well as 
addressing future developments of the ERC in the global context and relevant 
indicators; and 
• Exploring novel and innovative methodologies and preliminary data collection 
for longitudinal assessment and evaluation of the direct and indirect impacts of 
the ERC. 
EURECIA (Understanding and Assessing the Impact and Outcomes of the ERC 
Funding Schemes) as a research project was formulated in response to this call and 
funded by the ERC as a Coordination and Support Action (CSA), grant no 229286. Its 
overall objective was to develop and apply a novel conceptual framework and 
methodology to measure and attribute the impact of the ERC and its funding 
schemes6. From the outset EURECIA was conceived as a project exploring novel 
                                                
6 For the detailed EURECIA objectives please refer to Annex 1. 
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approaches and methodologies to the study of the impact of funding and policy 
schemes and preliminary data collection. 
Here we address the project objectives, by reporting on the novel approach and 
methodology developed by EURECIA, presenting the results from the first stage data 
collection7 and some preliminary findings about impact, and discussing the 
implications of our work for the methodology and some key messages for the 
monitoring, evaluation and assessment strategy of the ERC. In this sense, the results 
achieved by EURECIA, we believe and hope to convey in this report, prepare the 
future evaluations of the impact of the ERC and its funding schemes. 
EURECIA explored novel approach(es) and methodology(ies) for studying the impact 
of the ERC on the science system for two main reasons. First, the ERC is different from 
the existing funding organisations and schemes at European level (e.g. the FPs, COST, 
EUREKA, the ESF etc.) in five substantive ways, namely it: a) explicitly focuses on 
supporting research at or beyond the frontiers of knowledge, without regard for 
established disciplinary boundaries; b) supports investigator driven rather than 
programmatic research; c) has a budget and allocates funding rather than coordinating 
national funds; d)  has very few clear and targeted goals; and e) uses peer-reviewed 
scientific excellence as the main criteria for funding decisions and section. This 
warrants different expectations of impact and, respectively, needs different evaluation 
approaches and methodologies. 
Second, our review of impact studies revealed what we consider to be an important 
methodological issue associated with the existing approaches. Whilst most impact 
studies assume that ‘impact’ is a difference that can be traced back to a particular 
funding scheme and/or policy of interest, they generally do not ‘operationalise’ this 
difference and go on to ‘pass the question to the object’. In other words, instead of 
measuring difference directly by comparing measurements at different states of the 
(affected) phenomenon and tracing it back to the conditions provided by the scheme, 
these studies rely mostly on the opinion of the respondents about both difference and 
attribution. 
We believe that the approach and methodology for the study of impact developed by 
EURECIA goes some way towards dealing with both points raised above. In terms of 
the first point, we clearly focused the study on the relationship between the ERC and 
the science system. EURECIA is a study of the impact that the ERC and its funding 
schemes have (could be expected to have) on researchers, their careers, the content of 
their research, research organisations (universities and research institutes), national 
funding bodies and the European funding landscape.  
                                                
7 EURECIA proposed and developed a panel-based methodology for the study of impact consisting of two 
measurements. Here we report on the first measurement. 
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In terms of the second point, we developed and applied an approach and 
methodology that build on the understanding of ‘impact’ as ‘difference that can be 
fully or partially attributed’. Following from that, the methodology combines 
provisions for direct measurement of difference and for attribution based on un-
packing generative mechanisms; it incorporates a panel survey of ERC grantees and 
controls, comparative case studies of grantees and controls, and case studies with 
research organisations, national research funders and research policy organisations at 
the European level. We discuss the approach and methodology developed by 
EURECIA in Part I of this report. 
Moving to the second research task of EURECIA, namely applying the methodology to 
collect Stage One data, our results are presented in Part II of this report. This part 
includes findings about impact (structured by the studied elements of the science 
system) and about the mechanisms that generate this impact(s). Furthermore, it is 
important to note that we report on three kinds of findings about impact, namely: a) 
early reported effects of the ERC; b) stage one (initial) measurement of the state of the 
potentially affected elements of the science system; and c) impact of the ERC in the 
case of some elements of the science system. This is because of the different nature of 
the potentially affected elements – individual researchers and organisations – and the 
different dynamics and timing of achieved and expected impact. It is probably safe to 
say, for instance, that the impact of the ERC on the European funding landscape has 
largely already occurred and that only minor adjustments can be expected in the 
future (provided broader boundary conditions reaching beyond the science system 
persist). Conversely, relatively few of the main effects of the ERC grants on 
researchers, their careers and the content of research have already occurred. 
We believe that EURECIA’s methodological contributions are at two levels: a) its 
overall approach and design; and b) approach and methodology as applied to the 
specific elements of the science system. We believe that overall, our contribution 
unfolds along three inter-related lines: a) we operationalised the science system to 
discern the actors and phenomena (elements) that can be potentially affected by the 
ERC and its funding schemes; b) we developed an approach that goes beyond 
studying the expected and intended impact of policy and funding schemes as read in 
the objectives ensuring that the results can be used for reflexivity and organisational 
learning; and c) the methodology is largely designed to measure difference directly 
and attribute it by un-packing the mechanisms through which it is generated. 
Furthermore, EURECIA made methodological inroads in respect to the study of 
impact on the specific elements of the science system by developing a novel 
framework for characterising researchers, applying a novel approach and 
methodology to the study of impact on the content of research, introducing an initial 
typology of research organisations and laying the foundations for developing a 
comparative framework for funding landscapes. 
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This report8 is structured in two parts to reflect the two main objectives of the 
EURECIA study, namely exploration of new approaches and methodology and initial 
stage data collecting. Thus in the chapters under Part I we discuss the overall 
methodological choices that were made; set out the key characteristics of the ERC; 
operationalise the potentially affected elements of the science system; and hypothesise 
some impact mechanisms. In Part II of the report we present our empirical finding 
following Stage One data collection; these are about the different potentially affected 
elements of the science system and prepare Stage Two measurement and comparison. 
In addition, we have included some preliminary finding regarding the mechanisms 
through which we expect change to be (has been) generated. 
The concluding chapter of this report examine critically the methodology and identify 
some early messages to the ERC and its Scientific Council emerging from this research. 
                                                
8 Please note, that the finding reported here build on very detailed reports on the ERC’s impact on the different 
aspects of science. These reports can be accessed on www.eurecia-erc.net. 
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Chapter	  1:	  Definition	  of	  ‘impact’	  and	  methodological	  choices	  
In this part of the report we present the working definition of impact that was used 
and the methodological choices regarding measurement and attribution of impact that 
were made. These choices, as noted below, have clear implications for the specific 
approach and methodology(ies) developed and applied by EURECIA to study the 
impact of the ERC and its funding schemes on the science system.   
1.1	  Definition	  of	  ‘impact’	  
EURECIA worked from a generalised definition of impact which is in line with other 
generalised notions of impact, most notably the one by Becker (2001) who defines 
impact assessment as the process of identifying future consequences of current actions 
at individual, organisational or system level. According to this, impact is defined as  
“...any difference and/or change of social actors or phenomena that can be partially or 
wholly attributed to other social actors or phenomena.” 
Specified in terms of the potential impact of the ERC and its funding schemes this 
definition translates into impact being 
“...any difference and/or change of the science system that can be partially or fully 
attributed to the establishment and functioning of the ERC and its funding schemes.” 
In other words, this means that the extent, nature and specific manifestations of the 
impact that the ERC may have on the science system depend on: a) the signals that the 
ERC sends through its objectives, organisational practices and rules of funding; and b) 
the properties, characteristics and positioning of the potentially affected elements of 
the science system. Furthermore, to attribute these effects it is necessary to work out 
and describe the social mechanisms that generate them. Using this notion of impact 
makes it imperative to: 
• Describe the signals that the ERC sends through its objectives, selection 
practices and rules of funding. Policies and funding schemes generate impact by 
the fact that some of their attributes and properties change the conditions 
within which the potentially affected social actors and phenomena operate. 
Outlining these attributes and properties is imperative both for framing the 
expectations of change and tracing this back, and attributing it. ERC’s 
objectives, selection practices and conditions provided by its funding schemes 
are presented in Chapter 2 of this report. 
• ‘Operationalise’ the science system as the potentially affected social domain. 
When working from a generalised definition of impact it is imperative to 
specify what can be expected to change and what change can be expected, as a 
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result of the policy/funding signals. This is important at three levels of 
aggregation: a) the broad domain that may be affected; b) the social actors and 
phenomena that may change and that can be accessed empirically; and c) the 
possible dimensions of change within these social actors and phenomena. In 
this case the domain where impact may occur is the science system; this has 
been operationalised in Chapter 3 of this report. 
• Setting out the mechanisms through which impact is generated. Our working 
definition places attribution at the core of the study of impact. Attributing 
impact, particularly in very complex systems such as the science system, is a 
very challenging task that can be approached in a number of ways. In EURECIA 
attribution is approached by describing the social mechanisms linking 
particular changes of the science system aspects and the conditions and 
opportunities that the ERC and its funding schemes provide for these to occur. 
These mechanisms are outlined in Chapter 5 of this report. 
1.2	  Methodological	  choices	  
The definition of impact as ‘difference or change that can be wholly or partially 
attributed’ implies two key research tasks, namely identifying (measuring) change and 
attributing this to the funding or policy scheme that generates this change. Both tasks 
are non-trivial and entail a number of choices that frame and characterise the overall 
impact study approach as well as the choice of methodology(ies). 
1.2.1	  Choices	  regarding	  measurement	  
In the context of EURECIA, it was necessary from the outset to make clear choices 
regarding five issues associated with measuring impact. These are the types of impact 
that EURECIA should address; the composition of information entry points and data 
collection methods; the number of measurements necessary to measure difference; the 
kind of comparison(s) used by the study; and the timing of the study. 
1.2.1.1	  Types	  of	  impact	  to	  address	  
Using as points of reference the stated intentions for impact as read in the objectives of 
policy and funding schemes and whether this impact can be reasonably expected, four 
types of impact can be distinguished. These are illustrated by Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Types of impact 
 Intended Unintended 
Expected  Straight runs Collateral 
 
Unexpected Long shots 
 
Accidentals 
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Expectations regarding intended and expected impact (‘straight runs’) and intended 
and unexpected impact (‘long shots’) can be identified through the stated objectives of 
policy and research funding scheme. Whether or not these intentions are realised 
depends on whether they are supported by the core practices and communicated 
clearly, on the one hand, and on how these are interpreted and used by the potential 
beneficiaries, on the other. Whilst ‘straight runs’ are intended and anticipated, the ‘long 
shots’ are effects that are intended but cannot be expected to occur with any level of certainty 
within a set time frame. 
Unintended and expected impact (‘collateral’) is the ‘collateral damage’ that actors 
anticipate but cannot avoid because there are many social influences at play that the 
policy or funding scheme cannot control. Finally, unintended and unexpected impact 
(‘accidentals’) is very interesting as a possibility but difficult to measure. It can, 
however, be captured if an empirical object is studied exhaustively. 
Most impact studies and assessments focus entirely on the ‘straight runs’ and ‘long 
shots’ types of impact. This is done by identifying possible change working solely 
from the objectives of the policy or funding scheme. Here, EURECIA departed from this 
practice by developing a methodology that allows all four types of impact to be identified and 
studied9. We believe that going beyond the stated objectives has the advantage of 
producing results that allow these objectives to be questioned. In other words, 
EURECIA aimed to produce data allowing the Scientific Councils to address not only 
the question of whether the ERC is achieving its objectives but also to reconsider, if 
and when necessary, these objectives. 
Choosing to address these four types of impact implied that the methodology 
developed and applied by EURECIA had to incorporate: a) theory informed 
operationalisation of potentially affected social actors, phenomena and expectations of 
specific change; and b) be sufficiently ‘open’ to cope with the ‘collateral’ and 
‘accidental’ impact. This was achieved by drawing on the knowledge and experience 
of broad range of social science research fields to identify possible change and by 
using a mixture between qualitative and quantitative research methods that were 
sufficiently open to be able to explore possible change that was beyond the stated 
objectives of the ERC and our theoretical expectations. 
1.2.1.2	  Single	  or	  multiple	  data	  collection	  methods,	  information	  entry	  points	  
Depending on the level of complexity of the objectives of the policy and funding 
scheme and the potentially affected domain different framework choices are possible 
regarding the data collection methods and information entry points. In light of the 
layered and multi-faceted objectives of the ERC and the notorious complexity of the 
science system the methodology developed by EURECIA used multiple data collection 
                                                
9 These four types of impact had different standing for different changing objects. Also, it is clear that ‘accidentals’ 
can be captured only by developing a sufficiently open methodology that can cope with unexpected findings. 
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methods. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this report that sets out 
the empirical approach that was used. 
Furthermore, and related to the previous point, the methodology developed and 
applied by EURECIA build on using multiple information entry points. These varied 
between the studies focusing on the different aspects of the science system potentially 
affected by the ERC and its funding schemes and generally incorporated, but did not 
stop at, the information provided by relevant respondents. 
1.2.1.3	  Single	  or	  multiple	  measurements	  
Whether the impact study relies on one or more measurements depends primarily on 
the notion of impact that has been adopted, on whether change (difference) is measure 
directly or indirectly through the opinion of respondents about it, and on whether it 
takes place in real time or ex-post. EURECIA is working from a definition of impact as 
‘change that can be attributed’ and aims to measure change (difference) directly. 
Furthermore, by necessity, the current study is a real time study of impact. 
In this light, the methodology developed by EURECIA relies on two (at least) 
measurements to register change (difference). This report present data from the first 
measurement, or what in our proposal and the DoW was referred to as Stage One data. 
Hence, although some early reported effects10 of the establishment and operation of the 
ERC on the selected aspects of the science system presented in Part II of this report the 
data mainly prepares the second measurement, the comparison of the two states of the 
relevant aspect of the science system and the testing of the impact mechanisms we 
have outlined. In this sense, conclusions regarding impact as ‘difference that can be 
attributed’ cannot be reached before the second measurement is conducted with the 
possible exceptions of the changes to the different funding landscape11. 
1.2.1.4	  The	  issue	  of	  control	  groups	  
It is entirely possible to measure the difference in time within a group of beneficiaries; 
this, however, raises some question regarding attribution because it naturally excludes 
from the study any alternative opportunities for the measured outcomes to occur. This 
is why, many studies of impact use control groups to discern difference (change) and 
to attempt to attribute it to particular policy and/or funding schemes. This in turn, 
brings to the fore the need to select control group(s) that are methodologically and 
empirically useful. 
EURECIA used control groups in the study of all potentially affected elements of the 
science system except, and for obvious reasons, the European funding landscape and 
the national funding organisations and landscapes. Thus, the study of impact on 
                                                
10 To a degree the methodology we developed was proposed because the ERC and its funding schemes were 
established only relatively recently and most of the impact these may have has not occurred yet.  
11 This is because these changes started much earlier during the debates regarding the establishment of the ERC (see 
Chapter 4 of this report).  
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research organisations included universities that had no ERC grants and the study of 
the impact on researchers, careers and content of research used controls of ERC 
applicants and project proposals shortlisted for but not in receipt of a grant.  
In the case of researchers and research proposals our choice of controls was un-
orthodox in that we selected for similarity rather than difference. In other words, we 
intentionally selected controls that we expected, at least initially, to match the 
recipients of grants in most if not all their characteristics except receiving the grant. We 
believe that this similarity is analytically useful in terms of registering, or not, 
differences at the second stage measurement and tracing these back to the ERC grant. 
1.2.1.5	  Timing	  of	  the	  impact	  study	  
According to when these are conducted during the life cycle of the policy, impact 
studies can be placed under three distinct groups: ex-ante impact assessments, real-
time studies of impact and ex-post impact studies. 
Ex-ante impact assessments are carried out before the policy is launched and aim to 
estimate effects by using prior knowledge, mathematical models and simulation. This 
kind of impact study has little relevance in the context of EURECIA. 
Real-time studies of impact attempt to monitor the effects of policy as these unfold; hence 
it is very powerful in capturing relatively short term effects. This kind of study has 
some advantages in that it enables timely feedback, learning and possibly correction of 
policy instruments as they are being used. These studies, however, have problems 
dealing with attribution and are time consuming and costly.  
Ex-post impact studies are carried out when the policy has been around long enough to 
have already generated effects in the system that can be measured directly. Ex-post 
studies can define the intervention and look for its effects, or they can start from a 
specific situation and trace it back to the intervention(s) that generated it. Ex-post 
impact studies are best suited to process tracing and attribution but the information 
collected can be tainted by time. Another disadvantage is that these studies are, by 
their very nature, backwards looking and timely corrective measures are impossible.  
Since EURECIA as a research project started work shortly after the establishment of 
the ERC and the awards of the first cohort of StGs (2007 call) conducting ex-anti or ex-
post study of impact is clearly impracticable. Hence, EURECIA developed and applied 
a real-time impact study methodology with some elements of retrospective ‘process 
tracing’. This methodology also prepares an ex-post impact study of the impact of the 
ERC on the science system by developing and applying methods for the multiple 
collections of comparable data. In addition, EURECIA collected only Stage One data; 
e.g. measurement of the initial state of the potentially affected aspects of the science 
system and information about the mechanisms that could generate change. A second 
measurement is absolutely necessary to be able to draw conclusions about difference 
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(change) and to ensure that the social mechanisms that were already identified have 
generated the hypothesised differences. 
1.2.2	  Choices	  regarding	  attribution:	  impact	  mechanisms	  
Attribution in social science is notoriously problematic and has been approached in 
variety of ways. One way to approach the matter of attribution, for instance, is to rely 
entirely on the opinion of respondents about it12. Particular effects can be also 
attributed by demonstrating that these coincide with the policy measure. This is 
achieved by using quantitative studies; given appropriate sampling these can establish 
whether the occurrence of change is statistically significant.  
Yet another way of attribution involves identifying the mechanisms that generate 
change. In this case, one could claim that ‘causality’ is established if the mechanisms 
generating particular difference (change) can be described. These are described by 
identifying particular properties of the policy or funding scheme, and the conditions 
that these offer, and the way(s) in which these relate to specific changes that may affect 
the relevant social actors and phenomena. A further condition for attribution is that 
these conditions ought to be unique to be able to claim that they cause rather than 
crystallise the change. 
In EURECIA we opted for the last option, namely attribution by describing the 
mechanisms linking the properties of the ERC and its funding schemes and the 
conditions these create and specific change in the selected aspects of the science 
system. These impact mechanisms are presented in Chapter 5. 
It is worth emphasising, however, that in the social realm attribution is neither 
straightforward nor ‘complete’. In other words, effects usually have multiple origins 
and ‘causes’. 
                                                
12 These approaches build on what is known in social science as the Thomas theorem and stating that “If men define 
situations as real they are real in their consequences”. In other words, this means that if respondents believe that 
particular effect can be attributed to a policy scheme they behave as if it were and make it ‘real’ by their actions. 
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1.2.3	  EURECIA	  methodological	  choices	  at	  a	  glance	  
 The methodological choices made by EURECIA are set out in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: EURECIA methodological choice 
(Choices in green) 
 
Type of impact 
 
Data collection 
 
Control group 
 
Timing of study 
 
Attribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Straight runs Long shots Collateral Accidentals 
Single Multiple 
Yes No 
Ex-ante Real-time Ex-post 
Statistics Mechanisms 
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Chapter	  2:	  Characterising	  the	  ERC	  and	  its	  funding	  schemes	  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the extent, nature and specific manifestations of the impact 
that the ERC can be realistically expected to have, depends on the signals that it 
transmits through its objectives, practices of selection and rules of funding.  
In this chapter of the report we address these in turn. Thus, in section 2.1 we examine 
the key objectives of the ERC as these were set initially; in section 2.2 we address the 
distinctive characteristics of the practices used by the ERC to select researchers and 
projects proposals for funding; and in section 2.3 we set out the main properties of the 
funding schemes of the ERC. For more detailed account of the origins, structure and 
structural position of the ERC, please refer to Annex 2. 
2.1	  Aims,	  objectives	  and	  remit	  of	  the	  ERC	  
The European Commission included the establishment of the ERC in its proposal for 
the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). Under this proposal the ERC was to 
implement ‘the Community activities’ in investigator-driven ‘frontier’ research at the 
European level within a dedicated Programme, namely the IDEAS Programme. The 
proposal was approved by Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament of 
December 18, 2006 (EP, 2006). Following that, the ERC was established with a 
Commission Decision of February 2, 2007 and the ERC Executive Agency was set up 
with a Commission decision of February 14, 2007 (EC, 2007).  
These documents approved also framed the rationale for the IDEAS Programme in 
general, and for the ERC in particular, in terms of the understanding that: (a) 
investigator-driven research is a key driver of wealth creation and social progress; (b) 
Europe is not making good use of its scientific potential and resources; and (c) an 
Europe-wide funding structure for ‘frontier’ research is an essential part of the ERA. 
Accordingly, the primary aim of the ERC and its funding schemes, as set out initially, 
was to ‘stimulate scientific excellence by supporting and encouraging the very best, truly 
creative scientists, scholars and engineers to be adventurous and take risks in their research. 
The scientists should go beyond established frontiers of knowledge and the boundaries of 
disciplines’.13  
This overall objective was to be achieved by developing and supporting European 
researchers (researchers based in European research organisations) and by supporting the 
research organisations of Europe (universities and research institutes) to develop their research 
strategies and priorities to become global players in research. Furthermore, the ERC had the 
ambition to ‘create leverage towards structural improvements in the research system of 
                                                
13 See http://erc.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=12, last accessed 11 Feb 2008. 
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Europe’14 and to support research that can form the basis for new industries, markets and 
innovations. 
Reading through the official documents on the ERC three points emerge. First, its 
missions and objectives are still evolving as evidenced by sequential formulations. 
Hence, recently the core aim of the ERC was re-formulated as being ‘...to encourage the 
highest quality research in Europe through competitive funding and to support investigator-
initiated frontier research across all fields of research, on the basis of scientific excellence.’15. 
This is only subtly different in that the emphasis has shifted to properties of research 
(excellence and frontier), remit and operating principles (competition and excellence) 
rather than characteristics of researchers. Such continuous clarification and sharpening 
of the missions and objectives of the ERC should be expected since it is still a very 
young organisation and the process of its institutionalisation is incomplete.  
Second, a distinction between objectives-goals and objectives-means can be discerned.  
Objectives-goals relate to the support of research with specific properties, namely 
excellent, highest quality research beyond the existing frontiers of knowledge. Objectives-
means, on the other hand, refer to the social conditions that increase the probability of 
the objectives-goals to be achieved. These include selecting proposals with particular 
properties (risky, excellent, outside the mainstream) and researchers with specific 
characteristics (talented, creative, at particular stage of their epistemic and organisational 
careers), and enabling conditions conducive to carrying out the research and developing 
researchers in organisational environments (enable research organisations to develop 
strategies, mechanisms and structures to become global players).  
And third, these objectives are diverse and include sometimes conflicting demands. 
This is very likely a result of the compromises that had to be made were the ERC to be 
established. However, the missions and objectives are a combination between ones 
that target directly the content of research, researchers and research careers, ones 
aiming to enable the transformation of research organisations which by its very nature 
can be only indirect, and objectives expressing a more ‘usual’ for the European Union 
level research and innovation policy approach and aiming to meet the demands of the 
knowledge society, make economic and societal contribution and lead to the 
development of new industries. 
For the purposes of EURECIA, it is analytical useful to distinguish between three sets 
of objectives.  
Objectives related to researchers, content of research and careers 
In this respect the ERC aims to: 
                                                
14 ERC Work Programme, 2008. 
15 See http://erc.europa.eu/about-erc/mission, last accessed 15 Feb 2012. 
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• Support the best of the best scientific efforts in Europe across all fields of 
science, scholarship and engineering. 
• Promote wholly investigator-driven, or 'bottom-up' frontier research.  
• Encourage the work of the established and next generation of independent top 
research leaders in Europe. 
• Reward innovative proposals by placing emphasis on the quality of the idea 
rather than the research area.  
• Harness the diversity of European research talent and channel funds into the 
most promising or distinguished researchers.  
• Raise the status and visibility of European frontier research and the very best 
researchers of today and tomorrow.  
• Put excellence at the heart of European Research.16 
Objectives specific to the StG scheme 
These include the provision of suitable resources and conditions for ‘up and coming 
research leaders...to establish or consolidate a proper research team and...start 
conducting independent research in Europe.’ 17 
Objectives specific to research organisations 
Regarding research organisations, the ERC aims to ‘help universities and other research 
institutions gauge their performance and encourage them to develop better strategies to 
establish themselves as more effective global players. The ERC aims to stimulate research 
organisations to invest more in the support of promising new talent ...’ 18 
These objectives, by a) their emphasis on supporting investigator-driven, frontier 
research and research excellence; and b) their stated intention to support the very best 
researchers and research based solely on criteria of excellence signal the emergence of 
an ambitious, and potentially high visibility and reputation, research funder at 
European level. Furthermore, the objectives offer an early indication that the ERC is 
fairly unique in that it deviates from the ‘customary’ objectives of both European and 
national funder. In the case of the former it is different by clearly targeting the of 
investigator-driven research supported on the basis of excellence rather than 
coordinating national research effort or research closer to industrial application. In the 
case of the latter it is different in that it explicitly aims to support research that is not 
only excellent but also frontier, risky and potentially path-breaking. 
Whether the ERC is positioned to achieve these objectives to a large degree depends 
on its selection practices (discussed in section 2.2) and the outcome of this selection 
(presented in Chapters 6 and 7).  
                                                
16 See http://erc.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=12, last accessed 15 June 2011. 
17 See http://erc.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=65, last accessed 24 August 2011. 
18 Mission statement: http://erc.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=12  
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2.2	  Selection	  practices	  
The ERC has developed and instituted practices for the selection of proposals for 
funding using a two-stage peer review process involving external referees. At the first 
stage of the peer review procedure consensual peer review is used to establish the 
ranking of the proposals; these rankings are agreed by the peer review panel.  
Each panel has a membership of about 10 scientists or scholars and a chair-person. 
Panel members review a certain number of proposals – the number of proposals does 
vary between panels but panel members report that reviewing takes on average about 
a week work19. Since there are two panels per research field (these work in alternate 
years) in case of overload it is possible to call on the help of the members of the 
alternate panel. Also where necessary, the panel members draw on the specific 
knowledge and expertise of external referees. There are currently 25 panels to cover 
the three domains of the ERC, namely social sciences and humanities, life sciences and 
physical and engineering sciences. 
According to the rules for peer review operated by the ERC each proposal is assessed 
by a minimum of three reviewers. Initially (step 1) all proposals are reviewed by 
designated panel members. In step 2 more formal reviews are carried out by panel 
members (usually 3) and external referees (2-3). Each application is assigned to a lead 
reviewer who introduces it for discussion and is responsible for producing the 
feedback to the applicant. 
The formal instructions to peers reviewers provided by the ERC stipulate that each 
proposal should be assigned a mark between 1 (non-competitive) and 4 (outstanding) 
for the proposed research, the investigator and the host organisation. Reviewers are 
advised to reserve the top mark for the top 10% of the proposals, mark between 4.0 
and 3.5 for the top 20% etc. The quality threshold is higher or equal to 2 (ERC Guide 
for Peer Reviewers, 2010). In reality, panels use their discretion and adapt these scales 
to the specific demands of the research field. 
Decisions regarding the ranking of proposals are taken by consensus. In our 
interviews we explored this matter is some detail. It appears that there are two 
common positions of discord in the individual assessment of proposals: one arises 
when a panel member from a neighbouring research field has mis-understood a 
particular point (in other words, this originates in limited knowledge and expertise) 
and the other one develops in the ‘middle ground’ of decisions and judgment 
(different opinion). These are resolved in different ways but here of particular interest 
is the discord founded in different expertise. 
                                                
19 This section of the report draws on information collected by a research project funded by the Stiftelsen Riksbankens 
Jubileumsfond, Sweden and entitled  “Peer Review Practices and the Legitimacy of the European Research Council” 
(PEERS). This was carried out by Dr T. Luukkonen and Dr M. Nedeva. 
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ERC peer-review panels are not discipline based but constructed around broader 
research areas. In other words, these are by their very nature cross-cutting and include 
scientists and scholars from different albeit neighbouring research fields. In turn, this 
can provide the variety necessary to ensure that consensus does not select only 
proposals above the field’s norm but also proposals that are interesting from the 
perspective of different research fields (shift of consensus) (Nedeva, 2012). 
Here we are not going to expand on the ways in which criteria and judgements are 
negotiated within the panels; a detailed analysis of that is provided by Luukkonen 
(2012). 
In a nutshell, the ERC’s peer review mechanisms focus on the assessment of the 
proposed research and on the potential of the applicant20. Only after that are the other 
conditions for carrying out the research are examined. 
2.3	  ERC	  funding	  schemes	  
To achieve its objectives, the ERC operates two funding schemes21. One of these, the 
ERC Starting Independent Researcher grant scheme (StG), targets researchers who are 
at a relatively early career stage and aims to enable them to transit into the highest 
echelons of their respective knowledge communities22. The second funding scheme 
operated by the organisation, the ERC Advanced Investigator grant scheme (AdG), is 
designed for stellar scientists and scholars and aims to provide support for highly 
innovative research ideas at the frontier of the respective research fields.  
These funding schemes are somewhat different in terms of their objectives. Whilst both 
schemes aim to support high quality investigator driven research, the StG scheme also 
aims to provide opportunities to early and mid-career scientists and scholars; the AdG 
scheme focuses exclusively on supporting highly innovative, frontier research projects 
(ERC Guide for Applicants, 2010). 
Both schemes support ‘frontier research’ which in the documents is defined as ‘the 
pursuit of questions at or beyond the frontiers of knowledge, without regard for 
established disciplinary boundaries.’ (ERC Guide for Applicants, 2010, p. 12). These 
cover all fields of research, including social sciences and humanities. Support is 
relatively generous and successful StG and AdG applicants are awarded up to 2 and 
2.5 million euro over up to five years respectively. 
Both schemes support research teams headed by a single Principle Investigator. It is 
important that the teams can be within a single organisation or transgress 
                                                
20 Here the balance can vary depending on the research field. Panels in the life sciences, for instance, are more likely 
to accord primacy the applicant and their ‘career history’. 
21 Recently two additional funding schemes were added to the portfolio – the Synergy Grants and the Proof of 
Concept grants. These are not discussed in any detail here since the time reference for EURECIA is 2007-2008 when 
only the two initial schemes were operational. 
22 There have been several changes to this since the establishment of the ERC. The most recent guide for applicants 
distinguishes between ‘starters’ and ‘consolidators’ thus distinguishing between the early and mid-career stages. 
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organisational and national boundaries – this is determined only by the nature of the 
research and the competencies, equipment and facilities necessary to carry it out. In 
other words, the ERC grants are not subject to conditions for international 
collaboration which often accompany research funding at the European level. To the 
extent to which the work is to be carried out in a research unit within EU member or 
associate states the PIs can be from any part of the world. Conditions regarding the 
status of the PI refer only to their career stage and/or their professional standing in 
knowledge communities. 
Table 2 (below) offers a comparison between the two funding schemes according to 
their key characteristics. Here, it is particularly important to emphasise that the both 
funding schemes offer three conditions key conditions for research, namely research 
funding is relatively generous, it is relatively long term and it allows flexible use 
between funding lines. 
 32 
 
Table 2: ERC starting grant and ERC advanced grant schemes by key characteristics 
 ERC Starting Grant ERC Advanced Grant 
Objectives To provide adequate support to the 
independent careers of excellent 
researchers, regardless of nationality 
or current location, who are at the 
stage of establishing or consolidating 
their own independent research team 
or programme. 
To promote substantial advances in the 
frontiers of knowledge, and to encourage 
new productive lines of enquiry and new 
methods and techniques, including 
unconventional approaches and 
investigations at the interface between 
established disciplines. 
Eligibility • The PI can be any age and any 
nationality, who intend to 
conduct the research in EU MS 
and Associated Countries.  
• The PI must have been awarded 
his/her first PhD no less than 2 
and no more than 10 years prior 
to the publication date of the call 
for proposals. 
• The PI can be any age and any 
nationality, regardless of age and 
current location 
• The PI should have a track record of 
significant research achievements in 
the last 10 years. 
Type of 
research 
• 'Frontier research': the pursuit of 
questions at or beyond the 
frontiers of knowledge, without 
regard for established 
disciplinary boundaries, in any 
area of research (apart from 
nuclear fission and fusion).  
• Projects of an interdisciplinary 
nature which cross the 
boundaries between different 
fields of research;  
• Pioneering projects which 
address new and emerging fields 
of research;  
• Unconventional, innovative 
approaches and scientific 
inventions so long as the expected 
impact on science, scholarship or 
engineering is significant.  
• Aiming to broaden scientific and 
technological knowledge – so 
projects should not be linked to 
commercial objectives. 
• Substantial advances in the frontiers 
of knowledge, to encourage new 
productive lines of enquiry and new 
methods and techniques, including 
unconventional approaches and 
investigations at the interface between 
established disciplines.  
• Research that aims high, in terms of 
the envisaged scientific achievements 
as well as the creativity and 
originality of its approaches.  
• Pioneering and far-reaching 
challenges at the frontiers of the 
field(s) addressed, and involving new, 
groundbreaking or unconventional 
methodologies, whose risky outlook 
is justified by the possibility of a 
major breakthrough with an impact 
beyond a specific research 
domain/discipline. 
Size of grants Up to 2 Million Euro for up to 5 years 
(pro rata for shorter projects).  
 
Normally up to 2.5 million Euro for up to 
five years pro-rata (can be up to 3.5 
million Euro if there is 'Co-Investigator'; 
interdisciplinary; purchase of major 
research equipment; or PI coming from 
outside Europe). 
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2.4	  Summary	  
In brief, looking at the objectives, selection practices and conditions of funding of the 
ERC, we can say that it transmits the following signals: 
• It clearly invites researchers with particular characteristics and at specific career 
stages to apply (the very best, talented etc.). 
• It explicitly invites researchers to submit research proposals that are ‘beyond 
the existing frontiers of knowledge’, unconventional and inherently highly 
risky. 
• It states its commitment to research excellence and has implemented peer-
review practices that use this as the sole criterion for selection. 
• ERC grants offer generous funding, over a relatively long period of time. 
• ERC grants are flexible in that funding is not ‘locked’ into particular pre-
determined expenditure line. 
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Chapter	  3:	  ‘Operationalising’	  the	  potentially	  affected	  aspects	  of	  the	  
science	  system	  
At the most general level, the ERC’s impact is on the science system. This, however, is 
far too general to be useful for the empirical study of this impact. Hence, in this part of 
the report, we operationalise the aspects of the science system that can be potentially 
affected, and thus were included in EURECIA, at two level of aggregation. First we 
outline seven empirical objects at different levels of aggregation that can, at least in 
principle have been affected by the establishment and operation of the ERC and its 
funding schemes. And secondly, we identify the specific change (dimensions of 
change) that can be expected. 
3.1	  The	  science	  system	  and	  its	  elements	  
Few would dispute that science is a complex and composite social phenomenon. 
Numerous studies have interrogated its different aspect and relationships depending 
on their disciplinary foundations. Thus, knowledge dynamics and change is 
traditionally the subject of the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge. 
The organisations and institutions of science and the ways in which it is organised are 
the traditional domain of the sociology of science. Similarly, science policy and its 
efficiency and effectiveness are approached by political science and science policy 
studies. These different approaches share little beyond their implicit assumption of 
‘unity of object’. 
In other words, these studies usually focus on a specific aspect or relationship and give 
it ontological and methodological priority whereby the relationships between the 
specific aspect and the rest are largely ignored. We know and understand much about 
policy, research organisations and knowledge, for instance, but very little about the 
dependencies between these. EURECIA, by focusing on the relationship between a 
policy (funding organisation) and the science system, had to work from notions and 
assumptions about science that are different from the ones used by these discrete 
accounts, whilst building on them. 
One notion that attempts to reach beyond the fragmented accounts focusing on a 
specific aspect is this of National Innovation/Research Systems (NRSs). This however, 
is very descriptive and fails to operationalise the link between policy and the content 
of knowledge (Nelson, 1993, Lundval, 1988, Boden et al., 2004). Another notion is this 
of science as a relationship between research spaces and research fields put forward by 
Nedeva (2010). This goes some way towards remedying the most obvious shortfalls of 
the NRSs but is still at fairly early stage of development to allow systematic theory 
based identification of empirical object. 
 35 
Through a combination of theoretically derived choices and ones informed by the 
objectives of the ERC, EURECIA identified seven empirical objects. These are: a) 
researchers; b) content of research; c) research careers; d) research organisations; e) 
knowledge communities and networks; f) national funding organisations and funding 
landscapes; and g) European landscape. In the next section of this report we discuss 
these changing objects in turn23. 
3.2	  Operationalising	  the	  empirical	  objects	  of	  EURECIA	  
3.2.1	  Researchers,	  content	  of	  research	  and	  research	  careers	  
Reading into the stated objectives of the ERC these relate mainly to researchers, 
research and research careers (see section 3.2.1). Given that (a) researchers are the 
direct beneficiaries of the ERC grants, (b) these grants create specific conditions for 
carrying out research, and (c) getting a grant, as well as carrying out the research, often 
affects the reputation of the grantees and their organisational position, they were 
selected as changing objects. 
In principle it is difficult to draw clear distinctions between the characteristics of 
researchers, the research they carry out and their careers. These are in complex 
interdependencies whereby researchers with particular characteristics carry out 
research with particular properties, which in turn affects some of the characteristics of 
researchers, and their career progression. However, distinguishing between these is 
useful analytically because they provide different entry points to the study of impact 
and demand somewhat different approaches and methods. 
3.2.1.1	  Characterising	  researchers	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  ERC	  
In the context of the study of ERC’s impact, characterising researchers is important in 
two ways: on the one hand, characterising the funded researchers (both as individuals 
and as a group) describes the selection and whether this selection corresponds to the 
objectives of the ERC (see section 2.1). On the other hand, this prepares the 
measurement and attribution of the impact that the ERC and its funding schemes may 
have on researchers. 
Correspondingly, the study of the ERC’s impact on researchers asks the following 
questions: 
• What are the characteristics of the researchers funded by the ERC and how 
different are these when compared to the controls? 
• What changes have occurred to the characteristics of the ERC’s grantees and 
how do these compare to the changes of non-grantees? 
                                                
23 The study of knowledge communities and networks is not included in the discussions. We developed and 
experimented with an approach different from the usual use of bibliometrics. This is based on co-nomination and 
regretfully we did not get sufficient response to be able to map the dynamics of the knowledge networks over time. 
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• What changes to the characteristics of the ERC’s grantees can be attributed to 
the ERC grant? 
Each of these demands the use of a set of key characteristics (profile) that describe a 
researcher comprehensively and is sufficiently robust to ensure the validity and 
reliability of measurement. Furthermore, this profile should allow repeat measurement 
for purposes of comparison. Looking at the literature, we failed to identify a 
framework that meets these conditions by reaching beyond the psychological24 and/or 
the discussion of obvious technical research competencies25. 
Broadly, attempts to characterise researchers fall under two groups. One of these 
focuses on ‘exceptional’ skills and competencies of academic researchers but these are 
operationalised in the context of PhD training (see Boyatziz 2008; Rowley and 
McCulloch 1999; Lee 2009) and employability debates (Boden & Nedeva, 2011). A 
second group of studies, sets out to identify the characteristics that enable researchers 
to undertake highly innovative research that can potentially become ‘pioneering’ and 
‘path-breaking’ (Braben, 2004; Heinze et al. 2007; Dowd and Kaplan 2005). This 
includes the growing literature on creativity (Heinze et al. 2007; Heinze and Bauer 
2007, Udwadia 1990). 
Overall, the literature suggests that researcher characteristics could not be addressed 
in isolation,26 as organisational and institutional factors affect the realisation of 
research outcomes with specific properties, not just individual traits alone. In other 
words, any characterisation of researchers ought to combine measures of individual’s 
approach to research and their standing in their knowledge communities and 
organisations.  
The DAS Framework 
We developed a framework (DAS) to characterise researchers along three sets of 
characteristics: ‘demographic’ characteristics to capture gender, age, relationship and 
dependents factors, and research domain; ‘approach’ characteristics to capture a 
spectrum from mainstream to more outlier markers of researchers’ risk-taking and 
novelty-seeking activities and dispositions; and ‘standing’ characteristics, to measure 
resource and prestige related status for three aspects of researcher conditions 
(organisational career, knowledge community career, and some local and national 
                                                
24 Whilst we content that psychological characteristics of people are likely to play in terms of their choice of topics 
and approach for research, as well in terms of the conditions for research they strive for and aim to create for 
themselves we are to build a sociological rather than psychological ‘profile’.  
25 Technical competencies (like research skills, core competencies etc.) are discussed in the literature but we believe 
that these are relevant at a very early stage of research career. At the time of applying for, and receiving, research 
grants from the ERC, we believe, researchers are at a level of mastery that is broadly comparable. This means that 
what distinguishes them are not technical research competencies but something else. 
26 Basalla (1988) also stresses multiple ‘factors influencing the emergence of novelty’ – not only individual 
psychological and behavioural factors (even invention following dreams and the overall ‘irrationality of the playful 
and fantastic’ of which human beings are capable) but also organisational and institutional factors such as ‘the 
rationality of the scientific, the materialism of the economic, and the diversity of the social and cultural’ (p.134). 
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characteristics of research environment). DAS consists of twenty four elements which 
can be seen in Annex 3. 
In EURECIA, the DAS framework was used to describe the groups of grantees and 
controls, and to prepare the ground for the second measurement of change and the 
retrospective causal analysis. More specifically, this model was used to: 
• Characterise the group of researchers funded by the first call of the StG scheme 
(2007) and the controls (Stage One data).  
• Identify matching pairs of grantees and controls to prepare the Stage Two 
measurement and attribution of the impact of the StG on researchers.  
• Develop four ‘approach’ and eight ‘standing’ types and use these to analyse the 
grantees and controls data. 
Possible change dimensions 
Using the DAS framework we could also identify the dimensions we can realistically 
expect to change as a result of a researcher being awarded an ERC StG and 
hypothesise the rough timeline of these changes.  
Table 3: Expected change by DAS component and timeline 
Researcher profile 
component 
Influence before receiving 
ERC StG 
Impact(s) undergone after 
receiving ERC StG 
Status 
DEMOGRAPHIC Might affect a researcher’s 
chances of receiving funding, 
their access to particular 
enabling conditions and/or 
other research 
opportunities/conditions 
Not affected by receiving 
the ERC StG (or any other 
type of funding) 
Independent 
variable 
APPROACH Might highlight researchers 
more predisposed to 
undertaking more risky, path-
breaking research (and the 
types of funding they obtain) 
Unlikely to be altered by 
receiving ERC StG. 
Receiving a certain type of 
grant may only manifest – 
to a greater or lesser extent 
– an already established 
‘approach’ 
Independent 
variable 
STANDING Might influence the changes of 
receiving certain types of 
funding 
Very likely to be affected by 
the ERC StG – given its 
amount, duration and other 
conditions 
Dependent 
variable 
 
In a nutshell, the demographic characteristics of researchers may affect their chances of 
getting a grant but are unlikely to change as a result of getting a grant. The situation is 
somewhat more complex in the case of researchers’ approach. This depends to a large 
degree on psychological and behavioural factors that can be moderated but not 
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entirely transformed27. Because the ERC explicitly invited more risky proposals we 
expect that high proportion of the grantees and controls will have non-standard 
approach. This however, doesn’t mean that their approach has changed; more likely it 
means that they finally have an opportunity to apply this approach. Hence, after 
receiving the ERC StG we may see a difference in approach but this cannot be 
interpreted as an impact of the ERC; rather the ERC is an enabling opportunity. The 
set of characteristics that we expect to be dramatically transformed as a result of 
receiving an ERC grant is ‘standing’ (see Table 3 above). 
3.2.1.2	  Content	  of	  the	  research	  conducted	  by	  ERC	  grantees	  
Ultimately, funders of research aim to support research with particular properties (e.g. 
excellent research, path-breaking research, pioneering research etc.) and can be 
expected to generate impact on the content of research conducted by grantees and on 
the content of knowledge of research fields. Supporting ‘frontier’ research in all areas 
of science, scholarship and engineering has been an explicit goal of the ERC since its 
inception (see section 2.1). Hence, studying the impact that the ERC and its funding 
schemes may have on the content of research is an important element of EURECIA.  
The key question here is: 
• What are the epistemic properties of the ERC grantees’ research and how do 
these compare to the epistemic properties of controls?  
• Could these characteristics be attributed to the ERC and its funding schemes? 
To answer these questions, and in line with our definition of impact, we ought to be 
able to characterise the research projects funded by the ERC along possible dimensions 
of change and attribute this change to the ERC (for the impact mechanisms see 
Chapter 5). 
There has been little systematic research of the impact of science policy measures on 
the content of research by the sociology of science, science policy studies, and 
evaluation research. For instance, the sociology of science, dominated for three 
decades by constructivist studies of laboratory life (Latour and Woolgar 1986 [1979]; 
Knorr-Cetina 1981; Fujimura 1987; Myers 1990), provides some empirical evidence that 
researchers adapt their knowledge construction processes to opportunities and 
constraints produced by science policy measures. However, this literature has not 
produced systematic accounts of the mechanisms of such adaptations, nor has it 
produced any account of the outcomes of adaptations beyond descriptions of 
individual cases. Hence, it doesn’t provide a basis for interrogating and explaining the 
impact of science policy measures on the content of research. 
                                                
27 Research shows, for instance, that people have preference for different kind of creativity (insight or stabilising); 
furthermore researchers moderate their creativity and dissent to meet the levels they perceive are the ones at which 
it is most likely to be rewarded etc. 
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Science policy studies approach the question of the impact of policy measures on the 
content of research by focusing on governance variable and rarely include the content 
of research. Despite this, science policy studies have found that: (1) science policy 
measures affect the content of research through the individual level, i.e. through 
decisions made by individual researchers; (2) researchers try to keep their autonomy 
by proactively influencing science policy or changing the appearance of their research 
(window-dressing); and (3) science policy measures nevertheless ‘reach through’ to the 
content of research, particularly when expectations concerning the content of research 
are linked to funding. The causal mechanism(s) through which these effects occur, 
however, have not been explored. Evaluation studies aiming to assess the impact of 
policy and funding schemes share some of the features of the science policy studies.  
According to the definition of impact used by EURECIA and the methodological 
choices discussed elsewhere in this report (see section 1.2) the study of the impact of 
the ERC and its funding schemes on the content of research demands: a) 
operationalisation of the notion ‘frontier’ research; and b) specifying the links between 
the effects on the content of research conducted by grantees and the impact on the 
knowledge of their field or field(s). 
The ERC uses the notion of ‘frontier’ research28 to refer to the properties of research 
they aim to support. Since this notion combines very different messages it is difficult to 
operationalise. This is why we don’t operationalise ‘frontier’ research but instead, 
building on the statement of riskiness, we ask about the extent to which the ERC funding 
supported well-established lines of research, enabled scientific innovations, or sustained such 
innovations at an early stage.  
Furthermore, when referring to the ‘content of research’ and the changes that can be 
traced back to the ERC funding schemes it is necessary to account for two levels of 
aggregation: the level of the individual29 and the level of the research field. Ultimately, 
research funding schemes aim to affects the content of research at aggregate level by 
funding high quality research proposals for conducting research with particular 
properties. In other words, the impact at aggregate level is inevitably achieved by 
selecting individual proposals; hence changing the properties of research globally is 
preceded by, and conditional upon, changes in the content of the research conducted 
at individual level.  
The relationship(s) between the content of research of individual researchers and the 
content of research of the field is complex and multi faceted. Thus, the content of 
                                                
28 The latest definition of frontier research on the ERC website reads: ‘The term 'frontier research reflects a new 
understanding of basic research. On one hand it denotes that basic research in science and technology is of critical 
importance to economic and social welfare, and on the other that research at and beyond the frontiers of 
understanding is an intrinsically risky venture, progressing on new and most exiting research areas and is 
characterized by an absence of disciplinary boundaries.’ 
29 It is important to note that the individual level may include, and indeed most does include, research collectives. 
When referring to the individual here we mean the researcher who is the PI of the research project. 
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research at the individual level is shaped by two contexts - the context of the scientific 
communities that shape topic selection and the use of results, and the host research 
organisations providing the operating conditions of research. What links the 
properties of individual research projects to the state of knowledge within research 
fields, or for that matter a number of research fields, are the innovativeness of the 
research and its relationship to the mainstream. 
For the purposes of this study, research innovation is defined as ‘research findings that 
affect the practices of a large number of researchers in one or more fields’. Research 
innovation can be identified in scientific fields but are more problematic in social 
science and humanities fields where the relationships between different research 
results are somewhat less direct or obvious.  Thus, for social science and humanities 
we use the notion of ‘big questions’ where such question needs to be answered on an 
exceptionally broad theoretical, methodological or empirical basis. 
Possible change dimensions 
In terms of the innovativeness of research we looked at whether:  
• The research project is planning an innovation (new method, enhanced 
empirical base or general explanation);  
• The research is planning to answer ‘big questions’ or  
• The research project planned to exploit and stabilise recent innovations. 
In terms of the relationship between the research project and the mainstream we 
looked at four different kinds of deviation:  
• Contradicting majority opinion; 
• Addressing a community’s blind spot; 
• Applying non-mainstream approach or methods to mainstream problems; and  
• Linking otherwise separate communities (bodies of knowledge). 
Furthermore, we identified five ‘local’ epistemic properties of projects that characterise 
the individual knowledge production process (Glaser at al. 2010). These are specific for 
each project and to a degree shape the conditions under which it can be successful. 
These are: 
• Complex-task specific equipment; 
• Complex task-specific approaches; 
• Long ‘Eigentime’30; 
• High strategic uncertainty (uncertainty concerning the existence of an outcome);  
• High technical uncertainty (lack of knowledge about the way in which the 
outcome will be achieved). 
                                                
30 The ‘eigentime’ of a research process is defined by properties of empirical object and research technologies. An 
example here is the growth and reproduction of biological objects. 
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3.2.1.3	  Academic	  careers	  
Individual academic careers were identified as a changing object because any research 
grant can potentially affect these by properties of the grant itself and by the research 
that is carried out using it. Furthermore, the ERC made explicit its intention to affect 
individual researchers’ careers (particularly at their early stage) through the objective 
for ‘facilitating early independence’. Thus, the main research question here is: 
“Are there any atypical developments in the careers trajectories of grantees that can be 
attributed to the ERC and their research grants?” 
At a minimum, to be able to answer this question, we ought to: a) operationalise the 
relationship between the ERC and individual careers; b) compare the career 
trajectories of ERC grantees with some measure of ‘normality’; and c) account for the 
differences between national and organisational career paths. 
There is a large body of literature on academic careers but there is little that addresses 
the relationship between research policy or funding schemes and the academic careers 
of individual researchers. Broadly speaking, the literature focuses on: a) the 
relationship between selected properties of career stages and attainment (Reskin 1979; 
Long and McGinnis 1985; McGinnis and Long 1988; and Miller et al. 2005); b) 
international and intersectional mobility (Mahroum 1999; Stephan and Levin 2001; 
Melin 2004; Laudel 2005; Solesbury & Associates 2005; Fontes 2007; Jöns 2008; 
Musselin 2004); c) the relationship between gender and careers (see the reviews from 
Zuckerman 1991; Fox 1995; and Prpić 2002); and d) traditional labour market research 
((e.g. Altbach 1996; 2000; Enders 2001). 
This literature contains very little that is useful in terms of answering our research 
question; the question how (by what mechanisms, with what effects) governance 
shapes patterns of academic careers has been neither formulated nor answered. While 
terms like ‘career pattern’ and ‘career path’ are routinely borrowed from 
organisational sociology’s career theory, the longitudinal structures of academic 
careers are rarely described, and don’t feature as dependent variables. Thus, while 
there is little doubt that science policy measures affect academic careers by both 
changing research conditions of specific career stages and paths through the career 
system, there is very little research on the mechanisms and effects of this impact. 
Furthermore, there are no comparative frameworks that account for variations in 
national and organisational career paths. 
For the purposes of this study we: 
1. Apply a notion of research/academic career that accounts for the position of the 
individual in the contexts of the development of knowledge (epistemic career), 
knowledge communities (knowledge community career) and organisations 
(organisational career). 
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2. Operationalise ‘research independence’ as a composite variable including 
researcher’s ability to raise resources for research, level of independence to 
decide his/her long term research agenda and personal funding situation. 
3. Measure the difference in individual career positions (as part of the DAS model) 
by using comparison over time and with a control group. 
4. Distinguish between a) structural change relating to national career systems 
(e.g. speeding up; extending career phases; moving across labour markets; and 
compensation for nationally specific barriers to career advancement) and b) 
providing opportunities that are not usually available at the grantees career 
stage. 
Possible change dimensions 
Changes in academic careers can be expected to the extent to which the ERC funding 
schemes change the structure of national career patterns by providing alternative sub-
paths in career patterns or provide researchers with opportunities that are unusual for 
the stage of their organisational career in their country.  
(a) The structural change of national career systems may include one or more of the 
following: 
• Shortcuts/speeding up: The ERC schemes may enable an earlier transition into 
more advanced career stages by increasing the visibility of grantees and/or by 
enabling a scientific production that provides earlier access to higher 
organisational positions. 
• Extension: The ERC schemes may extend career phases that are usually much 
shorter in a national career system, e.g. by providing an extended ‘research 
only’ phase before academic standard employment is entered. 
• Transition: The ERC funding schemes may provide additional options for 
moves between labour markets, e.g. by increasing visibility and/or production 
in a way that career move into industrial research or other mobility are enabled.  
• Compensation: The ERC funding schemes may help women or minorities to 
overcome nationally specific barriers to their career advancement. 
The extent of structural changes in national career patterns depends on the existence of 
functional equivalents in a national career system. If a national career system already 
includes positions that provide the structural opportunities listed above, the ERC 
funding schemes will produce a gradual rather than qualitative difference. If 
functional equivalents don’t exist, the change produced by the ERC is likely to be 
highest.31  
                                                
31 It is important to note at this point that there are so few grantees that the current change of national career 
patterns is unlikely to be significant anyway. This may change in the future. 
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(b) The provision of researchers with specific opportunities that are not usually accessible at 
a grantee’s career stage includes the provision of  
• Early independence; and 
• Exceptionally generous resources for an exceptionally long period of time.  
While these opportunities can be identified now, their impact on knowledge 
production cannot be measured yet. 
3.2.2	  Research	  organisations	  
Research organisations were included in EURECIA as a changing object because 
impact on universities and research institutes is an explicit part of ERC’s overall 
mission (see section 2.1). Furthermore, research organisations provide the 
organisational conditions for researchers to perform and thus are highly likely to 
change as a result of powerful signals by funding schemes. 
The question here is: 
“What are the effects on universities and research institutes in terms of their 
performance/reputation, strategic capabilities and ability to attract talent that can be 
attributed to the ERC and its funding schemes?” 
To answer this question, it is necessary to: a) operationalise the relationship between 
the ERC and research organisations accounting for a range of intervening factors; b) 
operationalise organisational performance/ reputation, strategic capabilities and 
ability to attract talent into empirical indicators; and c) distinguish between the 
different changes that the ERC may precipitate in research organisations from different 
‘positioning’ groups. 
In the literature, change of universities has been discussed extensively and 
predominantly in the context of: a) the entrepreneurial university (Clark 1998 and 
2001; Etzkowitz 1994, 1998 and 2002; Jakob et al., 2002; Marginson and Considine 2000; 
Yokoyama 2006; Nedeva and Boden 2006); b) the rise of the ‘third mission’ and its 
transforming potential (Floud 2003; Molas-Gallart et al. 2002; Jones 2002; Thorn and 
Soo 2006; Martin and Etzkowitz 2000; Nedeva 2007; Laredo 2007); c) university 
governance (Shattock 2003; Fuller 2007); and d) the strategic actor-hood of universities 
(Whitley, 2008). Whilst the relationship between ‘the state’ and science generally has 
been interrogated (Shore and Wright 2000; Nedeva and Boden, 2006; Whitley and 
Glaser 2007; Bence and Oppenheim 2004; Henkel 1998; and Cooper and Otley 1998) 
there are no empirical accounts that measure and attribute the impact of a specific 
policy or funding scheme. There is recognition, however, that the strategic actor-hood 
of universities, or in other words their capacity to change, is shaped by the regulatory 
and political frameworks of national science systems (Paradeise et al., 2009a; 
Jongbloed, 2009; Geuna/Martin, 2003; Bleiklie/Kogan, 2007; OEU, 2006, Whitley 2008). 
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Any changes that can be expected to occur in research organisations are mediated by a 
set of characteristics at two levels of aggregation: this of the national funding 
landscape and of the organisation itself. These create a level of complexity and variety 
that requires the use of typologies. However, our extensive search of the relevant 
literature failed to identify empirically and analytically useful typologies of research 
organisations.  
Thus, this study identified three intervening frameworks that outline the positioning 
of research organisations. These are: a) the level of organisational autonomy or degree 
of self-determined steering of and within the organisation; b) the level and allocation 
mechanisms of funding to and within the organisation; and c) human resource policy 
related to whether the organisation has discretion over recruitment procedures and 
retention strategies and how are these organised. These were used to develop a basic 
typology of research organisations. 
Basic typology of research organisations 
This basic typology was developed following an analysis of the landscape of research 
organisations across Europe. The typology was built around the dimensions of 
organisations that we assumed to influence the impact of the ERC most and serves to 
simplify the analysis given the heterogeneity of organisations by allowing for 
organisations. 
A typical, stylised organisation in the top basket is well endowed and can draw on 
considerable funds available to perform research.32 Furthermore, top organisations are 
characterised by a high level of organisational autonomy. This allows those 
organisations to actively respond and act to changing environments. Finally, these 
organisations have established recruitment and human resources development 
strategy, that has already resulted into hiring of a larger pool of top people, by offering 
favourable, highly competitive employment conditions (including salary levels) as 
well as incentive oriented human resources development activities. Overall, 
organisations in this group regard themselves – and are regarded by others – as 
delivering excellent research. It is not necessary for these characteristics to be found at 
organisational level for a research organisation to be considered “top”; these may be 
found at lower levels of the organisation. 
A typical, stylised in-between organisation is characterised by a sufficient overall 
endowment for research but is constantly under pressure to raise more funds. It shows 
some capability to realise and act upon emerging opportunities to improve its own 
status, but its capability as a strategic actor is limited (for historical institutional 
and/or legal reasons). While those organisations may not yet have a clear recruitment 
                                                
32 In this first approach we did not – for our basket definitions – distinguish the different financing models, i.e. we 
did not systematically distinguish between organisations that rely on grants and those that can heavily or 
exclusively draw on institutional funding. In the actual analysis, however, we did find differences and report on 
them.  
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or human resources development policy, at the level of operating units recruitment is 
often professional and strives to fulfil the highest standards. Furthermore within these 
organisations we find acknowledged fields of excellence (with sometimes highly 
autonomous and strategic units), but often these are limited to specific areas. In sum, 
these organisations both have a basis for research excellence and for strategic actor 
capability to react to the external “shock” of a new, high level and highly demanding 
ERC funding scheme. 
A typical, stylised weak organisation is characterised by a low level of research funding 
available; this funding may also be earmarked for activities and cost categories 
different from research. Normally, these organisations have low levels of 
organisational autonomy and strategic leadership; this is further translated into very 
low capability to adequately handle human resource policies on the level of the 
organisation. However, this lack of overall strategic capability to act as an organisation 
does not necessarily imply that weak organisations are not able to perform high 
quality research in certain areas or ‘pockets of excellence’. Also weak organisations do 
host top people that do perform competitive research. However, these remain 
individual pockets of excellence do not put an excellence mark on the organisation as a 
whole.  
Possible change dimensions 
The following groups of possible change were identified: 
• Improving (perceived and expected33) performance relates to quality and quantity of 
research output (impact, level of journals, setting new research agendas etc.), to 
increased visibility of the university or individual units, to extraordinary 
growth of research groups, and to the increased capability in raising further 
research income (high level grants);  
• Enhancing strategic capability involves the development and implementation of 
strategies to succeed in a global competition for talent, resources and reputation. 
This includes attempts to raise the profile and coherence of organisations and to 
increase regional and global recognition, as well as strengthening or building 
up of organisational capabilities to define goals and develop structures and 
processes to achieve them;  
• Supporting and attracting talent means to support better outstanding researchers 
and to increase the capability to successfully incorporate these talents into the 
university’s research environment. This also translates – more broadly – into the 
creation of the conditions and support mechanisms within organisations that 
best suit (current or future) grantees in their drive to set up and implement 
challenging frontier research projects which might need new levels of 
                                                
33 The performance of organisations in terms of research output cannot yet be determined; a proxy here will be the 
perception and expectation of performance and its justification in interviews.  
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autonomy and co-operations to allow for different kinds of research. This 
furthermore includes (intended or sometimes unintended) effects on staff 
retention, i.e. staying attractive for both grantees and other, already existing 
staff not directly profiting from an ERC grant. 
3.2.3	  National	  research	  funders	  and	  funding	  spaces	  
Whilst this is not an explicit aim of the ERC, its establishment could have discernible 
impact on national funders of research and funding landscapes. This is because the 
establishment of the ERC signals the emergence of a European research space 
comparable to, as well as, overlapping and competing with national spaces (Nedeva & 
Stampfer, 2012). In turn, this is likely to precipitate re(adjustment) of organisational 
objectives and modes of operation. 
The question here is: 
“What change of national research funding organisations and spaces can be attributed 
to the establishment of the ERC?” 
Answering this question is not straight forward because of variety and mediation. 
National research funders vary according to their position in the national space (state 
led or agency led), their remit, their organisational characteristics (overall goals, 
structure, practices and funding tools) and the stage of their institutionalisation. These 
different organisations are likely to respond to the signals of the ERC in different ways 
(change in different ways and at different rates). Furthermore, the response is 
mediated by a range of factors including characteristics of national funding landscape, 
organisational characteristics and self-perception of strengths and weaknesses. 
For the purposes of this study, at the level of organisations the focus was on national 
research councils and functionally equivalent bodies. Whilst this reduced the variety 
somewhat it still remained considerable. Further reduction of variety is possible by 
using typologies and comparative frameworks for national funding spaces and 
funding organisations. Our search of the literature failed to identify such typologies 
and frameworks. 
Previous research of research funding organisations focuses on the study of research 
councils. These studies largely use ‘principle-agent’ theory and discuss the research 
councils as intermediaries mediating the relationship between the state and science 
(Braun 1993; van der Meulen and Rip 1998; Caswill, 1998; Guston, 2003; Caswill, 2004; 
van der Meulen 2003, Gulbrandsen, 2005 ). This approach, whilst productive, doesn’t 
account for the relationships of the research councils with other intermediaries form 
the same funding landscape or across landscapes.  
Hence, building on assumptions drawing on the notion of research systems and spaces 
(here references) and organisation studies (references here) we outlined four levels at 
which change may occur as a result of the establishment of the ERC. 
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Possible changing dimensions 
• At systemic level, or the level of national funding space, the ERC can provide a 
model for structural change in countries which do not have a system of research 
councils. For instance, in countries where the funding landscape is state-led 
(Braun 2011) and funding is allocated by Ministries as (predominantly) block 
grants, such as Italy, Spain and Poland, it may precipitate the establishment of 
research councils and change of the overall funding principles. 
• Changing the organisational mission and structure of a national research funder to 
emulate the organizational structure of the ERC is a second level of influence, 
less fundamental than the adoption of the funding council system per se. 
• Change may occur at the level of funding instruments. This would normally 
involve the abandonment of some instruments, changing the operating 
principles of existing one and/or starting entirely new funding instruments to 
mirror the ones used by the ERC. 
• Change may also happen at the level of procedures and practices of the research 
funding organisation. This includes proposal structure and submission, peer 
review practices and procedures, and procedures for reporting and 
accountability. 
3.2.4	  European	  research	  funding	  landscape	  
Last but not least, the establishment of the ERC is highly likely to precipitate important 
change of the European funding landscape. Indeed, it has been argued that the ERC is 
a dramatically different funding organisation at European level which marks the 
beginning of a move from a policy period of ‘science in Europe’ to ‘European science’ 
(Nedeva & Stampfer, forthcoming) and that it is the core element of an emerging 
European research funding space of a different kind. 
Thus, the broad research question here is: 
“What changes of the European funding landscape can be attributed to the 
establishment and functioning of the ERC.” 
This question was approach by developing a framework along three analytical 
dimensions that capture the levels at which change can be expected to occur (for more 
information on the framework please refer to the EURECIA WP7 report).  
Possible change dimensions 
• The research policy level that refers to the arenas in which the principles of public 
funding for research are negotiated. The essential aspects for this analysis 
consist of changed concepts, changed policy models, and changed research 
funding principles which are the outcome of this process. 
• Organisational level refers to the consideration of the new body as a funding 
organisation in a context which has other, similar or nearly similar, funding 
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organisations, or other relevant associations and organisations active in the field 
(‘organisational field’). The new body has to take into account and define itself 
with regard to the existing organisations; these may also adjust to the 
newcomer by modifying their objectives, instruments or processes. 
3.3	  EURECIA	  potentially	  affected	  empirical	  objects	  and	  changing	  dimensions	  
at	  a	  glance	  
The table below (Table 4) offers an overview of the potentially affected empirical 
objects studied by EURECIA and their changing dimensions. They structure the 
account of empirical finding from the Stage One study discussed in the part of this 
report. 
Table 4: Empirical objects, change dimensions and findings 
Empirical object Change dimensions Kind of findings 
Researchers Approach to research (cognitive mobility, 
perceived novelty and risk of research etc.; 
highlighting existing characteristics) 
Standing (organisational position and 
conditions, research resources, research 
independence, productivity etc.)  
Characterisation of the StG 
cohort 2007 and controls 
(Stage One data); 
Identification of ‘matching’ 
pairs of grantees and controls 
for Stage Two study; 
Analysis of grantees and 
controls by ‘approach’ and 
‘standing types; 
Content of individuals’ 
research 
Innovativeness of research; 
Relationship to the mainstream  
‘Local’ epistemic properties of the research 
process 
Characterisation of grantees’ 
and controls’ research 
projects in terms of the 
change dimensions (Stage 
One data) 
Academic careers Shortcuts/speeding up of career; 
Extension of career phases; 
Transition between labour markets; 
Compensation for ‘disadvantaged’ groups; 
Early reported effects; 
Measure of career positions of 
grantees and controls (Stage 
One data); 
Opportunities for these 
changes to occur and whether 
these have been taken up. 
Research organisations Change in perceived performance of 
quality and quantity of research; 
Change in strategic capabilities to compete 
globally for talent, resources and 
reputation; 
Changing structures to attract and support 
research talent; 
These by type of research 
organisation. 
National funders and 
funding spaces 
Systemic changes 
Changes of organisational mission and 
structure 
Change of funding instruments 
Change of procedure and/or practice 
Impact 
European research 
funding landscapes 
Change of research policy 
Change of organisations and schemes 
Impact 
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Chapter	  4:	  EURECIA	  Empirical	  Approach	  
4.1	  Research	  methods	  and	  instruments	  
Because of the variety of research objects EURECIA used a combination of research 
methods including qualitative and quantitative one. Thus, the following research 
methods to study the impact of the ERC on researchers, the content of their research 
and careers, research organisations, and national, and European level funding spaces 
and organisations: 
• A descriptive survey of ERC first cohort StG grantees and controls was used to 
measure the impact on researcher; this survey also provided other descriptive 
data to feed into the analysis of other changing objects. 
• Comparative case studies were used to study the impact of the ERC on the 
content of individual’s research and careers; 
• Case studies of universities and research institutes were used to study the 
impact of the ERC on research organisations; 
• Case studies of national research councils (and comparable) were used to study 
the impact of the ERC on national funding bodies and landscapes; and 
• Semi-structured interviews and analysis of policy documents were used to 
capture the effects of the ERC on the European funding landscape. 
All studies, bar the descriptive survey, also used documentary analysis. In addition, 
the comparative case studies of researchers, research and careers used individual 
based bibliometrics. For more detail on the methods used by EURECIA please refer to 
the separate reports work packages reports (www.eurecia-erc.net). 
Correspondingly, the following research instruments were developed by EURECIA: 
• Survey questionnaire for ERC grantees and for controls; 
• Interview frame for the study of researchers, research and careers; 
• Interview frame for the study of research organisations; 
• Interview frame for the study of national funding bodies; and 
• Interview frame for the study of the European funding landscape. 
All instruments can be found in Annex 4 of this report. 
4.2	  Selection	  and	  sampling	  
4.2.1	  Country	  selection	  
The selection of instances for each of the study objects was shaped by both general and 
object-specific considerations. The most general decision, which affected all empirical 
investigations, except the studies the ERC’s impact on researchers and the European 
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research landscape, was the selection of countries to be studied. EURECIA followed a 
suggestion by Dietmar Braun and based country selection on a taxonomy derived by 
comparing application and success rates of the first cohort of starting and advanced 
grantees. The properties of countries that produce applications and success were likely 
to be most pronounced in cases showing consistent patterns for starting and advanced 
grantees. Table 5 shows the countries with such consistent patterns (Braun, 2010): 
Table 5: Clustering of countries according to levels of ERC applications and success 
(first cohort of StG and AdG data) 
Success in ERC calls  
High Low 
High Netherlands, Switzerland Italy, Greece 
Application 
Low France, Finland, UK, Germany 
Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal 
 
From these countries, EURECIA aimed to cover fully: 
• UK; 
• France; 
• Italy; 
• Switzerland; 
• Netherlands;  
• Poland; and 
• Norway.  
Germany was included only in the qualitative study of researchers, research and 
careers, the survey and the study of national funding spaces and bodies. Austria was 
covered fully using additional resources. In contrast, Italy was covered by the 
study(ies) of researchers, research and careers but had to be dropped from the study of 
national funders and funding landscapes.  
This uneven coverage of countries is explained by predominantly practical 
considerations. Thus, Poland and Norway had none or just one grantee from the first 
calls of the ERC, which made them unsuitable for the interview-based study of 
research and careers. On the other hand, interviews from a parallel project on 
academic careers in Germany provided additional information from a control group, 
which made it advantageous to include Germany in the study. Because of personnel 
changes in Italian ministries our repeated attempts to identify and recruit interviewees 
for the study of national funders and landscapes failed. However, none of these 
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alterations affected the major intention of EURECIA to cover countries from all four 
cells of Table 1.  
4.2.2	  Selection	  and	  sampling	  of	  cases	  
Having selected the countries to be included in EURECIA, a second level selection and 
sampling was used; this selection largely followed the logic specific to the changing 
objects. Thus: 
• Because of the timing of EURECIA and our general approach, the first cohort of 
StG grantees constituted the population for the descriptive survey. A control 
group consisting of applicants who passed the quality threshold and were 
shortlisted for funding but didn’t receive any was also included in the study. 
This was selected so that the difference between grantees and controls are 
minimised to ensure that comparison following the second stage measurement 
reflects differences generated by the ERC grant and mediating variables. 
• The selection of cases (interviewees) for the study of researchers, research and 
careers was guided by three considerations: a) inclusion of grantees and 
controls; b) selection by kind of ERC grant (StG and AdG); and c) selection by 
research field (ERC domain). 
• Research organisations were selected along five dimensions, namely: a) 
number of ERC grantees in the organisation; b) type of organisation; c) level of 
specialisation; d) size; and e) international standing. 
• The selection of national research funding organisations largely followed the 
selection of countries; furthermore, this study focused on research councils (and 
equivalent). 
• The study of the European funding landscape included a variety of funding and 
policy organisations at the European level. 
4.3	  Impact	  timing	  and	  dynamics	  
It is worth noting that the different changing objects are experiencing the effects of the 
ERC and its funding schemes at different time. This is summarised in Figure 2. 
Thus, the ERC changed the European research landscape even prior to its existence, 
namely during the discussions about its institutionalisations. In such a strategic 
discussion, the actors involved inevitably reassessed the European research landscape 
and their own position in it. Naturally, the impact of the ERC increased after it was 
actually there. Its future impact depends on the success of its grantees, feedbacks from 
scientific communities and national science policy actors, and the future dynamics of 
interactions at the European level. One can assume an increasing impact of the ERC 
but it is equally possible that a new stable equilibrium between European-level actors 
will be achieved and the impact of the ERC will fade into the background of these 
relationships. 
 52 
The national funding councils were involved in the discussion about the creation of 
the ERC and thus can be expected to have changed since this discussion. More 
significant effects of the ERC on national funding councils can be expected from the 
publication of the funding schemes, and subsequently from the success of researchers 
from the respective countries. As is the case with the European research landscape, the 
impact of the ERC may either remain or grow stronger with an increasing number of 
grantees and the resulting various feedback loops, or may fade into the background of 
newly adjusted funding council policies. 
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Figure 2: Assumptions about the dynamics of effects and position of the EURECIA 
(Stage One) empirical investigation relative to that dynamics 
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The international scientific communities can be assumed to be affected by the 
involvement of their elites in the funding practices of the ERC in the newly created 
roles of ERC review panel members and ERC external assessors. The ERC is likely to 
trigger reconsiderations of research priorities in scientific communities and discussions 
among the elites about directions in research that their communities should take. After 
research funding begun, scientific communities are also likely to be affected by the 
grantees themselves, i.e. by the results of ERC-funded research (if the ERC makes a 
difference for the kind of research being conducted in Europe) and by the reputational 
gains of grantees. 
Research organisations (universities and publicly funded research institutes) might 
have noticed the emergence of a new funding agency early, i.e. prior to the 
establishment of the ERC. They are likely to become increasingly aware of the ERC’s 
existence to the extent to which they become confronted with their researchers’ 
successes and failures in receiving ERC grants, and to the extent to which they are 
affected by the mobility enabled by ERC grants.  
Researchers are likely to be affected from the moment the actual funding opportunity 
occurs. The opportunity to apply for and receive ERC grants is likely to trigger 
reconsiderations of research strategies and career plans. A researcher’s reputation will 
be affected by a successful application, and is likely to grow from then on due to being 
an ERC grantee and due to the research results produced with the grant. Careers may 
be affected by the fact that the grant is received, and may benefit further from the 
grantee’s increased reputation. The content of research might already change in the 
application process but is likely to change significantly only if the application was 
successful.  
This presented a range of opportunities and limitations for EURECIA. In practical 
terms, however, this means that EURECIA generated three kinds of findings: 
1) Findings about impact that has occurred; 
2) Findings about early reported effects; and 
3) Level one measurement of the initial state of the object. 
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Chapter	  5:	  The	  issue	  of	  attribution:	  impact	  mechanisms	  
In line with EURECIA’s objective and definition of impact, attributing the change that 
occurs (may occur) in terms of researchers, careers and content of research, research 
organisations and research funding landscapes and bodies is important. This was 
approached by experimenting with identifying, describing and exploring empirically 
the mechanisms that generate change; here we refer to these as ‘impact mechanisms’. 
Despite some similarity, rather different impact mechanisms are at work in relations to 
the changes at micro level and these at the level of organisations.  
These impact mechanisms link particular properties of the ERC and its funding 
schemes, the social conditions created by these, and specific changes that have 
occurred or may occur. Impact can be generated directly or indirectly and it depends 
on the kind of signals and their relative strength. 
5.1	  Direct	  and	  indirect	  impact	  
In the context of identifying and describing the mechanisms by which the ERC and its 
funding schemes generate impact on the elements of the science system it is important 
to distinguish between direct and indirect impact. Direct impact is the change that can be 
immediately attributed to a policy measure because actors respond mainly to that very 
measure. Indirect impact refers to change that occurs indirectly, mostly because actors 
adjust to other actors’ response to a policy measure (e.g. researchers adjusting to their 
organisations’ responses to the ERC). Visually, direct impact can be presented as a star-
like network with the ERC as the centre of the star, while indirect impact is a more 
distributed network where changing objects are linked by a variety of exchanges 
(Figure 3)34. Identifying and attributing indirect impact is notoriously difficult because 
the signal triggering a response is delayed, modified by the actors involved, and 
overlaid by a potentially large number of other signals.  
                                                
34 Please note that for reasons of tidiness and simplification this diagram is slightly misleading. Even the direct 
impact is mediated although the level of complexity of this mediation is different depending on the empirical 
object; organisations and funding landscapes, for instance are highly mediated. 
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Figure 3: Direct and indirect impacts of the ERC on the objects studied by EURECIA 
 
While such indirect impact certainly exists, this can be expected to be both delayed 
and weaker than the direct impact. Since it is highly unlikely that the indirect impact 
will ‘overwhelm’ the direct impact of the ERC the methodology developed and applied 
by EURECIA focuses systematically on direct impact. It is, however, open to the 
observation of indirect impacts. 
5.2	  Kinds	  of	  signals	  
It is also methodologically useful to distinguish between three different kinds of 
signals through which the ERC could generate impact, namely material, symbolic and 
normative. 
First, the ERC could generate impact by its funding channelled through its funding 
schemes. This impact is generated by sending signals about the conditions for research 
that these grants offer and by mobilising these conditions. In this context, the change is 
linked to the conditions that the grant offers; however, impact can be achieved by 
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applying for a grant, being awarded a grant or even aspiring for grant awards. This 
type of signal we refer to as ‘material’. 
Next, the ERC can generate impact by the fact of its existence and reputation; in other 
words, the ERC can generate impact because it has become a symbol embodying 
properties coveted by and important for the actors. More specifically, the ERC may 
generate impact because it has come to be regarded by the actors as a marker for 
‘excellence’ and ‘fairness’. In this context, it is important to explore issues of legitimacy 
and reputation. This type of signal we refer to as ‘symbolic’. 
Last but not least, the ERC can send normative signals by changing the rules and 
practices of research funding. In this case, impact can occur either directly or by other 
funding agencies using the ERC and its practices as a model. 
The relative weight of each of these kinds of signals is different for different groups of 
empirical objects. Thus, at the micro level - in the case of researchers, research content 
and careers – the material and symbolic signals are likely to be very important; at the 
level of organisations the symbolic and normative signals are likely to be more 
effective than the material ones. 
5.3	  Strength	  and	  distinctiveness	  of	  signal	  
Whether and to what extent the ERC generates impact depends on the strength and 
clarity of the signals it emits.  
Research policy and funding spaces are very ‘noisy’; in other words there is a chorus 
of signals; some of these discordant, others partially or even entirely overlapping. This 
is why, studies of impact working from a definition emphasising attribution ought to 
establish, and make a clear statement of, the strength and distinctiveness of the signals the 
changing agent sends.  
Generally, attributing impact fully is not possible – in other words, the changes 
occurring in the science system are, as a rule, the aggregate effect of a fairly large 
number of policy interventions. This is probably one of the reasons why impact 
assessment methodologies generally work from the objectives of the scheme and resort 
to entirely opinion based methodologies. Complete attribution is also problematic 
because of distance and mediating of effects.  
However, attribution is possible given that the signal is clearly different from other 
signals and it is sufficiently strong. In other words, attribution is possible if the policy 
or funding scheme provides unique opportunities and conditions, has exceptionally 
high reputation and legitimacy and/or uses rules and practices substantively different 
from any other ones that are in use. 
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How different and unique are the signals that the ERC emits is an important question 
and it was explored by EURECIA in the context of the different changing objects. Our 
finding about this are set out in Chapter 12 of this report. 
5.4	  Impact	  mechanisms	  
The specific impact mechanisms that can be identified at the level of researchers, 
content of research and careers, and the level of organisations and funding landscapes 
are somewhat different. At the former, the ERC generates impact mainly through its 
selection and the conditions of its funding schemes; at the latter impact is generated 
through the objectives of the ERC, its reputation and the perceived trustworthiness of 
its organisational practices (mainly practices for selection). In the case of research 
organisations this impact is also mediated by whether the organisation has grantees or 
not. 
5.4.1	  Impact	  mechanisms:	  researchers,	  content	  of	  research	  and	  careers	  
The ERC can change the ‘approach’ and ‘standing’ of researchers in two principle 
ways: 1) material, through the properties of the research grant and the conditions for 
research and career change this affords; and 2) symbolic, through the reputation of the 
ERC as a research funder and the reputation of the ERC’s research grants35. Impact 
through the properties of the grant should be found only amongst grantees; impact 
through the reputation of the ERC and its grants could be found amongst both 
successful and not-successful applicants. 
More specifically, this means that ERC impact on researchers can be traced back to the 
ERC if: 
• ERC grant application was made; and  
• ERC grant was awarded; and  
• The opportunities this grant offers can be linked to change in ‘approach’ and 
‘standing’  
then we can say that the change was caused by the ERC grant. If the opportunities that 
this grant affords are also unique and are not offered by any other funding scheme, it 
is possible to say that the change was generated (caused) only by the ERC grant. 
Or 
• ERC grant application was made; and 
• The ERC and its grants have exceptionally high reputation and there is 
confidence in the selection practices; and 
                                                
35 This is also known as the ‘halo’ effect. 
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• This reputation and confidence can be linked to changes of ‘approach’ and 
‘standing’. 
then we can say that the changes were caused by the perception of ERC’s reputation 
(symbolic value). 
Whether and the extent to which impact will be observed also depends on the 
characteristics grantees. In other words, a researcher who already has very high 
‘standing’ is likely to be affected less than a researcher with lower ‘standing’ and great 
potential. 
Impact on research content/career can be expected if a change emerges because  
• An ERC application was written and a project was funded by the ERC; and 
• The application or the funding of the project led to decisions by the grantee 
which resulted in the observed change;  
then we can say the ERC funding was a sufficient condition for the change to occur. If 
furthermore 
• No alternative funding schemes exist that could have produced a similar 
change,  
then we can say that the change can be produced only by the ERC funding scheme. 
5.4.2	  Impact	  mechanisms:	  research	  organisations,	  funding	  organisations	  and	  
spaces	  
Specific changes within research organisations can be attributed to the ERC if 
• The ERC and its funding schemes are considered to be relevant and thus 
attracting grantees or enabling existing staff to win grant is highly desirable; 
and 
• The ERC is considered to have high reputation and be a symbol of research 
excellence. 
Furthermore, the impact is moderated through whether or not the research 
organisation hosts any grantee. Thus: 
• Hosting grantees can make a difference because of ERC’s material, symbolic 
and normative value; the change may be strategic and supportive. This means 
that universities and PROs may react at strategic level or at the level of the 
operational units (that define the context for the grantee) in order to create the 
environment that is most favourable for the grantee to be successful. 
• Organisations not hosting grantees can be affected through the symbolic (i.e. the 
high prestige and reputation coming with the instrument as such) and normative 
value (through its widely accepted contribution to the definition of excellent 
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research and the role and autonomy of young researchers within organisations) 
of the ERC. This can lead to changes of the organisation’s incentive structures 
and the support these offer for ERC bids. 
Identifying impact mechanisms is most tricky in the case of the European funding 
space and the national funding space, and landscapes. Although some differences can 
already be identified these cannot be linked functionally to the ERC for two reasons. 
One, because it is possible to identify a different social force – policy ideas and 
rationales as embodied in the notion of the ERA – that are likely to be causing both the 
establishment of the ERC and the changes in these empirical objects. And two, changes 
in these contexts are mediated by multiplicity of factors that often reach beyond the 
science systems as such (general politics, for instance, or the state of the economy).  
We believe that in these cases it is much more appropriate to think of co-evolution and 
mutual adjustment than ‘impact’ in the sense of our strict definition incorporating 
attribution. 
5.5	  Impact	  mechanisms:	  key	  questions	  
Unpacking the impact mechanisms in play where the impact of the ERC and its 
funding schemes are concerned, implies answering the following questions: 
• Are the signals sent by the ERC strong and distinctive? 
• How are these signals perceived by different constituencies? 
• What are the opportunities that the ERC and its funding schemes provide and 
how do these match the properties and needs of the empirical objects? 
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Chapter	  6:	  Characterising	  researchers,	  content	  of	  research	  and	  careers	  
6.1	  Characterising	  ERC	  grantees	  and	  controls	  
Characterising the ERC grantees and controls has twofold importance for the study of 
impact: on the one hand, it describes the selection of grantees, and on the other it is the 
Stage One, comparative measurement. In this section of the report we turn our 
attention to the question ‘what are the characteristics of the researchers funded by the 
ERC and how do these compare with the controls’. This is answered through the 
analysis of the data collected using a survey with the first cohort of ERC StG grantees 
and controls using the DAS framework developed specifically for this study. 
Here, the following kinds of findings are presented: a) characterisation of the survey 
population using the DAS framework; b) identifying matching pairs for stage two 
study; c) analysis by ‘approach’ and ‘standing’ types; and d) early reported impact of 
the ERC grants. 
6.1.1	  Survey	  response	  rates	  
Our online survey focused on the first cohort of StG grantees (2007) and controls; thus 
276 grantees (all grantees excluding the once approached by other CSA projects) and 
105 controls were included. The overall response rate to the survey was 48 percent, 
with 184 usable responses. The ‘grantee’ group response rate was 50 percent (138 
usable responses from an original sample of 276); the ‘control’ response rate was 
slightly lower at 44 percent (46 usable responses from 105). The overall response is 
illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
Tests were run to ensure that our response offers a fair representation of the variety of 
the population by ERC domain (LS, PE or SH); distribution of responses by specific 
ERC peer review panel (e.g. PE4); distribution of responses by country of residence; 
nationality; gender; and age.36 These indicated that the response is a reasonable 
representation of the distribution of variety present in the population. Please note, that 
generalising from our response set is problematic since we studied only the first cohort 
of the ERC grantees and controls. 
 
                                                
36 The latter two could only be checked for grantees. Control group data on for these aspects was not provided by 
the ERC. 
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Figure 4: Summary of survey response – response rates; gender, ERC domain and age 
coverage 
 
	  
6.1.2	  Characterising	  ERC	  grantees	  and	  controls	  	  
6.1.2.1	  Overall	  description	  of	  population	  (grantees	  and	  controls)37	  
The survey results indicated that the respondents were a reasonably homogenous set 
of very highly qualified, highly productive, largely ‘tenured’, and formerly highly 
geographically and intellectual mobile people – who appear now to be quite settled 
(married with dependents, and had moved little since their ERC StG application).  
Overall the respondents set a very high benchmark for an ‘early career’ cohort; this 
2007 call ‘first cohort’ may be exceptional for a variety of reasons (e.g. selection bias 
during the first round of a new funding scheme). The ERC has also since changed its 
StG approach to differentiate between ‘starters’ (2–6 years post-PhD) and 
‘consolidators’ (6+ years) to ensure there is scope for more ‘early career’ characteristics.  
                                                
37 Please note, that all results presented here apply only to the two groups that responded to this survey and, at this 
stage, cannot be extrapolated to the broader populations of researchers. 
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Box 1 below shows an illustrative summary of finding highlights about the overall 
respondent set: 
MOBILITY 
Geographic mobility (2+ countries)   = ~90% respondents 
Geographic mobility (3+ countries)   = ~55% 
Geographic mobility (only in EU)  = ~40% 
Workplace mobility (median)   = 4 workplaces 
Significant intellectual field changes (2+) = ~50% 
Post-StG intra-organisation move  = 8%   (Grantees=9%, Controls=3%) 
   (within same workplace) 
Post-StG inter-organisation move  = 12%  (Grantees=11%, Controls=16%) 
    (within same country) 
Post-StG international move   = 6%  (Grantees=3%, Controls=6%) 
   (to a different country) 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS & OTHER CONDITIONS 
Age (average)    = late-30s 
Married (or equivalent)   = ~90% 
1+ dependents    = >70% 
Permanent contract    = 76% 
At highest career level or 1 step away = 55%  (Grantees=58%, Controls=47%) 
Principal investigator on most important = 88%  (Grantees=85%, Controls=97%) 
   recent research project 
Based at a university    = ~70% 
At a research institute   = ~25% 
Main research funder   = National ministry 
Research conditions    = Good or excellent 
Research time (median)   = ~60%  (Grantees=63.5%, Controls=60%) 
Team size     = 2–5 people  
Research collaborators   = 8–10 (external, global) 
Most recent project duration   = 4 years 
Most recent project budget   = 400,000 Euros 
Most important output type   = Multi-authored articles 
Submitted article acceptance rates  = 70–80% 
Box 1. Descriptive finding highlights (grantee and control respondents overall, 
undifferentiated) 
 
This survey was conducted in late-2010/early-2011 – i.e. three years after the 
respondents’ StG applications in 2007. It may have registered StG-related impacts 
already, e.g. promotions, improvement of employment contract length conditions, 
indicative of mid-career stages. Whilst this may distort somewhat our impression of 
the respondent set, our grantee/control matched-pairing approach controls for any 
such distortion, by only matching grantees and controls observed to be similar at the 
actual time of measurement.  
Our methodology included the selection of a control group that consists of researchers 
as similar as possible to the grantees; this is to ensure that differences of researcher 
profiles registered by a later measurement are accounted for only by the different 
conditions following the ERC grant. Our analysis shows that at the initial stage the 
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groups of grantees and controls are very similar and the only statistically significant 
different between these is their reported perception of the reputation of their 
workplaces. This shouldn’t present methodological issues since the slightly better 
perception of grantees of their workplace may be already an indication of a positive 
bias following the award of the ERC grant. 
6.1.2.2	  Characterisation	  of	  researchers	  using	  the	  DAS	  framework	  
To characterise the grantee and control group included in the survey we used a novel 
approach developed specifically for EURECIA to which we refer as DAS framework. 
This framework consists of three components, namely demographic characteristics, 
characteristics of ‘approach’ and characteristics of ‘standing’. The main advantage of 
using the DAS framework is that it allows systematic comparison, and direct 
measurement of difference in three dimensions: a) comparison between grantees and 
controls at stage one; b) longitudinal comparison within groups; and c) comparison 
between grantees and controls at stage two.  
Cross-tabulations of the DAS elements were done by respondent group (grantee, 
control), country grouping (Tier 1/2/3) and ERC domain (Life Sciences (LS), Physics 
and Engineering (PE), Social sciences and Humanities (SH)).  
The country groupings used by our research were developed following work by Braun 
(see Braun, 2012, www.eurecia-erc.net) and the membership and principles of selection 
are in the next table (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Country groupings 
Classification Sub-classification Countries 
Tier 1 - Austria [AT], France [FR], Israel [IL], Switzerland 
[CH] 
2a. Improvement intentions Germany [DE], Sweden [SE] Tier 2 
2b. Low or no apparent improvement 
intentions 
Belgium [BE], Netherlands [NL], Spain [ES], United 
Kingdom [UK] 
3a. Improvement intentions Ireland [IE], Norway [NO] Tier 3 
3b. Low or no apparent improvement 
intentions 
Greece [GR], Italy [IT], Poland [PO] 
Other Not classified or intentions not yet 
clear 
Cyprus [CY], Hungary [HU] + remaining others 
 
Highlights of the findings are shown in Table 7 below, for the ‘demographic’ and 
‘approach’ aspects: 
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Table 7: Finding highlights for ‘demographic’ and ‘approach’, based on the 
characterisation using the DAS variables, as differentiated by respondent, country and 
research domain groupings 
DAS 
element 
Findings 
D1. Gender - Proportionally more male respondents in the control group, i.e. the ERC funded an 
atypically high proportion of females 
D2. Age 
bracket 
- More ‘below average’ control group respondents, i.e. either the ERC selected older 
and/or more advanced people to receive the StG for the first cohort (2007) or younger 
and/or less experienced people were less likely to succeed in getting this particular 
StG 
D3. 
Relationship / 
dependent 
status 
- Most (84%) Tier 1 country group respondents had ‘high’ (married/equivalent, and 
cared for dependents); Tier 3 respondents had the largest proportion of ‘low’ (not 
married/equivalent; no dependents) – i.e. Tier 1s were the most settled group 
A1. 
Geographic 
and 
workplace 
mobility 
- Controls had proportionally more ‘medium’ or ‘high’ values than grantees (56% 
versus 45%) 
- Tier 1s had the most geographic/workplace mobility, followed by Tier 2s then Tier 
3s, i.e. this factor was linked to national setting, with higher research 
performance/ambition linked to greater geographic/workplace mobility 
- SH were the most mobile research domain group (26% ‘high’) closely followed by PE 
(22%) but some way ahead of LS (6%) 
A2. Cognitive 
mobility 
- Grantees had higher cognitive mobility than the controls (30% ‘high’ or ‘very high’ 
versus 19%), i.e. grantees were more atypical 
- Tier 1 country group respondents had greater cognitive mobility than Tier 2s and 3s 
(12% of Tier 1s had ‘very high’, 3% of Tier 2s and no [0%] Tier 3s), i.e. this factor 
appears linked to national setting, with higher performance/ambition linked to greater 
cognitive mobility 
- SH were the most cognitive mobile group 
A3. Perceived 
research 
novelty and 
risks 
- Grantees were divided (they had the largest proportions of both ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
values); most controls had average (68% compared to 57% for grantees) 
- Tier 3 country group respondents had the highest values (22% ‘high’), suggesting 
‘pockets of excellence’ in otherwise lower research performance/ambition settings 
- LS were the least risk-taking group (with no ‘high’ values at all) 
A4. Job 
security 
indifference 
- Grantees ranked slightly higher than controls 
- Tier 3s had the most indifference (30% ‘high’) followed by Tier 2s (22%) then Tier 1s 
(16%), i.e. more aversion to job security risk in higher performance/ambition national 
settings 
- LS had the highest indifference (28% ‘high’) 
A5. 
Atypicality of 
project 
funding track 
record 
- Grantees ranked slightly higher than controls (37% ‘high’ vs 28%) 
- Tier 3 country group respondents had the greatest atypicality (45% ‘high’), i.e. the 
least mainstream project funding track record, perhaps necessitated by having to seek 
varied funding sources in lower performance/ambition national settings 
- SH had the highest atypicality (50% ‘high’) perhaps reflecting its variety of activity as 
a research domain; LS were the most associated with a main national research funding 
source 
A6. 
Atypicality of 
journal 
targeting 
approach 
- Controls ranked slightly higher than grantees (31% ‘high’ vs 19%) 
- Tier 3 had the lowest atypicality (11% ‘high’) perhaps suggesting more conservatism 
in lower performance/ambition national settings (e.g. for career progress reasons) 
- PE had the largest proportion of ‘high’ atypicality (25%); SH the least (16%) 
suggesting relatively the greatest journal targeting conservatism in SH 
 
It appears that the highest proportions of geographic/cognitive mobility and journal 
targeting atypicality, lowest job security indifference and least atypical funding track 
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records were found amongst respondents from Tier 1 countries. Respondents from 
Tier 3 countries displayed ‘pockets of excellence’ features, i.e. high apparent risk-
taking, highest job security indifference and funding track record atypicality. 
Looking at research domain differences, the highest level of geographical and 
cognitive mobility was found amongst SH researchers; they were also the most risk-
taking, indifferent to job security, atypical according to their funding track record. LS 
respondents were reportedly the least geographically/cognitively mobile, least risk 
taking38 and least atypical funding track record ones albeit having the highest apparent 
job security indifference. Highlights for ‘standing’ are shown in Table 8 below: 
Table 8: Finding highlights for ‘standing’, based on the characterisation using the DAS 
elements; differentiated by respondent grouping, country and research domain 
DAS element Findings 
S1. Ability to 
raise needed 
research 
resources 
- Grantees ranked slightly higher than controls (25% ‘high’ vs 17%) 
- Tier 1s ranked highest (27% ‘high’) followed by Tier 2s (24%) then Tier 3s (11%) 
- LS had the highest indifference (28% ‘high’) 
S2. Time for 
research 
- Grantees ranked slightly higher than controls (43% ‘high’ vs 32%) 
- Tier 1s ranked slightly highest (43% ‘high’) followed by Tier 2s (41%) then Tier 3s 
(38%) 
S3. Long-term 
research direction 
independence 
- Grantees ranked slightly higher than controls (44% ‘high’ vs 34%) 
- Tier 1s ranked highest (61% ‘high’) followed by Tier 2s (41%) then Tier 3s (29%) 
- SHs ranked highest (50% ‘high’) followed by PE (43%) then LS (37%) 
S4. Personal 
funding situation 
- Grantees ranked slightly higher than controls (44% ‘high’ vs 29%) 
 
S5. Own team 
size growth 
- Controls ranked only very slightly higher than grantees (64% ‘high’ vs 59%) 
- Tier 1s ranked highest (67% ‘high’) followed by Tier 2s (57%) then Tier 3s (53%) 
- LS had the largest proportion of ‘high’ (67%); SH the lowest (47%) 
S6. Amount of 
academic service 
tasks undertaken 
- Tier 1s ranked highest (35% ‘high’) followed by Tier 2s (30%) then Tier 3s (24%) 
- SH had the largest proportion of ‘high’ (42%) followed by LS and PE (both 27%) 
 
S7. Prestige of 
academic service 
- Grantees ranked slightly higher than controls (18% ‘high’ vs 11%) 
- There were only small differences by country grouping, but Tier 2 ranked the 
highest (19% ‘high’) 
S8. Number of 
research 
collaborators 
- SH had the largest proportion of ‘high’ (27%) followed by PE (21%) then LS (17%) 
S9. Output 
productivity 
- Grantees ranked slightly higher than controls (23% ‘high’ vs 14%) 
- PE had the most ‘high’ responses (30%) followed by LS (17%) then SH (8%) 
S10. Number of 
accolades 
- Grantees ranked slightly higher than controls (23% ‘high’ vs 17%) 
- Tier 1s ranked highest (34% ‘high’) followed by Tier 2s (20%) then Tier 3s (0%) 
- PE had the most ‘high’ responses (27%) followed by LS (22%) then SH (8%) 
S11. Article 
acceptance rate 
- Tier 1s had the least ‘high’ responses (37%) whereas Tier 2 and Tier 3 had more 
(46% and 47%, respectively) 
S12. Perceived 
workplace 
reputation and 
performance 
- Grantees ranked statistically significantly higher than controls (8% ‘very high’ and 
26% ‘high’ vs 0% and 16% of controls, respectively) 
- Tier 3s ranked highest for ‘very high’ responses (10%) followed by Tier 2s (8%) 
and Tier 3s (0%); Tier 3s had the largest proportion of ‘very low’ (29%) 
                                                
38 Please note that pre-disposition to risky taking here is deduced from the perceived risk taking in previous projects 
applications. Most funders in the LS expect proof of concept at the moment of application. This reduces the level of 
riskiness of proposals. 
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DAS element 
(cont’d) 
Findings 
S13. Assumed 
research / 
performance of 
national setting 
- PE had the largest proportion of ‘very high’ (10%) followed by SH (7%) then LS 
(0%); SH had the smallest proportion of ‘very low’ (7%) followed by PE (19%) then 
LS (31%) 
- SH had the lowest proportion of ‘high’ (14%) 
 
The only statistically significant difference between ‘grantees’ and ‘controls’ we found 
at the time of the study was that grantees had self-reportedly better ‘workplace 
reputation and performance’ than controls. All differences are summarised below in 
Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Radar plot of mean ‘approach’ (A) and ‘standing’ (S) variable values for 
grantees and controls. 
 
NB. All values normalised to 0.00–1.00 range, with 0.00 least ‘frontier-potential’, 1.00 most (grantee 
‘n’=61–137, missing=1–77; control ‘n’=25–42, missing=4–21; standard error of mean ~0.05–0.10).  
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6.1.3	  Identifying	  matching	  pairs	  
Using the DAS framework we identified 19 matching pairs of ‘grantees’ and ‘controls’. 
These are part of the preparation for Stage Two of the study and will allow a robust 
measurement of difference, the certainty that the differences (if any) at stage two are 
linked to the ERC grant (and possibly other mediating influences) rather than 
differences at the outset, and the opportunity for retrospective causal analysis 
(retrospective process tracing) using the methodology developed by Glaser and 
Laudel for this study (see WP 4 report on EURECIA website). For more technical 
information about how these pairs were identified, please refer to the report on the 
EURECIA survey (www.eurecia-erc.net). 
Confirming the difference between ‘grantees’ and ‘controls’ and the causal 
mechanisms generating this difference will hopefully enable the monitoring of the 
impact of the ERC by measuring the conditions that generate specific difference 
(change) rather than the change itself. 
6.1.4	  Description	  of	  researchers	  by	  type	  
Building on the DAS framework elements and integrating these further we developed 
sets of ‘approach’ and ‘standing’ types. Our ‘approach’ types are based on two 
variables, namely intellectual mobility (the ‘number of significant changes of 
intellectual field’); and perceived research novelty and risks (respondents’ StG 
proposal perceived novelty, StG proposal perceived risk, most important recent 
research project reported chance of success and reported immediacy of applicability of 
its outputs). This generated four ‘approach’ types.  
Furthermore, three sets of ‘standing’ types were developed: a) one building on level of 
research independence and level of output productivity; b) another one accounting for 
level of researcher independence and workplace reputation; and c) our final set of 
types using the level of output productivity and the reputation of the workplace. 
These generated eight ‘standing’ types of researchers. 
All ‘approach’ and ‘standing’ types, as well as the distribution of respondents by type 
across these, are illustrated by Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Standing and approach types 
 
 
Please note that these typologies build on relative categories derived empirically from 
a very ‘elite’ set. In other words, the fact that a large proportion of the grantees fall in 
the ‘dependent-unprolific-normal’ and ‘settled-moderate’ types only means that the 
ERC has selected grantees that can develop in line with its objective for supporting ‘early 
career’ researchers to ‘research independence’. 
We also developed hypothetical ‘impact pathways’, illustrated in Figure 7. 
Using the composite ‘standing’ types we can indicate our intended/expected StG 
impact pathways in more detail. 
APPROACH 
STANDING 
Intended / 
expected 
StG impacts 
Intended / 
unexpected 
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Figure 7: Impact pathways along our composite ‘standing’ type dimension 
(considering ‘settled-moderate’ ‘approach’ only)  
 
NB. Grantees in positions A, B or C at the baseline stage should have moved to position G by the time 
of the repeat measurement; those in positions D, E or F at the baseline should have moved to H 
following a repeat measurement. Grantees in position G (‘pocket of excellence’) may move to position H 
but this is likely to require workplace mobility, for which this respondent set has shown little 
propensity. (Changes would be StG attributable if proportional movements are greater for grantees 
than controls.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the baseline stage grantees and controls were concentrated in the ‘dependent-
unprolific-normal’ ‘standing’ type and ‘settled-moderate’ in ‘approach’, on the whole. 
If the StG has had impact along this composite ‘standing’ type dimension we would 
expect this ‘dependent-unprolific-normal’ concentration to move to the ‘independent’, 
‘prolific’ and ‘elite’ types. For this impact to be attributable to the StG this shift must be 
proportionally greater for grantees than controls. Because of un-predictability of 
Dependent-unprolific-normal 
 
Dependent-prolific-normal 
Dependent-unprolific-elite 
Dependent-prolific-elite 
Independent-unprolific-normal 
Independent-prolific-normal 
Independent-unprolific-elite 
Independent-prolific-elite 
A 
B 
C 
G 
D 
H 
E 
F 
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funding, we would expect controls to become dispersed among types rather than 
becoming more concentrated in the higher/stronger types.  
We found some grantees in positions A, B and C via our baseline data. These we 
expect to move to position G by the time of a second-stage, repeat measurement. 
Grantees at baseline positions D, E and F should have moved to repeat measurement 
position H. If the proportion of grantees exhibiting these pathways is greater than for 
the corresponding proportion of controls (who may also have made such moves 
without a StG but via others means) then these will be StG-attributable impacts.  
These changes would represent grantees achieving independence and increasing their 
output productivity. Changes of workplace standing (normal/elite) – either through 
moves to new research workplaces or by negotiation with current workplaces, as 
already discussed – may occur but we believe may be secondary effects and/or take 
more time where grantees are already quite advanced in their careers or may have 
already found their desired workplace conditions and be unlikely to move (as 
suggested by our baseline data). Overall workplace conditions may be harder to 
change than conditions like dependence/independence within a team, group or 
department and personal factors (such as output productivity) – that is, without 
moving workplace (which we have currently found to be a rare occurrence).   
There are also the cases where researchers are in the positions G or H at the baseline 
stage. For G a move to H may be possible, say by moving to a new workplace (or 
changing current workplace conditions). A move from G, which may be a ‘pocket of 
excellence’ position of sorts, to H may be likely, but may therefore require workplace 
mobility. For H, the only option would be to maintain these excellent ‘standing’ 
conditions (or see them deteriorate, say because of reduced time for research as an 
unintended but expected StG impact). Case H would probably require an interview 
follow-up if the position is maintained (our survey approach may be unable to 
determine impacts beyond say, ‘sustainability of position’ as a StG impact, in this 
case). 
6.1.5	  Early	  reported	  impact	  
Early effects reported by the respondent to the survey appear to be: 
• Both grantees and controls reportedly increased their internal reputation (i.e. 
within their current workplace/country) due to their StG application; 
• Both reported increased external reputation (i.e. outside their current 
workplace/country) – although this effect was weaker for the controls; 
• Grantees were able to attract additional internal and external research funding 
from their own workplace and from external funders (‘halo’ effect) due to 
getting the StG; and 
• Some controls attracted additional internal research funding, more attracted 
additional external funds, as a result of applying for the StG and being 
shortlisted for award. 
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These perceptions correlate with our later survey questions about the overall effect of 
the StG application on respondents’ career so far and their overall impressions of the 
ERC. Thus: 
• 96% of grantees (and 57% of controls) reported a ‘quite’ or ‘very positive’ career 
effect so far; 99% of grantees (87% of controls) reported a ‘neutral’ or ‘positive’ 
effect; only 1% of grantees and 3% of controls reported a negative effect (and 
this was only ‘quite negative’ rather than very ‘negative’); 
• 99% of grantees (87% of controls) would recommend the ERC’s funding 
schemes to their research colleagues/collaborators; and 
• 93% of grantees (79% of controls) would re-apply to the ERC for a grant in the 
future. 
 
When asked to describe apparent impacts to date from their StG application some 
control group respondents noted that their StG application – and passing Stage 1 of the 
process – was widely seen as a sign of their quality and led them to getting an 
alternative grant. Controls also stated they learned a lot from writing their StG 
application and from related feedback. Some later re-applied to the ERC – some 
successfully; others not. 
Additionally grantees reported having more influence over financial and human 
resources, improved international visibility, greater ability to do novel research and 
take risks, greater control over their own workloads, improved ability to buy 
equipment, they were able to produce high-quality and high-impact outputs, and had 
improved long-term planning about their research because of the long duration of the 
StG funding. For some grantees winning a StG from the ‘first cohort’ was clearly a life-
changing event; it gave them the stability and confidence to be ambitious. Others 
enjoyed the experience of being headhunted for the first time.  
Some adverse effects for both grantees and controls were reported. For controls these 
included lost time and energy that could have been better spent doing research, 
writing papers, writing other grant proposals and so forth; and slower overall career 
progress than hypothetically would have occurred had they won the StG. Adverse 
impacts for grantees included additional, unwanted responsibilities or burdens related 
to managing more people (e.g. as a result of starting a research group or promotion to 
a role with line management duties) and/or bureaucratic and administrative reporting 
obligations related to the StG. Tensions – some so strong they led to having to change 
workplace – were reported by some respondents who were reportedly based in a 
research team or organisation unable to accommodate their sudden new research 
activity, new research group and generally increased autonomy arising from them 
having won a StG.  
An indicative selection of some of these reported positive and negative StG impacts 
are presented in Box 2 below, excerpted from responses by grantees. 
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Box 2: Early reported impact by grantees  
 
Positive Impacts 
‘[T]he most important aspect of this grant is the sense of freedom it has given me, I feel that I can do 
whatever I want, that I am not bound by funding or strategic steering from anyone in the institution, I feel 
completely independent. In a nutshell, this ERC grant has given me wings.’  
‘I have started a new group, pursuing a challenging goal. I am independent, and my hands untied for 5 
years. This is priceless.’ 
‘It gave me the long-term stability to pursue ambitious goals.’ 
‘Above all, it has strengthened my belief in my own capacities as a researcher and given me more self-
confidence to continue doing research in the direction the ERC grant has allowed me to explore.’ 
‘It has greatly enhanced my reputation both in my institute and nationally, and potentially also 
internationally. It has allowed me to pursue a very ambitious research project, take on a number of students 
and researchers and carry out the research with the tools and to the rigour I feel is necessary without 
worrying about having enough funds. It is a fantastic program!!’ 
‘I became visible for a number of people in my research area and became known as a researcher independent 
of my supervisor.’ 
‘At the time of applying for the ERC grant, I was also applying for various professor positions. Before I 
received the ERC grant, I was shortlisted several times, but never offered a job, after having received the 
grant, I was immediately offered a job. I suspect that rich brides are more attractive.’ 
 
Adverse Impacts 
‘I had to pass through very important struggles in order to reach my independence as a researcher. In fact, I 
had to learn that not everybody is happy when you get an ERC grant and I lost about one year through 
changing my host institution which had become necessary in order to be able to build my own research 
group.’ 
‘Our institute does not have enough resources to accommodate the addition of such a big group.’ 
‘My organization is not organized for supporting ERC projects.’ 
 
 
In summary these early, reported StG-related impacts fall into three clusters: 
• Resource-related impacts – money, time, people, equipment;  
• Symbolic impacts – increased reputation, prestige, visibility, networking, quality 
hallmarks leading to additional funding (‘halo’ effect); and 
• Norm-related impacts, concerning organisational career and knowledge 
community career patterns –faster than typical promotion, greater than typical 
workload/resource autonomy, rapid ability to start a research group, more 
freedom to pursue risky/ambitious research content than typical (all 
sometimes resulting in tension with the existing host workplace). 
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6.1.6	  Summary	  
Overall, our characterisation of the ERC grantees and controls leads us to believe that: 
• Our respondents, both grantees and controls, are a homogenous set of very 
highly qualified, productive, largely ‘tenured and formerly geographically and 
intellectually mobile people who are currently ‘settled’. 
• This cohort sets a very high benchmark for ‘early career’ researchers. 
• Grantees and controls are very similar in all but their opinion of the reputation 
of their work place; this is a good basis for analytical comparison after the Stage 
Two data collection. 
• Our analysis by approach and standing types shows that the ERC grantees and 
controls that took part in our survey are mainly still dependent, think of 
themselves as not highly prolific, work in ‘normal’ research organisations, and 
are settled and moderately risk taking. This allows space for the grantees to 
develop and move to other types. The ERC grants has had impact to the extent 
to which more grantees than controls make the transition. 
• Our analysis identified nineteen matching pairs for investigation at Stage Two 
of the study. 
• Early reputational and resource generating effects were reported by both 
grantees and controls. It seems that in some cases simply being shortlisted for 
an ERC grant is enough to generate impact. 
• The reported early impact is not only positive; some researchers have 
experienced problems as a consequence of receiving a grant. 
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Chapter	  7:	  Characterising	  the	  content	  of	  research	  conducted	  by	  the	  ERC	  
grantees	  
Following from the considerations set out in section 3.3.2.3 of this report, the empirical 
study of the impact of the ERC grant on the content of research conducted by grantees 
interrogated the innovativeness of the research proposals, the relationship between the 
proposed research and the mainstream of the field and the ‘local’ epistemic properties 
of the research. This was done using comparative case studies of grantees and controls 
consisting of individual level bibliometrics, mapping of research and careers trails and 
ethnographic interviews. 
7.1	  Epistemic	  properties	  of	  the	  research	  funded	  by	  the	  ERC	  
7.1.1	  Innovations	  and	  ‘big	  questions’	  
An important aspect of the relationship between research and the state of the art of a 
scientific community is its innovative character. We empirically categorized the 
funded research as planned innovations, planned answers to ‘big questions’, and the 
exploitation of recent discoveries.  
Planned innovations 
We defined innovations as research findings that affect the research practices of a large 
number of researchers in one or more fields (i.e. choices of problems, methods or 
empirical objects). About half of the grantees we interviewed planned such 
innovations and promised them in the grant proposal. Planned innovations included 
the development of new methods which, when applicable, will provide new research 
opportunities to many members of the community.  
I have for a long time been trying to find ways to improve the [sensitivity] of 
these [microscopes] […]. So it’s a natural thing for me to think about and 
then I think I came up with a good idea and therefore I pursued it and then I 
think because it has the potential of really giving a breakthrough in biology 
by determining the structure of […]. 
-Starting grantee, Physical Sciences and Engineering39 
 
A second type of planned innovation, which occurs across all discipline groups, 
promises to significantly enhance the empirical basis of a community’s research by 
                                                
39 For reasons of privacy protection, we can provide only very little information on the interviewees we quote. For 
each quote, the most relevant information is provided to the extent to which the grantee’s identity remains 
protected. Quotes from interviews conducted in German are our translations. Square brackets indicate changes or 
omissions that have been introduced to protect the identity of interviewees. 
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providing access to new empirical objects that will become central to the community’s 
research.  
I think we could never fail in the sense that, already the [group members] 
who work on it are producing editions of new relevant texts. So even if the 
synthetic study doesn't come at this moment these text editions will be out 
there and people will be able to use them. So we will, in any case, have 
increased the data pool of this period.  
-Starting grantee, Social Sciences and Humanities 
Similar to the development of new broadly applicable methods, the provision of new 
empirical objects opens up new research opportunities for a community. A third type 
aimed at general explanations that, once achieved, will alter the community’s 
understanding of its empirical objects. Examples include the search for a mechanism 
that influences protein biosynthesis or for general patterns of plant adaptation. 
Answers to ‘big questions’ 
This kind of innovations is found in the social sciences and humanities. A typical ‘big 
question’ is more general than a common research question of the social sciences and 
humanities and needs to be answered on an exceptionally broad theoretical, 
methodological or empirical basis. Researchers would, for example, study a major 
society-shaping historical process by incorporating all available sources across 
languages, locations, and types of sources for the relevant period of time. Three 
grantees and one unsuccessful applicant had designed research projects that addressed 
such big questions of their respective fields.  
Recent discoveries 
Several projects planned to exploit recent innovations. These recent innovations were 
serendipitous discoveries. Naturally, innovations of this type cannot be aimed for with 
ERC grants (or any other grants). Serendipitous discoveries occur in the course of 
research without being anticipated at the beginning of a project. They result from 
unexpected observations during experiments, or they emerge as ideas triggered by the 
current research. Serendipitous discoveries are innovations if they affect research 
practices of a large number of researchers from a field. Three ERC grantees exploit 
their recent serendipitous discoveries (two discoveries of effects and one discovery of a 
new empirical object), which meet the definition of an innovation.  
And in 2007 we made – I think – an important discovery, namely that 
[phenomenon]. And this opened up new directions for research, and this is 
exactly the topic of the ERC grant. 
-Advanced grantee, Life Sciences 
That's exactly part of these … experiments, where you try something new 
without much hope for success. You just try, really, because it is fun and 
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because it doesn't take much time to try. And then, it was really like this. So 
we used to run few, a few experiments like this. And some of them are 
successful …. some of them never end up in any publication at all. And, [our 
discovery] was one of those. 
-Starting grantee, Physical Sciences and Engineering 
The table below (Table 9) summarises the distribution of interviews by kind of 
research innovation. 
Table 9:  Empirical categorisation of interview by kind of innovation (some projects 
belong to more than one category) 
Planned Innovations Recent Innovations 
(Exploitation of previous 
discoveries) 
 
New 
method 
New 
empirical 
basis 
New 
general 
explanation 
Planned 
answers 
to ‘big 
questions’ New 
objects 
New effects 
LS  1 4   3 
PE 5 1 1  1  
SSH 1 4  4   
Nf 1 LS 
1 PSE 
     
 
This table excludes six projects funded by the ERC, one non-funded applicant (Nf) and 
all non-applicants (na) because these projects, which we consider excellent research, 
did not meet the definitions of innovations, ‘big questions’ or recent innovations. For 
many of these projects ERC funding was still essential. This is an important finding 
because it indicates that normal grant funding is insufficient not only for certain types 
of exceptional research, but also for excellent research on topics that were crucial for 
the progress of one or more fields. There are also cases where the ERC funding 
excellent researchers who are funded well enough from other sources. 
About half and the interviewed grantees planned research innovations and promised 
them in the research proposal. Given the highly individualised formulation of 
problems, the non-mainstream character of some of these innovations and their 
dependence on specific funding conditions, it is reasonable to assume that at least 
some of them would have been delayed to some extent if there were no ERC. 
7.2	  Relationship	  of	  ERC	  funded	  research	  to	  the	  mainstream	  
An ERC research project can also be characterised in terms of the project’s position vis-
à-vis the community’s mainstream. In our analysis, we identified four different types 
of deviation from a community’s mainstream that we describe below. 
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Contradicting the majority opinion 
Several projects contradicted the majority opinion, either by attempting something the 
community considers impossible or by addressing problems that were considered as 
irrelevant by the community.  
And I think people just don’t do it because the processes are so far apart. In 
the beginning I said that there are many consecutive steps. And people 
believe that the second influences the third, the third the fourth; but that a 
process influence another which is even spatially separate, this is new. And 
this is where people are relatively sceptical.  
-Starting grantee, Life Sciences 
the community is not totally convinced that this is a good method. So, I want 
to change that because I strongly believe that this is not true. 
-Advanced grantee, Physical Sciences and Engineering 
 
Addressing a community’s blind spots 
Another version of non-mainstream research addresses a community’s ‘blind spot’ by 
doing something that does not at all contradict any majority opinion but has not yet 
been done because nobody else seems to have thought of it.  
And the problem with the study of [X’s] history is that all the narrative 
sources we have … they all were written down 200 years later. So we don't 
have anything contemporary for this period which means a lot of people 
have said ‘we cannot study this early period because we don't have anything 
contemporary’. But the [texts] are contemporary. So in a way, it's almost 
natural to understand what's happened [in this early period]; the [texts] is 
such a fantastic source. So if you're interested in looking at the [texts] it's a 
very easy topic to get to. It's such a big blind spot in our knowledge and our 
understanding of [X’s] history. 
-Starting grantee, Social Sciences and Humanities 
Applying non-mainstream approaches or methods to mainstream problems  
A third non-mainstream relationship occurs when projects apply non-mainstream 
approaches or methods to mainstream problems.  
The basic methodology in [the field] was a success story, was set up by […] 
great 19th century [researchers]. Basically, it hasn’t changed since then. In 
some sense, the field has been a bit a victim of its own success. It was a very 
important field and the discovery of […] was a big success in the 19th 
century. But then the field got frozen a bit. I think it is time for new 
techniques to come in.  
-Advanced grantee, Social Sciences and Humanities 
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Linking previously separate communities 
Finally, non-mainstream research includes attempts to link communities that have no 
previous epistemic connections. Such links are created by combining approaches from 
two communities in one experiment, or by demonstrating the relevance of one 
community’s empirical object to the research of the other community.  
But the real theme of the ERC proposal is combining two fields that nobody 
has combined yet. We were established in one field. We had done little 
things in the other field. And that’s what we want to build and to combine. 
-Advanced grantee, Physical Sciences and Engineering 
 
Normally these are two separate fields. They have separate meetings, 
separate conferences, they are separate communities... But these are two very 
big fields which are far apart. Since we deal with everything between these 
two fields, we naturally have a big area to cover. 
-Starting grantee, Life Sciences 
 
Where the investigated projects fit according to the way(s) in which they deviate from 
the mainstream in their respective fields is presented in Table 10. 
Table 10:  Deviations from the mainstream by the investigated projects40 
Contradicting 
majority 
opinion 
Addressing a 
community’s 
blind spots 
Applying non-mainstream 
approaches or methods to 
mainstream problems 
Linking otherwise 
separate 
communities 
4 8 
 
1 na 
5  3 
 
1 na  
 
These versions of non-mainstream research are not mutually exclusive. The link 
between two communities may be a blind spot for both, the application of non-
mainstream methods to mainstream problems may contradict the majority opinion, 
and so on. Several of the investigated projects fell into more than one category of non-
mainstream research including one that fell into all four. 
7.3	  ‘Local’	  properties	  of	  the	  research	  
In addition to its relationships to the field, the research of our interviewees also has 
‘local’ properties, i.e. properties that characterise the individual research process.  
                                                
40 One control group project (unsuccessful applicant) could not be categorised so is not included in the table. 
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In our empirical investigation we found that in some cases there were indivisible 
resource requirements, i.e. necessary conditions that cannot be created partly but are 
met either fully or not at all. We found three types of such indivisible resource 
requirements, namely the need for complex task-specific equipment, the need for 
complex task-specific approaches, and a long ‘Eigentime’ of the research. Two further 
important properties are the strategic and technical uncertainties inherent to research. 
Complex task-specific equipment  
The need for complex task-specific equipment for specific experiments occurred in 
four projects. In each case, the generation or observation of empirical objects required 
a complicated large instrument or the integration of several instruments into a task-
specific experimental system. Interestingly, all such requirements refer to projects from 
the Physical Sciences and Engineering. The equipment for life sciences research was 
often more universal and more modular, and thus could be accumulated by standard 
grants and utilised across projects.  
Complex task-specific approaches 
In the social sciences and humanities we observed an equivalent to the need for 
complex, task-specific equipment in the natural sciences. In these projects, complex 
task-specific approaches took the form of the integration of different approaches in an 
‘interdisciplinary’ group, in which the joint work on a common subject matter requires 
the co-presence of researchers mastering these approaches during the whole time of 
the project. ‘Interdisciplinary’ is meant here in the weakest possible sense and may 
include the mastery of different languages or the familiarity with different types of 
sources.  
This co-presence requirement can be traced to the central role of the human mind in 
the selection and interpretation of empirical evidence. Approaches in the social 
sciences and humanities are often holistic. This is why collaborative designs that 
define sequential, sub-task specific contributions of collaborators who may be 
separated in space are not applicable.  
Long ‘Eigentime’ 
The ‘Eigentime’ of a research process is defined by material properties of empirical 
objects and research technologies, for example growth and reproduction cycles of 
biological objects. In our analysis, we found one example for an unusually long 
‘Eigentime’, namely a project that included the observation of a biological process that 
takes years and required an observation time of at least three years.  
A specific epistemic property of some research processes, which we assume to be an 
equivalent of ‘Eigentime’ in the humanities and non-empirical sciences, is the need for 
uninterrupted research time. All knowledge about the research object must be 
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constantly kept and actualised in the mind of the researcher, which makes it extremely 
difficult to enter the necessary ‘research mode’. In more technical terms, the properties 
of the human mind as the major research tool create the necessity to constantly ‘run’ - 
engage in research - without interruption by other tasks, because each interruption 
requires a major recalibration.  
Strategic uncertainty  
An important and very consequential epistemic property of research is its uncertainty. 
Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty concerning the existence of an outcome. Effects 
might either not exist at all or not be observable with the current experimental setting. 
Attempts to generalise effects might fail because what has been found is idiosyncratic. 
This kind of strategic uncertainty we found in seven projects, all of them from the 
natural sciences. 
There were also cases of high strategic uncertainty where it was already clear at the 
time of the interview (about three years into the project) that the hoped-for effects did 
not exist and the most ambitious aims of the projects could not be achieved.  
Technical uncertainty 
Technical uncertainty refers to the lack of knowledge about the way in which a certain 
goal can be achieved. The building of experiments might include a lot of trial-and-
error manipulation of equipment before the intended effects can be achieved. Stages of 
experiments might fail, either because the outcome is partly random or because the 
experimental conditions cannot be fully controlled. The equivalent in the social 
sciences and humanities is a situation in which data that are necessary for answering 
the question cannot be found in time. We identified a significant technical uncertainty 
in 11 projects. One of them belonged to the social sciences and humanities, where 
technical uncertainly emerged from the possibility that the sources would not yield 
enough information to answer the question. But even in this particular case the 
interviewee’s understanding of failure was to produce different and maybe worse 
results than intended. None of the projects in the social sciences and humanities could 
fail completely. 
Table 11 presents the ‘local’ epistemic properties of the projects by the broad research 
fields. 
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Table 11:  Specific ‘local’ epistemic properties of the investigated projects  
 Life Sciences Physical Sciences 
and Engineering 
Social Sciences and 
Humanities 
Complex task-specific 
equipment 
 4   
Complex task-specific 
approaches 
  6 
Long ‘Eigentime’  1 1 
High strategic 
uncertainty 
2 5  
High technical 
uncertainty 
4 6 
1 nf 
1 
 
Not all of the investigated projects were strategically or technically uncertain. The 
question we asked all interviewees – “In what ways could your project fail?” - was in 
some cases answered by unambiguous statements to the effect that the project could 
not fail. In other cases, no unusual risk was described.  
It is important to note that the ERC already with its first round triggered adaptive 
behaviour. For at least some grantees, the common response to a funding opportunity 
- writing what they think the funding agency wants to read – involved framing their 
projects as more risky than they were, or writing about risk although this would not 
have come to their minds without the ERC asking about it. 
7.4	  Summary	  
In a nutshell, our research shows that: 
• A sizeable proportion of the projects that were selected for funding in the first 
calls of the ERC (StG and AdG) have proposed planned innovation or have 
raised ‘big questions’. 
• A proportion of the proposals selected for funding deviate from the mainstream 
in their respective research fields in a number of ways. 
• A proportion of the projects have ‘local’ epistemic properties that are met by the 
conditions of the ERC grants, like high levels of strategic and technical 
uncertainty, demanding complex task-specific approaches and equipment. 
• These are all characteristics of risky and, potentially, ‘frontier’ and path 
breaking research. 
• The ERC has also supported a number of proposals which are for excellent 
research buy are not likely to generate community level knowledge 
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transforming effects. For these proposals ERC funding was essential because of 
their ‘local’ epistemic properties. 
Only time will show whether, and what proportion, of this research will have 
dramatic, community level effects (become path breaking). However, the ERC appears 
to have selected a proportion of research proposals that have the potential for that. 
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Chapter	  8:	  ERC’s	  impact	  on	  careers	  and	  research	  independence	  
The most important effect on grantees’ organisational careers appears to be that some 
organisations respond to the reputation of ERC grants by promoting grantees or by 
offering them permanent positions. These effects occurred only for starting grantees. 
As was the case with the other reputational effects, the changes in organisational 
positions were often difficult to attribute unambiguously because the impact of the 
ERC grants was overlaid by other factors. We observed similar effects for non-grantees 
who were awarded prestigious national grants. Owing to the career systems being 
nationally specific, we could identify a pattern across countries (Table 12).  
Table 12:  Effects of ERC grants on grantees’ organisational positions (interviews) 
Country Move to a permanent 
position 
Promotion  Extension of fixed-
term contract  
NL 1 
1 non-applicant (other 
prestigious grant) 
3 
1 non-applicant (other 
prestigious grant)  
 
D   1 
UK 1 2  
CH    
IT  1 (research institute)  
F    
AT   1 
Other Move from a fixed-term 
position in one country 
to a permanent position 
in another country, grant 
helped. 
  
 
The table clearly demonstrates the importance of national career systems for the 
impact of ERC grants on career progress. The variation in effects can be explained by 
the difference between the ‘lecturer system’ of the Netherlands and the UK and the 
‘chair system’ that is in place in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, and Italy. In 
the lecturer system, most academics enter the university at a low-level entrance 
position (Lecturer or Senior Lecturer in the UK, Universitair Docent in the Netherlands) 
and subsequently can be promoted through several levels and, in the end, can become 
professor at the same university. In the chair system, positions below the professorial 
level are often untenured, and the move to a professorial position requires applying 
for such a position at a different university. As a result, there are only very few – if any 
– opportunities to be promoted in a chair system. 
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In the UK and the Netherlands, grants play an important role as performance 
indicators in standard situations of promotion and recruitment. Interviewees describe 
the impact of the ERC grants as “the grant helped”. This ‘help’ is possible in the 
lecturer systems because decisions on promotions and tenure are made by the host 
organisation, which also benefits from the ERC grant because it potentially influences 
the block grant of the university.  
However, ERC grants also differ from most national grants in that they are portable. 
This means that in addition to being a marker of performance in recruitment and 
promotion situations, ERC grants create a negotiation situation in which the grantee 
has the power to provide or withdraw a benefit to the host organisation (the prestige 
and income of an ERC grant). Several of our interviewees used that opportunity for 
negotiating their situation with their (potential) host organisation. 
[I]t’s totally dependent on your negotiation skills and that is something that 
really must remain – the ability to move the monies – because otherwise 
you’re locked. This really enables you to manoeuvre in a way that won’t 
harm the project but would answer the goals of the ERC which is [to become 
an] independent researcher.  
-Dutch starting grantee 
In chair systems there are very few situations in which having a grant can be utilised 
in negotiations. Fixed-term positions cannot usually be turned into permanent 
professorial positions. The only way of receiving tenure is to be appointed as a 
professor, which traditionally requires a move to a different university. Universities 
can break with this tradition but not all of them do, as the following quote describes.  
And this is the big difference between ERC and Emmy Noether [funding 
programme]. Noether is ultimately considered as equivalent of the funding 
of habilitations. The framework is different but it has clearly the status of a 
qualification, while the ERC starting grants of the first round were decidedly 
different. They were aimed at funding the highest scientific excellence. It is a 
different question whether they actually do that but this was the aim. This 
aim was clearly that the people who were funded shall achieve scientific 
independence, which in the German context means a professorship. 
And this [my university] does not do. They treat it like Emmy Noether. With 
regard to the structure, they treat it like Emmy Noether, which means it is 
not linked to tenure or something similar. And of course there are other 
universities that link it to a professorship. I know examples of people who 
received an associate and also one full professorship. 
-Germany, starting grantee  
Even though higher education reforms are currently eroding the chair systems in 
many countries, table 10 indicates that the systematic differences between the two 
systems still remain. More generally, we would tentatively conclude that the impact of 
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ERC grants on career positions crucially depends on the number and distribution 
along careers of ‘negotiation situations’ (promotion and recruitment) in which grants 
can be utilised. Generally, ERC grantees can negotiate career progress more easily in 
lecturer systems than in chair systems. 
Promotions and the move to permanent positions usually also increased the 
independence of grantees. However, in some countries starting grantees who were not 
yet full professors still depended on professors in one important respect, namely the 
supervision of PhD students. Control group interviews confirm that this formal 
limitation exists in the lecturer system in the Netherlands and in chair systems. 
However, only one grantee actually mentioned this as a problem, which indicates that 
the grantees have found working arrangements with their professors.  
Although the portability of the grant – the opportunity to take it to another 
organisation – is an important property of ERC grants, the grants played only a minor 
role in promoting organisational mobility. Only three of the interviewed thirty 
grantees took their grant and changed their research organisations before starting the 
project. All three grantees were from the Social Sciences and Humanities panel.  
There are three reasons why mobility, and thus the ERC grants’ capability to bring 
researchers to the best possible environments, is limited. The first and most obvious 
reason is that the grantees work in an optimum research environment. 
Answer: Well the environment is very, very good for what we intend to do. 
And this was the main reason to come here [prior to the ERC grant] and 
nowhere else. The other reason was that the institute is known for my 
research area, which means that I also get intellectual input and feedback. It 
is enormously important, I believe, especially when one starts with his own 
group, that one is embedded in an institute that as a whole works at a high 
level. If you work completely alone somewhere, the quality is not going to be 
as high as when you are integrated in an institute.  
Question: Theoretically you could have taken the ERC grant and could 
have gone someplace else. The rules make this possible.  
Answer: Yes, in principle. However, one of the criteria of the ERC grants is 
the host institution, i.e. the institute that takes you. And I can imagine that in 
my case this was a big bonus form because the conditions for this kind of 
research are ideal. I don’t believe it would have been … one could have done 
it but I don’t believe it would have been wise. 
-Starting grantee, Life Sciences 
The second reason is personal. Both starting and advanced grants are given to 
researchers several years after their PhD, mostly in fairly advanced career stages. At 
this time, most grantees have a partner and children. This means that moves to 
another university that require a move of the whole family are difficult to accomplish 
because the complex interests of a whole family have to be accommodated.  
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Question: Did you think about moving? Was there a particular reason that 
you stayed where you are at the moment? 
Answer: Well... Mostly it’s family reasons, I never thought about moving, 
actually – because I have a family in […]. So anyway, I never thought about 
moving because my husband has work there and so I don’t think I could 
move. 
-Starting grantee, Physical Sciences and Engineering 
The Netherlands are an exception in this regard because the distance between most 
cities is small enough to enable daily commuting after a move.  
The third reason is field-specific. In the sciences, researchers at a grantee’s career stage 
already have their own laboratory, PhD students, staff, and collaborators. Moving to 
another university requires an enormous investment of time and effort, which again 
makes scientists stay. 
Especially for an experimental physicist this would have been a disaster, you 
know. You cannot put these experiments in your suitcase and reassemble 
them in Paris. I mean you can, but it takes two years. 
-Starting grantee, Physical Sciences and Engineering 
It can be safely assumed that as a result of these obstacles to mobility, at least some 
grantees remained in sub-optimal research environments. 
8.1	  Summary	  
The following points are important in terms of the ERC’s impact on researchers’ 
careers: 
• Career effects are more pronounced for StG researchers than for AdG ones. 
• At this early stage, it appears that the most pronounced impact is on the 
organisational career of StG researchers; some organisations promote grantees 
or offer them more favourable conditions of employment. This is specific to the 
national environment and national career structures. 
• Portability of grants is recognised by grantees as an opportunity but relatively 
few have moved. This is mainly because: a) grantees are already in the best 
research environment; b) they are ‘settled’; and c) there are very considerable 
problems associated with moving complex lab equipment and research groups. 
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Chapter	  9:	  ERC’s	  impact	  on	  research	  organisations	  
In this chapter we look at the effects that the ERC is having on the different categories 
of organisations (‘top’, ‘in-between’ and ‘weak’) in the context of the three dimensions 
of change identified in section 3.2.2. More specifically, these are: perceived 
performance and visibility of organisation, strategic capabilities and support, 
attraction and retention of talent. Since we found no substantive differences between 
universities and research institutes in the categories, here we refer to ‘research 
organisations’ and ‘universities’ interchangeably. 
9.1	  ERC’s	  impact	  on	  top	  research	  organisations	  
9.1.1	  Perceived	  performance	  and	  visibility	  
Interviewees from top research organisations see the ERC grants, because of their 
funding conditions and duration that are more generous than most national grants, as 
potentially enhancing the quality of the research. Furthermore, these organisations 
perceive the ERC as being a visible indicator of and a catalyst for quality. Attracting 
ERC grants is seen as a new and more telling indicator for research excellence, and for 
some the ERC is even regarded as a means to overcome the more obvious 
shortcomings of more traditional rankings of universities.  
Top organisations, however, use the number of grant they receive to confirm their 
position as part of the elite. Pre-existing quality is seen by interviewees as the most 
important condition for successful grant getting; hence the ERC grants, both AdG and 
StG, reinforce the position of these organisations as top performers. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the leadership of the top research organisations do 
not see a special need for investment in activities and structures aiming to increase their 
quality and reputation. Where such investments are made this usually occurs at lower 
organisational levels. 
9.1.2	  Strategic	  capabilities	  
The impact on strategic capabilities at the top leadership level in top organisations is 
not obvious since important decisions and conditions are set at lower organisational 
level; effects on strategic capabilities are therefore at lower (and sometimes 
intermediate) level. Most sub-units we studied already show a high level of strategic 
capabilities although research strategies and support activities are developed within 
the constraints of funding conditions and tough internal assessment exercises 
alongside discipline based criteria.  
As the ERC grant itself, not only the outcome produced by it, is perceived as excellence 
indicator, it allows a change of research direction which often necessitates investment 
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of time and patience that is not possible in more traditional funding modes. Thus, 
interviewees reported that with the ERC they “can be much bolder” and do things 
they “could not do otherwise”.  
In this light, the material effects of having ERC grants is important; these grants 
contribute to funding the sub-units competing for institutional and project grants. This 
is particularly important in times of growth when having a number of ERC grants can 
catalyse and accelerate the process of transformation and profiling. 
In top organisations, the ERC is increasingly used to benchmark units within the 
organisation and thus is a tool for internal competition for prestige and resources. In 
two examples serial ERC success has considerably enhanced and strongly confirmed 
the reputation of a specific area within a top organisation. In other cases units take 
extra care that the ERC success is reported not only externally, but within the 
organisations, expecting an improved bargaining position at higher levels and vis-à-
vis other units. 
In brief, the main effects on strategic capabilities here is not on at the level of 
organisation but at the level of sub-units. We also found that lower organisational 
levels offer more support for ERC grants preparation than for national or EU FP 
applications. However, top organisations (and their units) do not change 
fundamentally the way they organise their internal support of research quality and 
income generation;, they take advantage of existing structures and have strengthened 
and tailored them where necessary. 
9.1.3	  Support,	  retention	  and	  attraction	  of	  talent	  
Generally, the ERC, and its grants, are considered to be a way to increase the 
attractiveness of research organisations because this is another confirmation that the 
top organisations recruit, support and retain high performers. Since the organisational 
mechanisms for that, as well as concentration of talent, is already there, the ERC grants 
were used as a confirmation rather than as a vehicle for changing recruitment and 
promotion practices to attract grantees. Hence, we didn’t find major change in these 
organisations. Existing structures and incentives are merely extended to ERC grantees; 
existing practices are efficient enough to attract and support performers and high 
potential performers. For these organisations the ERC adds an additional (symbolic 
and normative) currency in the market, a mutual signalling device for the individual 
researcher and for employing organisations, but the key criterion still is output and 
publications. In some cases, the larger grant is used to pay an additional bonus for the 
researcher who succeeded in the ERC competition.  
In terms of recruitment, the ERC has not yet had much impact. In our interviews there 
were not many cases of recruitments of grantees; most grants (AdG and StG) were 
submitted by researchers who have already been employed there for some time. In 
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some organisations, the ERC grants provide opportunities for retaining high 
performers by offering the resources to extend their contracts. 
 “No changes in recruitment strategies come along with ERC: We primarily go for 
people who we think are outstanding … We do not especially look for people that might 
then get an ERC grant, usually people are already some time with us and then succeed 
in landing an ERC grant”.  
Even in top organisations, individual strategic leaders at the lower organisational levels 
perceive a potential downside of the ERC grants. First, it puts normative pressure On of 
these is that the ERC grants, by the prestige and reputation they carry, afford more 
autonomy to researchers to the expense of academic leaders and limit the possibilities 
for influence of the strategic managers. This is not a widespread phenomenon, as in 
most of the top organisations, and their units, researchers who attract funding or have 
a strong institutional funding base often are already relatively autonomous in their 
research strategy planning and implementation. Another reported problem is that the 
large ERC grants can endanger the balance within units and groups and distort cohesion. 
This is especially the case if the grant allows for multiple recruitments by the PI, thus 
leading to a group building that is not planned for strategically and may not spill over 
to the unit more generally (leading to a “two class system”).  Some organisations have 
already started to be restrictive with grant applications, taking care of a balanced growth 
rather than an accidental growth within their portfolio. Internal pre-selection 
procedures do play a decisive role here.  
The abovementioned challenges of large grants, especially if units have attracted 
multiple grants, trigger new efforts and structures to plan, handle and support large grants 
in sub-units, simplifying internal rules and procedures. In addition, more senior 
management has been mobilised to support applicants and higher level administration 
support has been improved. Even in organisations that have been reluctant to apply 
for external funds – as not many schemes meet the criteria of their research - staff are 
now encouraged to consider ERC applications.   
9.2	  ERC’s	  impact	  on	  ‘in-­between’	  research	  organisations	  
9.2.1	  Perceived	  performance	  and	  visibility	  
All interviewees agree that the ERC is a quality brand that arises from its symbolic 
and normative value: The ERC is expected to impact on quality of research as it allows 
focusing on basic research without further conditions. However, for in-between 
organisations, ERC’s impact on the perceived performance of organisations or sub-
organisational levels (divisions, departments, institutes, labs, groups) is closely linked 
to whether these are hosting ERC grantees or not. Having (the right number of) ERC 
grantees is perceived as bringing visibility and reputation for the respective 
organisation or sub-division – nationally and internationally. These organisations, and 
 92 
their sub-units, are under pressure to succeed and either get, or attract, more ERC 
grants so that they continue being visible and make the transition into the top.  
Furthermore, the ERC grants allow certain units or research groups within an 
organisation to grow extraordinarily or faster than comparable units without any 
grantees. This growth of research capabilities includes numbers of researchers as well 
as infrastructure, which as a consequence leads to more competitive research 
performance in the years to come. Some in-between research organisations see this 
inherent risk of uncontrolled and imbalanced growth at lower organisational levels 
triggered by multiple ERC success as threatening organisational cohesion and 
stretching the resources of the organisation.  
9.2.2	  Strategic	  capabilities	  
The evidence here is mixed. We found no evidence that a major re-orientation of 
research strategies or completely new research priorities has occurred because of the 
ERC and its funding schemes. We did find, however, that ERC grants have three kinds 
of effects on already on-going policies and research priorities: (i) made these visible or 
justified, (ii) considerably strengthened in their research capacities and (iii) in some 
cases the ERC grant was used as seed money directed into new, more risky lines of 
research within the field.  
For these organisations this chance of increased visibility also acts as a driver to adapt 
internal incentive structures in order to motivate existing staff to apply for ERC 
grants. Furthermore, due to the considerable size and the favourable funding 
conditions of ERC grants, research may be re-organised in flexible and non-
bureaucratic manner. ERC grants are considered an opportunity to catch up with 
excellence strategies and helping to raise a unit’s research capabilities, be it via new 
infrastructure, via building up critical mass, via extraordinary growth of research 
groups, via more incentive-driven overall financial endowment but also via the 
different research methodologies or approaches that are applied. As regards the latter, 
ERC funding – primarily in the case of AdG – also catalyses new, more risky lines of 
research (within already existing priority research areas), particularly as it comes with 
a favourable time span. In many cases ERC money functions as seed money and 
allows units or research groups within an organisation to grow extraordinarily or faster 
than comparable units without any grantees. This often comes with re-directions:  
“The ERC grants have allowed us to almost instantly start new research directions – or 
more precisely to very quickly acquire ‘critical mass’ for certain research directions, by 
acquiring the right people and the right equipment”. 
However, the definition of research directions sometimes follows the money:  
“ERC grants are also indicators where in the future to put our internal money for 
research priority programs.”  
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This presents a challenge to some organisations because of the inherent risk of 
uncontrolled and imbalanced growth triggered by multiple ERC success; this can push 
in-between organisations towards its limit in terms of space allocation, resources and 
infrastructures.  
All in all, while the strategic merit of the ERC more likely unfolds at the sub-
organisational levels of organisations (faculties, departments, institutes, labs) than at 
the highest leadership level, the perceived material and symbolic value of the ERC has 
triggered strategic reaction at top leadership level as well. There is awareness that the 
ERC grants are an opportunity to’ catch up’ and the will to use these as a signal for 
this. ERC has become part of the organisational discourse and practices for reinforcing 
quality strategies and internal allocation for resources.  Thus, in some cases the 
research organisation allocates additional money to the groups or sub-units of 
grantees, in others ERC grants are considered a useful indicator for quality based 
allocation of competitive university budgets. The main challenge for the top 
organisational level here lies with balancing conflicting strategies of sub-levels.  
9.2.3	  Support,	  attraction	  and	  retention	  of	  talent	  
Within this group, the existence of ERC and of having ERC grantees triggers diverging 
promotion structures: ERC grantees are – by means of being branded as ERC-excellent 
– often entitled to leap-frog certain career steps, i.e. are promoted to positions with more 
autonomy than colleagues of comparable academic age, are already tenured at an 
earlier stage or are entitled to a full professorship. However, the ways in which this 
happens varies, ranging from mere expansion of already existing exceptional 
promotion rules, to newly created staff categories and positions for ERC grantees that 
are considerably different from pre-existing staff profiles (e.g. research only positions 
in a teaching-heavy environment).  
Even more so than in top organisations, in-between organisations face a challenge here: 
this reward system puts a lot of pressure onto existing staff structures and 
organisational capabilities, and threatens existing cohesion among the unit’s staff 
members. This relates closely to the issue of motivating and retaining existing staff and 
thus closely linked to the attraction of talent dimension. Empirical evidence in this 
group of organisations shows that ERC related reputation and prestige are very likely lead 
to further internal differentiation among staff members. Generally, ERC grantees are – 
given the amount of funding they bring and the reputation and autonomy they enjoy – 
in a privileged bargaining position towards their hosting university. 
 “The ERC is important in our career policy, … personal grants become increasingly 
important in our decision to take someone’s career to the next level.”  
For in-between organisations those pressures are critical, as large ERC grants are 
potentially more disruptive than in top organisations that, generally speaking, have 
better funding endowments and more success in other high level schemes. Whether 
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and how this challenge can be handled depends on the size and tasks of the unit as 
well as on previous experience with comparable grants.  
Our empirical evidence shows that a talent-oriented strategy prevails over a (top down pre-
defined) research priorities strategy. This means, in essence, that the urge to attract and 
retain top class researchers is top priority, the definition of a research strategy follows 
from that.  
Applying for ERC grants or having attracted ERC grants strengthens and extends 
existing mechanisms for recruitment and retention of top talent. Thus, some 
organisations have been setting up internal peer committees to further develop proposals 
in terms of content as an important means for ERC grantee support. These peer 
committees play an additional role in terms of assuring internal quality control over 
research conducted by potential grantees.  
“We make a pre-selection; we select only those researchers who have a high chance of 
success when applying […] If a researcher decided to apply, the faculty will involve a 
financial expert and they will appoint a sparring partner for the researcher”. 
This latter finding, the internal filter for ERC applications, is an expression of a deeper 
tension between objectives. On the one hand, the ERC schemes target individuals and 
seek to fund risky, unconventional research. On the other hand, the ERC is intending 
to support research organisations to become strategic actors and thus defines an 
organisational role in supporting ERC grants and grant getting. But by doing that 
organisations and their units could counteract an essential part of the spirit of the ERC, 
by pre-selecting proposals and potentially eliminating ‘risk’ at this level.  
9.3	  ERC’s	  impact	  on	  ‘weak’	  research	  organisations	  
9.3.1	  Perceived	  performance	  and	  visibility	  
The impact of the ERC on weak organisations is fairly low and limited to isolated sub-
fields and sub-units. At the level of sub-units ERC grants seem to make a difference 
and allow institutes and labs to position themselves better internationally and to gain 
further reputation.  
Further, ERC grants afford the opportunity to establish new fields or research avenues. 
These grants allow researchers and organisations to bypass traditional, national 
hierarchies and fields. In this respect ERC grants seem to contribute to the creation of 
additional pockets of excellence within weaker organisations.  
9.3.2	  Strategic	  capabilities	  
This group of organisations are normally characterised by very low level of financial 
endowment, limited discretion over spending decisions, rigid recruitment structures, 
problems with recruitment more generally and a lack of top-down quality policies, 
steering and priority setting processes. Thus, in line with our expectations, we found 
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that impacts on strategic capabilities appear only on the level of individual research groups, 
labs or institutes. Because the ERC grant(s) is disproportionately large compared to the 
finances of the organisation (sub-unit) its effects at the lower organisational levels can 
be considerable.  
“Real research can only be performed when additional external funds are acquired; this 
substantially impacts on (the organisations’) ability for steering of research strategies”.  
In weak organisations ERC grantees with loads of funds, flexibility and freedom are 
(and are seen) truly outliers. They change the geometry, habits and perceptions within 
their immediate surroundings.  
In these organisations, grantees are role models and they are highly visible. There is 
low level of strategic research planning at all levels; where this exists, it is driven by 
the grants rather than by developing the conditions for getting grants.  
As some weak organisations saw the ERC grant(s) as an important source of income, 
they developed considerable efforts to rush scientists into applications. The 
subsequent lack of success led to disillusion, positively speaking to a stronger sense of 
reality: the ERC story highlights existing weaknesses, but is not seen as a remedy. 
Consequently, these organisations turn their sight to more ‘local’ and/or specific 
opportunities. For instance, some interviewees emphasised the importance of the 
Structural Funds and its bureaucratic burdens.  
Weak organisations, with or without grantees, do not experience ERC’s impact at the 
overall organisational level. The organisations interviewed share (i) a high degree of 
decentralisation and (ii) lack of vigour as regards priority setting, recruiting, providing 
incentives or quality policy. These practices have not seen changes due to ERC as such 
or through grants. In sum, in weak organisations the symbolic and material value of 
the ERC is insufficient to induce change. 
9.3.3	  Support,	  attraction	  and	  retention	  of	  talent	  
Weaker organisations in general face greater problems to recruit and retain top people. 
Many weak organisations are not in the position to offer favourable conditions of 
employment and for research and they lack structured recruitment policies. Within the 
organisations in this group, change can be and is being introduced on a lower level, but 
mainly erratic and unplanned. For example, they try to attract researchers from their 
own countries’ origin who have started or successfully mastered their career abroad. 
Another strategy includes the already mentioned creation of pockets of excellence in 
some labs or parts of the organisation, and therefore become internationally attractive 
at least in a few sub-fields.  
Both strategies are used as regards ERC and ERC grants: excellent expatriates are lured 
back with the possibility of a (Starting) Grant, and ERC grants help in building pockets 
of excellence. However evidence is unclear, due to the small number of grants and the 
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competitive nature of the ERC. The same holds true for support offered to potential 
grantees during the application phase; even though individual solutions may turn out 
to be helpful, there are no formalized structures in place.  
For weak organisations that do host grantees, the impact is twofold: first they have 
something to offer (in case of success and paid by ERC) they could not offer on their 
own. Second through ERC grants they can establish special areas where different 
dynamics apply: more freedom, more flexibility, more focus on competition and 
quality.  
For weak organisations without grantees, there is no impact; for them the record of not 
hosting any grantee merely confirms the unfavourable conditions they have to operate 
within. The performance gap is just too high, the requirements of ERC are too 
stringent, the ERC is too far away to send any signals that could trigger any response 
that can be read as impacts.  
9.4	  Summary	  
In a nutshell, our investigation of the effect of the ERC on different kinds of research 
organisations at this stage shows that: 
• The ERC and its funding schemes do not have (and cannot be expected to have) 
strong impact on top research performers and on research organisations that are 
lagging far behind these. More often than not, top performers are subjected to 
other pressures for change (national and global) and the ERC merely enhances 
and/or is used as part of rhetoric for particular developments. ‘Weak’ 
organisations, on the other hand, are too much behind to realistically hope to be 
able to compete for ERC grants and grantees. 
• Impact is most pronounced in the research organisations that are just below the 
top research performers since the existence of the ERC as well as attracting 
some grants is used to overhaul the organisation. This enables the development 
and implementation of structures and practices conducive to research 
excellence and enabling more favourable outcome in wining, attracting and 
retaining ERC grants. 
• ERC grants attracted by second tier research organisations can generate 
organisational imbalances by creating imperatives for redirecting resources. 
• Many changes occur at lower organisational levels which makes us question 
whether the university or research institute as such is the appropriate study 
level. 
• Change found in different research organisations cannot be fully attributed to 
the ERC and its funding schemes – but it contributes to the speed and scope of 
the changes, in some cases crucially. 
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Chapter	  10:	  ERC’s	  impact	  on	  national	  research	  funders	  and	  spaces	  
In this part of the report we discuss changes of national funding organisations and 
spaces (research councils and equivalent) at four different levels of aggregation: a) 
systemic level, the level of the organisations, the level of funding instruments and the 
level of procedures and practices. 
These changes cannot be attributed to the establishment of the ERC in the strict sense 
(see Chapter 5). Since there are other social forces that underpin both the establishment 
of the ERC and some of the changes described here, these are more a result of mutual 
alignment and adjustment. This, however, doesn’t mean that these changes are not 
significant or important. 
10.1	  Systemic	  level	  
Our results show that there have been effects associated with the establishment of the 
ERC at systemic level. These are evident in state led national funding spaces where a 
transformation to a research council led system has occurred. 
At the time of establishment of the ERC only few EU member states still had a state-
led system for funding research. These were France, Italy, Poland, and Spain. France 
and Poland were part of this study and in both we found profound processes of 
transition to a council led system.  
Thus, Poland recently underwent a change (2007-2010) whereby the previous 
Ministry-centered system was changed into a council led system. Two councils were 
set up: the National Science Centre focusing on basic research and the National Centre 
for Research and Development the remit of which is more applied and innovation 
based. Our interviewees pointed out that the change from state-led to research council 
based national research space was discussed a number of times after 1989. This debate, 
however, did not gather sufficient legitimacy so the transformation can be enacted. 
What brought legitimacy to the proponents of a council based system was the poor 
performance of Poland in the ERC calls; this was framed in terms of the old fashioned 
funding system of the country that doesn’t provide an environment conducive to 
competition and selectivity. In turn, this means that Polish researchers are at a 
disadvantage when it comes to competing for prestigious, international project grants. 
France is another country that did not have an actual system of research councils 
allocating research funds extramurally, but these were allocated by the Ministry of 
Research. In addition, France had, and still has, a powerful public research centre 
CNRS which funds besides research in its own labs, that carried out in the universities. 
The new funding body was decided in 2004, and started its activities in 2005. In effect, 
it precedes the establishment of the ERC and thus this change cannot be interpreted as 
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one of its impacts. According to one interviewee, the model for the ANR was obtained 
from the German DGF; and the examples of the US NSF and the Canadian Research 
Council were also important. However, the debate for establishing the ERC was used 
to lend legitimacy to the establishment of a dedicated research funding agency for 
project based funding. 
In brief, whilst the changes of the two science systems, these of France and Poland, 
have been profound the debate about and the establishment of the ERC provided 
legitimacy to the introduction of a novel characteristic – move towards project based-
funding – and a model of good practice for setting up dedicated research funding 
agencies. 
10.2	  Impact	  of	  the	  ERC	  at	  the	  level	  of	  organisations	  
In this section we take a snap shot of the support principles of the research funding 
bodies included in our study and compare these with the principles of support of the 
ERC. A summary of our findings is presented in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Similarity of the principles of support of the funding agencies with those of 
the ERC (not including Polish National Science Centre, established in 2011) 
 Prom
otion of 
excellence an 
im
portant goal 
Prom
otion of 
frontier 
research, risky 
research 
Bottom
-up 
principle 
Support of 
individuals 
Support of 
collaboration / 
netw
orks 
Them
atic 
support areas 
Socio-econom
ic 
challenges 
Austria 
FWF 
X - x X x x (x) 
CH 
SNSF 
X - x x x x (x) 
France 
ANR 
X (x) x* - X X X 
Germany 
DFG 
X x** x x x x x 
The 
Netherlands 
NWO 
X x x x x x (x) 
(increasing) 
Norway 
RCN 
In science 
part (17% of 
funding) 
- (x) (x) x X X 
UK EPSRC X -*** x x X X X 
UK ESRC X -*** X x x x X 
ERC X X X X - - - 
Key:  
X (in BOLD) means of great importance; x, of medium importance; (x), of low or uncertain importance. 
* = 35% of ANR funds are to non-thematic research proposals, 65% to thematic research programmes. 
** = Reinhart Koselleck Projects 
*** = ‘all supported research is frontier research’ thus no specific funding instruments adopted. 
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Notes:  
Table 13 does not include the Polish National Science Centre that started its activities in 2011. For ANR 
there are intentions to launch a special call for risky research but the details are so far uncertain. Funder 
acronyms are detailed in the Annex. 
 
Looking at Table 13, the support principles of the ERC and of the national research 
councils studied by EURECIA are very similar41 with one exception: the ERC is the 
only one to explicitly promote and support risky, path-breaking, ‘frontier’ research on 
a large scale. We found that DFG has a scheme specifically promoting risky research 
(the Reinhart Koselleck Projects) and our interviewees from the Dutch NWO and 
Swiss SNSF noted that the promotion of frontier and risky research was important for 
their organizations.  
We could not trace this as funding support principle through the official documents of 
the Swiss SNSF, however, which lets us question its importance as a policy concern. By 
contrast, supporting path-breaking, risky research was clearly stated to be a policy 
concern in the official strategy documents relating to the Dutch research council 
system (2007-2010 and 2011-2014). This is certainly a change that can be associated 
with the establishment of the ERC, since frontier research or risk-taking were not 
mentioned in research policy documentation before the ERC highlighted them and 
posited them as a central part of its mission. It is a different question whether and the 
extent to which the formulation of the strategy is translated into funding practices and 
support forms.  
Generally, research councils, originally established to fund basic research, have in 
recent decades been faced with increasing demands for widening their activities towards 
fulfilling a variety of societal objectives and expanding their activities to include mission-
oriented research. The ERC model is one which focuses – at least, so far – on a 
narrower mission, the promotion of excellence and frontier research – and at a 
symbolic level, reinforces the rationale for basic research funding council. This model 
could influence the national-level funding bodies by the provision of support or 
arguments to maintain a balance in the promotion of non-thematic research and 
bottom-up activities vs. thematic and top-down activities. The Austrian FWF is, 
according to the interviews, facing increasing pressures towards more societal 
relevance, and it was reported that in this situation, the establishment of the ERC provided 
arguments to support scientifically top-level research. This type of impact is symbolic and 
reinforces the traditional values of a research council system funding basic research.  
Finally, another way to measure the impact of the ERC on the strategies and principles 
of the national funding agencies and bodies would be to consider the share of funds 
                                                
41 This is not surprising given that European level developments are inevitably a result of interaction with 
stakeholders, negotiation and compromise. 
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going to a responsive and non-programmatic support of research and the 
development of this share over time, to the extent that such breakdown data are 
available. If there is impact from the ERC we can assume that this share will increase 
after the emergence of the ERC. This could not be done in this explorative study, but it 
is mentioned as a way forward.  
10.3	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  ERC	  at	  the	  level	  of	  support	  instruments	  
Table 13 offers a comparison between the support instruments of the national research 
councils in our study and the ERC.  
The German Reinhart Koselleck Projects were started in 2008 and are an emulation of 
the Advanced Grants of the ERC. The projects are for five years, the funding ranges 
from 500 000 EUR to 1.25 million per project, and they are for research projects “that 
are highly innovative and risky in a positive sense” (Press release, 7, February, 2008, 
DFG). The formulation of the goals of the scheme closely resembles the goal-setting of 
the ERC grant schemes. They are, nevertheless, smaller than the AdG. We also found 
that the Dutch NWO has a scheme to support risky research since 2001, thus preceding 
the launch of the ERC schemes. None of the schemes of the national funding councils 
we looked at is identical or even sufficiently similar to the schemes of the ERC – these 
schemes provide conditions for research and researchers that are different from the 
conditions provided by the ERC in terms of amount of funding, time and portability of 
grant. 
A mechanism for interaction between the national research councils and the ERC at 
this level is through overlapping researcher applications. Here, we find that the ANR 
issued a special support scheme for French StG applicants who passed the quality 
threshold in the first StG call but were not funded. In Norway, OYI applicants are 
obliged to submit an application to the ERC StG scheme as well, and if they pass the 
threshold, but do not obtain the grant, they get 75% of the funds from the national 
council. These developments, however, are ‘adjustments’ to rather than impacts of the 
existence of the ERC.  
 
10.4	  Processes	  
In terms of the similarity of the processes, we focused on peer review which is the 
cornerstone of the selection process in research councils and thus crucial to the 
selection outcome. We compared the national research councils in our study and the 
ERC in terms of two dimensions of peer review, namely whether it is international or 
not and whether selection is done by rating or ranking as a proxy for the relative 
influence of peers and council officials in the process.  
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Table 14: Similarity to the ERC in processes (peer review)* 
 Austria  
FW
F 
CH
 
SN
SF 
French 
AN
R 
Germ
any 
DFG 
The 
N
etherlands 
 N
W
O 
N
orw
ay 
RCN
 
UK 
EPSRC 
UK 
ESRC 
Inter-
national 
peer 
review 
Yes (for 
longer 
than 
the last 
decade) 
Varying 
by 
scheme, 
in 
general, 
more and 
more 
internati
onal 
Varying 
dependin
g on the 
panel 
(25-40%) 
To some 
extent, 
varies 
In 80% 
internation
al; the 20% 
where not 
used are 
focused on 
Dutch 
areas 
Almost all 
are 
internation
al peers 
To some 
extent (10 
% of the 
panelists) 
To a 
very 
small 
extent 
Role of 
Peer 
review 
(ranking, 
rating) 
 Rating, 
advisory 
Ranking Ranking Ranking 
(interpretat
ion) 
Ranking Rating, 
the 
ERSRC 
makes 
the final 
selection 
Rating 
     NWO “is 
the 
Mercedes 
of Europe”  
   
*The table does not include the Polish National Science Centre that started its activities in 2011. The 
Polish system, however, emulates the peer review system of the ERC. 
 
International peer review and one in which the peers have the power of selection are 
the features of the ERC peer review. It seems that peer review is over the years, 
increasingly, becoming international though in the studied countries it varies by 
scheme type. In most systems for which we have information the reviewers rank the 
applicants, that is, the experts effectively make the selection. There are many other 
features which also matter, but for which we do not have information. The criteria of 
the review, the information base, inclusion of interviews etc. also matter for the 
outcome of peer review, but we do not have enough information of them to be able to 
make far-reaching comparisons.  
10.5	  Summary	  
Our study of the changes of national research funders and funding spaces that can be 
linked to the debates, establishment and functioning of the ERC show that: 
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• At the systemic level: 
o In state-led systems with no funding councils, the ERC provided a 
general model of funding body (Poland) and/or legitimacy for the 
creation of a funding council (France). 
• At the level of the structure of the funding council: 
o The ERC provided an organizational model for the newly established 
research councils (e.g. the National Science Centre in Poland) 
• At the level of strategy, funding instruments and support principles: 
o The ERC reinforced the position of the Research Council systems in 
funding fundamental or bottom-up research or individual researchers 
(Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway) 
o The ERC provided a model for the support of highly innovative, risky 
research (Reinhart Koselleck Projects, Germany) 
o The ERC reinforced the Europeanisation of activities (Germany, Norway) 
• At the level of processes: 
o Some research councils subcontracted evaluation of applications to the 
ERC (Norway for OYI scheme) 
o The ERC reinforced the importance of internationalisation in peer 
review, and overall, reinforced cross-European competition  
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Chapter	  11:	  Impact	  of	  the	  ERC	  on	  the	  European	  funding	  landscape	  
11.1	  Findings	  at	  the	  level	  of	  research	  policy	  	  
11.1.1	  Changes	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  ERA	  	  	  
The notion of the European Research Area (ERA) was adopted in 2000 in parallel with 
the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy targets and can be regarded as one of the means to 
achieve it. The notion has evolved during its life-time of about ten years. The process 
of promoting the idea of a European Research Council has affected the notion of ERA.   
The range of questions which the ERA concept includes has become wider, and 
towards the end of the decade, environmental and social issues gained importance 
(Luukkonen, 2010).  Since 2007, however, excellence has gained prominence on the 
policy agenda. ERA has embraced, besides the ‘internal market’ in research and better 
coordination of national research activities and programmes with each other and those 
of the Community, the promotion of research excellence, more effective knowledge 
sharing and transfer, and addressing pressing societal problems.  
11.1.2	  Moving	  excellence	  to	  the	  core	  of	  European	  research	  policy	  
Our analysis shows that during the debate on a European Research Council, support of 
basic research became legitimate for EU through reference to the underlying assumptions 
about the need to build up excellent research organisations, which were part of the 
ERA vision and were part of the broader knowledge-based society objectives. At the 
same time, this debate changed the way European research policy was framed. It put forward 
the question of basic research and research excellence on the EU research and 
innovation policy agenda. While this debate continued, it highlighted the importance 
of excellence for the whole ERA initiative. It thus got fuel from the ERA but also 
changed the way in which the ERA and the achievement of its targets were perceived. 
Issues of excellence became part of the way in which both the ‘causal’ and ‘normative’ 
ideas were framed (see Edler, 2003)42. This development was visible in the gradual 
evolution of the way in which excellence was dealt with in important policy 
documents of the EU (Luukkonen, 2010).  
This process of aligning European level research policy along lines of basic research 
and excellence culminated in the summer of 2004 when the Spring Council concluded 
that there is “merit in enhanced support for basic research of highest quality”. 
Similarly, the informal Competitiveness Council of 1-3 July 2004 welcomed the 
creation of “a mechanism to support research conducted by individual teams in a 
                                                
42 The distinction is based on Edler (2003, p. 102–103). Causal ideas “help define the current situation and explain 
what action leads to what outcome”, normative ideas “suggest where one should head and what is perceived as 
legitimate”.  
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competition at European level and expressed its will to conclude before the end of 
2004 on the principles for such a funding mechanism” (Interim Working Document, 
2004). 
Henceforward, promotion of excellence has featured as an important target among the ERA 
objectives. For example, the Green Paper on ERA (Inventing our Future Together, 2007) 
highlighted excellence of researchers and research institutions as well as world-class 
infrastructures as ERA targets. Further, the Lund Declaration (2009) noted the fact that 
meeting the Grand Challenges requires, among other things, “strengthening frontier 
research initiated by the research community itself” and “excellence and well-
networked knowledge institutions”. The report by the European Research Area Board 
of 2009, entitled “Preparing Europe for a new Renaissance”, advocated “an ERA to 
deliver excellence … where risk-taking in research, regardless of its public or private 
origin, will be the guiding principle for ERA policy” as one of the six areas of action 
the Board outlined (Preparing Europe for a New Renaissance, 2009). These quotes 
seem directly to point to the principles of the ERC to promote excellence, frontier 
research and risk-taking43. The proposal for the new framework programme, Horizon 
2020, adopted in 2011, highlights the importance of the excellence agenda by the fact 
that excellence is one of the three major objectives and priorities of the programme44.  
However, the ERC is not the only inspiration behind this concern for excellence. In the 
Framework Programme projects are selected on the basis of evaluation using S&T 
quality as one of the criteria. However, it is not the only criterion and attention to 
potential impacts and the consortium composition have played an equally important 
role. Thus, the ERC is the only part of the EU funding tools regarding excellence as the 
sole criterion of selection, though there are other EU programmes, such as Marie Curie, 
infrastructure programme and in the FET (Future Emerging Technologies) which 
support basic research.   
11.1.3	  Redefining	  European	  value	  added	  
Traditionally the European added value in research policy was framed in terms of the 
general principle of subsidiarity which is expressed in the consolidated Treaty of 
Lisbon (art. 5) as follows:  
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”  
                                                
43 See http://erc.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=12.  
44 http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm?pg=h2020-documents  
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This principle has traditionally been interpreted to justify the funding of research 
collaboration through transnational consortia (Muldur et al., 2006, p. 186) and enabling 
cooperation. This had to be re-defined were the establishment of the ERC to be possible. 
The Communication from the Commission “Europe and Basic Research” (COM(2004)9 
final, 14.1.2004) already expressed a new definition of European added value justifying 
the establishment of the ERC, namely “the added value which comes from competition at 
EU level” (p. 13). At the Dublin Conference on the ERC entitled “Europe’s Search for 
Excellence in Basic Research” on 16-17 February, 2004, Dr. Achilles Mitsos, the then 
Director-General for Science, Research and Development, presented this new 
interpretation of European value added, and referred to the fact that “competition is to 
be on a European scale, drawing on an enlarged pool of researchers” (p. 36).  
In a nutshell, during the debate regarding the establishment of the ERC, the notion of 
European added value was re-defined from ‘cooperation and collaboration’ to 
‘competition’. 
11.2	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  ERC	  at	  organisational	  level	  
We studied four organisational entities at European level to gauge the impact of the 
ERC. These were selected on the basis of their (assumed) membership in a European 
level organisational field; this field is outlined by the similarity between organisations 
in terms missions, objectives and activities. The organisations studies by EURECIA are 
presented in Table 15. 
Table 15: European-level organisations/schemes in descending order of presumed 
closeness to the ERC 
 
FP: NEST; FET 
ESF; EUROHORCs 
EMBO 
COST 
 
Our findings regarding similarity and difference between different research funding 
and policy organisations at the European level are summarised in Table 16 (for a more 
detailed description of the organisations included in EURECIA please see the WP6 
report). 
Although all these organisations share basic values and principles associated with the 
promotion of excellence and bottom up and in some cases even risky research the 
differences are large enough to make it possible to avoid the need for major 
‘organisational’ adjustments. In many respects, their aims, remit and activities 
complement rather than compete with these of the ERC. Furthermore, these set out to 
achieve these aims by using policy and funding instruments that are substantive 
different from the ones used by the ERC. 
 106 
Thus, despite the fact that the ERC is universally regarded as having achieved a high 
level of excellence in its activities and practices (particularly peer review) positive 
coordination and/or policy learning at the European level have been limited. 
Interestingly, we found some effects on the FP in that administrative principles first 
applied by the ERC (including re-imbursement levels, time keeping rules and audit 
principles) have been included in the proposal for the next programme, Horizon 2020. 
Table 16: Comparison of the ERC and the other European funding organisations or 
schemes 
 ERC FET and 
NEST in FP 
ESF + 
EUROHORCs 
EMBO COST 
Promotion of 
excellence an important 
goal 
x  X x  
Promotion of frontier 
research, risky research 
x x    
Promotion of goal-
oriented research 
 x   x 
Bottom-up principle x partially X x x 
Support of individuals x   x  
Collaboration a 
precondition for 
funding 
 x X  x 
No thematic support 
areas 
x partially    
The organization 
allocates, in contrast to 
coordinates, money to 
carry out research 
x x  (x)  
Peer review and final 
selection of projects at 
European level 
x x Peer review x  
Peer review and final 
selection of projects at 
national level 
  X (x) x 
 
There is some evidence of negative coordination, namely the discontinuation of some 
policy instruments to make room for the instruments of the ERC. Examples here are 
provided by the ESF-EUROHORCs EURYI and the FP6 NEST Programme.  
None of the interviewees mentioned that there existed any competition between their 
organisation and the ERC as such. Some (COST) hoped for positive coordination with 
the ERC in the form of linking their activities with those of the ERC, like suggesting 
that they could provide opportunities for networking the ERC grantees with each 
other. Our interviewees tended to emphasise the joint principles they had with the 
ERC, for example, the bottom-up principle in their support. Like several of the 
European scientific and scholarly associations interviewed45, most of these 
                                                
45 ALLEA, EUA, EASAC, Academia Europaea, EARTO, EIRMA, and BUSINESSEUROPE. 
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organisations had been actively involved in the process of promoting the emergence of 
an ERC and felt that the ERC supported values they believe in, and share.  
In a nutshell, with regard to the impacts of the ERC on the above organisations, very 
little could so far be seen apart from very few examples of negative coordination. 
11.3	  Summary	  
We found that: 
• The ERC has brought about a number of principal changes in the EU research 
funding policy. These include strengthening the importance of excellence on 
the ERA agenda, changes in traditional principles in EU support to research 
(support of individuals vs. organisations; no ‘just retour’; not pre-allocation of 
funds to fields or specific areas; fundamental research  vs. targeted research), 
modification of the definition of European value-added in research support (in 
addition to international collaboration, competition at European level), and 
providing an important case, the only programme allocating EU money only, 
where strategy formulation and the implementation of the strategy has been 
delegated to external stakeholders. The ERC has provided a test ground for 
simpler administrative procedures which will eventually be adopted in Horizon 
2020. 
• At the level of European research funding organisations, the ERC has brought 
about fewer changes. The ERC has been defined in such a way that a full 
overlap does not exist with any other funding organisation in strategy or 
funding schemes. Where there is overlap in instruments, as with the ESF-
Eurohorcs EURYI, these have been withdrawn. There is no evidence that this 
has been necessarily caused by the emergence of the ERC.  
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Chapter	  12:	  Impact	  mechanisms:	  preliminary	  findings	  
At this stage of the research (before conducting Stage Two data collection) the impact 
mechanisms set out in Chapter 5 cannot be discussed in much detail. It is possible, 
however, to approach the three sets of issues noted in Chapter 5, namely: 
• Are the signals sent by the ERC strong and distinctive? 
• How are these signals perceived by different constituencies? 
• What are the opportunities that the ERC and its funding schemes provide and 
how do these match the properties and needs of the empirical objects? 
This chapter builds on data collected by the different parts of the study and by 
different methods. 
12.1	  Are	  the	  signals	  sent	  by	  the	  ERC	  strong	  and	  distinctive?	  
The issues around the strength and distinctiveness of the ERC signals are inter-related. 
In fact, it can be argued that signals strength is increased by their distinctiveness. At 
any rate, the ERC sends strong signals in two ways: a) by being in charge of a generous 
budget (during the 7th FP ERC’s budget was €7.51 billion set to increase during H-
2020) and offering relatively generous grants for research; and b) by becoming a 
marker for research excellence. 
As to the distinctiveness of the signals, our research provides indications that the ERC 
and its funding schemes are fairly unique; this is equally valid where the European 
level is concerned and regarding the national level. At European level, the ERC is 
different from the organizational arrangements discussed above in five substantive 
ways: (i) explicitly focuses on supporting research at or beyond the frontiers of 
knowledge; (ii) supports investigator-driven, rather than programmatic, research; (iii) 
has a budget and allocates funding (unlike the ESF and COST); (iv) has few clear and 
targeted goals (unlike the FPs); and (v) uses peer-reviewed scientific excellence as the 
sole criterion for selection rather than as a discourse for achieving other political goals 
(Nedeva & Stampfer, 2012). At the national level it is different mainly in its clear call 
for more risky, ‘frontier’ research proposals and by the fact that it operates at trans-
national level; hence in effect it selects from a much broader pool of outstanding 
researchers at different career stages. 
12.2	  How	  are	  these	  signals	  perceived	  by	  different	  constituencies?	  
Our survey provide information about the way in which respondents – both grantees 
and controls – regard different characteristics of the ERC as compared to these of a 
range of other funder. The results are presented in Tables 17 and 18. 
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Table 17: The ERC and other funding organisations: Starting Grant recipients 
 High 
reputation/pre
stige 
H
igh quality 
peer review
 
Low
 
adm
inistrativ
e burden 
A
ppropriate 
grant size 
Enables novel 
/ innovative 
research 
Enables inter-
national 
collaboration 
H
elps 
significant 
research 
findings to be 
achieved 
Own university 19% 9% 25% 7% 19% 28% 12% 
National 
funding agency 
14% 27% 21% 20% 28% 23% 28% 
ERC 66% 49% 26% 66% 64% 46% 56% 
ESF 4% 4% 2% 1% 5% 9% 1% 
EU FP 
(excluding 
ERC) 
15% 6% 3% 17% 12% 33% 12% 
Industry 3% 1% 9% 6% 7% 1% 6% 
Charities 9% 5% 25% 10% 14% 12% 12% 
Source: Thomas, Nedeva, 2011 
Table 18: The ERC and other funding organisations: control group 
 High 
reputation / 
prestige 
H
igh quality 
peer review
 
Low
 
adm
inistrativ
e burden 
A
ppropriate 
grant size 
Enables novel 
/ innovative 
research 
Enables inter-
national 
collaboration 
H
elps 
significant 
research 
findings to be 
achieved 
Own university 17% 11% 26% 15% 22% 22% 22% 
National 
funding agency 
17% 24% 22% 26% 22% 17% 26% 
ERC 57% 33% 13% 65% 43% 28% 46% 
ESF 13% 13% 0% 9% 9% 11% 9% 
EU FP 
(excluding 
ERC) 
15% 11% 0% 24% 15% 30% 17% 
Industry 0% 0% 15% 13% 2% 4% 9% 
Charities 11% 11% 13% 15% 13% 7% 12% 
Source: Thomas, Nedeva, 2011 
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It is apparent that very shortly after its establishment the ERC was seen by its grantees 
and by the members of the control group as a research funding organisation that 
outperforms other research funders in terms of: reputation, quality of peer review, 
appropriate grant size and the opportunity it affords for the conduct of highly 
innovative research. 
Our interviews with representatives of research organisations provided evidence that 
the ERC is seen as a ‘marker of excellence’. ERC grants assign prestige and symbolise 
excellence of individuals and of host organisations. There is high awareness amongst 
strategic leaders and the ERC has already acquired a high level of credibility. It is used 
as benchmark for quality between organisations and within organisations. By and 
large, this impact could be found at all organisational levels. Although our sample is 
biased towards grant getting organisations, it is obvious that the symbolic value is 
relevant across the board. This symbolic effect is strongest for top organisations and 
those in-betweens who claim to compete on excellence. Weaker organisations see less 
symbolic value in the ERC, for them the prestige – excellence gap is just too big. 
We also found that the initial opinion expressed in the interviews with European 
stakeholder groups (their list in the appendix) is that the ERC has achieved excellence 
in its operations and panels within a short time. However, there was also recognition 
of the tension(s) between the rules and procedures of the scientific and scholarly 
communities and the EU Commission. This is in line with and complements the 
findings of the EURECIA team exploring the effects of the ERC on research 
organisations (WP5). This results show that the symbolic value of the ERC is already 
vast for European research organisations (Edler et al., 2011). ERC grants carry high 
prestige and are regarded as symbols for excellence which differentiate individuals 
and host institutions. ERC grants are in some cases already used as benchmarks for 
quality across organisations and units within organisations. 
According to one of the interviewees for this study, the US National Science 
Foundation “belongs to the same league” of funding organisations and is a real 
competitor of the ERC in terms of organisational performance, rather than the national 
level funding organizations. The ERC is attracting review panel members and 
researchers to return or to move to Europe from all over the world. The willingness of 
scientists and scholars to serve on the panels or to apply and move to Europe is 
dependent on how they perceive the ERC. Thus, in addition to other funding 
organizations in Europe, at the European and national level, and other stakeholders 
(public and private bodies) in Europe, stakeholders all over the world play a role in the 
building of the legitimacy and institutionalisation of the new organization.  
Discerning the ways in which national level funders regard the ERC was somewhat 
more problematic are depends on the type of funding space and its level of 
institutionalisation and perceived reputation. Building on the perceived reputation 
and importance of the ERC as European level funder of frontier, risky and excellent 
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research forces in France and Poland managed to mobilize discourses for the 
transformation of their national research spaces. In the UK, on the other hand, the 
attitude towards the ERC can be expressed by the phrase ‘live and let be’. 
12.3	  Opportunities	  provided	  by	  the	  ERC	  funding	  schemes	  and	  grants	  
Figure 8 provides an illustration of the relationship(s) between the epistemic 
properties of research discussed elsewhere in this report, the conditions for success of 
the projects funded by the ERC and the conditions that the ERC grants offer to 
researchers. 
Figure 8: Links between epistemic properties of research, conditions for project 
success, and properties of ERC grants 
 
The ERC funding does offer the particular conditions of project success. In the eyes of 
grantees from some countries, it is the only source of funding that provides the 
necessary conditions described above, at least for researchers of the ‘starting 
investigator’ category. It is important to note here that it is not important whether this 
perception by grantees is correct. It might well be that a national funding agency 
would indeed fund a risky project or exceptionally expensive equipment. However, if 
potential applicants don’t believe this and therefore don’t apply, the research will not 
be conducted. People base their actions on their perceptions, and the perception that 
the ERC behaves in a certain way is the ultimate reason that projects with certain 
properties are conducted today. 
It is also worth noting that the conditions for success of the selected research projects 
that are provided by the ERC funding schemes are necessary but not sufficient for this 
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research to come to be regarded as path-breaking. The other conditions, however, are 
beyond the remit and control of the ERC. 
There are other opportunities provided by the ERC’s funding schemes, like the 
opportunities for mobility, but at this stage it is too early to attempt to link these with 
specific ‘approach’ and ‘standing’ changes.  
12.4	  Summary	  
Whilst it would be too premature to attempt a detailed tracing the impact mechanisms 
before Stage Two data collection has been conducted there are early indications that 
changes in the science system, particularly the ones affecting the researchers, research 
and careers, can be attributed to the ERC and its funding schemes. Attribution is likely 
to be much weaker in the case of research organisations and highly problematic in the 
case of the European and national funding landscapes. For the time being, we can say 
that: 
• The ERC and its funding schemes appear to give reasonably fairly strong 
signals through the conditions of funding and becoming a symbol of research 
excellence. 
• These signals are also fairly unique since the ERC and its funding schemes are 
distinct from, and provide different opportunities when compared with, the 
other research funding organisations at European and national level.  
• There is evidence that the ERC and its funding schemes have come to be 
regarded as having (and carrying) very high reputation and prestige as a 
funder, high quality peer-review and as enabling innovative research by both 
grantees and controls responding to our survey. Furthermore, they placed the 
ERC far ahead of other funding agencies and opportunities in these respects. 
• The ERC was overwhelmingly seen as a marker of excellence by our 
respondents in research organisations and European steak-holder groups. This 
means that it already has considerable symbolic value. The situation is much 
less clear at the level of national funding organisations and landscapes. 
• The ERC funding schemes appear to provide the opportunities matching the 
epistemic properties and conditions for project success of the kind of research 
that the ERC aims to support. 
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Chapter	  13:	  Conclusions	  and	  next	  steps	  
In line with our overall objectives, EURECIA explored novel approaches and 
methodologies for studying the impact of the ERC on aspects of the science system 
and applied these to collect data on impact, early reported impact and information 
about the state of the potentially affected empirical objects at the first level of 
management. 
In this concluding chapter of this report, we offer a brief assessment of the 
methodology and summarise our preliminary empirical findings and the key 
messages that emerge from these. Finally, we offer some points regarding Stage Two 
data collection, measuring difference and the matter of attribution. 
13.1	  Conclusions	  about	  methodology	  
EURECIA explored approaches and methodologies to register and attribute the impact 
of the ERC and its funding schemes on six potentially affected aspects of science, 
namely researchers, the content of individual research, researchers’ careers, research 
organisations, national funders and funding spaces and the European research 
funding landscape. Since these demanded somewhat different approaches, the 
methodology that EURECIA developed and used was at two levels: overall 
methodological choices and methodologies tailored to the specific empirical objects. 
In terms of overall choices, EURECIA worked from a generalised definition of impact 
as a partially or wholly attributable difference and set out to explore methodologies 
that capture all four type of impact (see section 1.2.1). Furthermore, this is a real-time 
study the methodology of which builds on multiple (two) data collection points, uses a 
control group and aims to attribute impact by describing its ‘generative mechanisms’ 
or the mechanisms through this impact occurs (can occur). EURECIA also developed 
and tested multiple data collection instruments. 
13.1.1	  The	  issue	  of	  measurement	  	  
Following an assessment of the methodology(ies) developed and applied by EURECIA 
the following points emerge. 
• Survey with StG 2007 cohort grantees and controls. This approach allowed us 
to identify nineteen matching pairs of grantees and controls for further study at 
Stage Two of the study and to identify a number of ‘researcher’ types that will 
be used to analyse and compare data after Stage Two.  The questionnaire also 
provided useful information regarding the views of the respondents about their 
research organisations and the conditions they expect and their funding 
landscapes. This approach has an ‘inbuilt’ risk in that it relies on repeat 
measurement of the exact same respondents and hence response rate at Stage 
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Two may be an issue. It is also worth noting that we have identified a range of 
minor changes to fine tune and focus the questionnaire; these changes are not 
likely to affect the comparability of collected information. 
• Comparative case studies with grantees and controls. These developed a 
methodology to identify and attribute causally changes in the content of 
research and careers. It demonstrated that while it is too early to identify all 
changes and assess their depth and breadth, the potential change can be 
estimated and causally attributed to the ERC grants. It was also possible to 
explore how the ERC may produce change in the fields in which the grantees 
work. Using this methodology, we identified characteristics of ERC-funded 
research indicating that the research of grantees has already changed in 
response to the ERC funding schemes and that, in case of success of the project, 
this is likely not only to change individual research trails but also affect the 
research directions of their communities. 
• Complementarities between the survey and the comparative case studies. Both 
methods focus on empirical objects at the micro level approaching these in two 
different but complementary ways. By identifying ‘matching pairs’ to measure 
difference robustly, the survey prepared the ground for applying the 
methodology for causal attribution developed by the comparative case studies 
at Stage Two of the study. 
• Case studies of universities and research organisations. The approach 
developed in the context of these allowed us to identify change in universities 
and research organisations. There are three issues to consider here, however, 
namely a) the importance of the intervening organisational and funding 
landscape variables which make the changes difficult to predict and attribute; b) 
a more fruitful level of study may not be the organisation as a whole but its sub-
units; and c) since there are still many ‘unknowns’ regarding the ways in which 
universities and research organisations translate policy signals and act on these, 
it may be empirically and analytically useful to increase the depth of the case 
studies. 
• Case studies of national research councils. At this stage the cases studies relied 
mainly on interviews with representatives of the selected national research 
councils which were very informative in terms of allowing further development 
of the framework (levels of aggregation at which impact can occur) and 
provided information regarding the opinion of key people currently working in 
the organisations. This information, however, was complemented by other 
sources of data (like policy documents, budgetary information, documents 
about rules and structure etc.) only in a very limited way for reasons reaching 
beyond methodological considerations. This can be, and shall be, remedied at 
the Stage Two data collection. Apart from that, the instruments worked well. 
• Semi-structured interviews with representatives from European policy and 
funding organisations. This approach usefully collected information regarding 
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the complex and multifaceted processes of change and adjustment in both 
policy and research and funding organisations at European level. 
13.1.2	  Next	  steps	  
Conducting a Stage Two study is necessary to be able to complete the development of 
the methodology and to measure and attribute the impact of the ERC and its funding 
schemes on the science system reliably. More specifically: 
• Since we already have some awareness of what impact can be expected to occur 
in terms of researchers’ approach and standing, the questionnaire used by 
EURECIA can be considerably shortened. Furthermore, the survey could 
explore respondents’ perceptions of pressures for change of their organisations 
and funding environments in a more focused way. This will contribute to 
maintaining the response rate; methodologically, it is important to ensure that 
the respondents from Stage One do respond to the survey at Stage Two. 
• We believe that further work using the ‘matching pairs’ approach could be 
particularly fruitful in terms of the study of the impact of the ERC on 
researchers approach and standing and attributing it causally to the ERC. This 
will be done by using a combination between the survey methodology (to 
measure the difference between ERC grantees and controls robustly) and the 
comparative case studies methodology developed during EURECIA (to explore 
the possibilities for causally attributing these differences to the ERC grant). 
• Furthermore, the comparative case studies with grantees and controls should be 
complemented with a stage two investigation. This is to explore questions that 
could not be answered because the research funded by the ERC was not 
completed. These include: investigation of ‘functionally equivalents’ to the ERC 
grants funding schemes; the differential impact of the ERC grants across 
different research fields; the fate and effects of the exceptional research 
supported by the ERC; conditions for becoming an ERC grantee; and mid- and 
long term effects on careers. 
• Whilst we do believe that a next study of the effects of the ERC on research 
organisations is necessary, this will have to be revised. In light of the fact that 
the differences appear to be much more pronounced across types of universities 
rather than across national funding spaces it may appropriate to explore in 
more depth this dimension and design more detailed case studies. Moreover, 
we know that the effects are most pronounced and distinct at lower 
organisational levels. 
• The study of national funding agencies is also worth doing again but with 
somewhat changed emphasis. Because our the limitations in our understanding 
of how impact unfolds in the context of research funding organisations and 
national funding spaces the study carried out in EURECIA was necessarily  
exploratory. Stage Two will rely more on documents (such as policy documents, 
annual reports, and equivalent documents informing of the nature of the system 
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and on the strategy of the major funding organisations), and statistical data on 
the relative shares of funding streams. The data could be complemented with 
interviews, especially to obtain the necessary documentary and other data, 
possibly also to clarify the interpretation of the data. Documentary analysis will 
be done retrospectively. 
• At Stage Two, the study of the European funding landscape ought to be fairly 
light touch to ensure that ‘there are no surprises’ and to provide additional 
background to the study of national funding organisations and spaces. 
 
13.1.2.1	  The	  issue	  of	  attribution.	  	  
Our exploration shows that attribution is possible to different degrees at the micro 
level and the level of organisations. Partial causal attribution is possible in the case of 
researchers, content of research and careers. In other words, and conditional on 
carrying out Stage Two measurement, it may be possible to discern the impact 
mechanisms linking specific changes to the conditions provided by the ERC and its 
funding schemes so that we can claim that the conditions ‘cause’ the changes. This also 
implied that the changes can be expected to occur when the specific conditions are 
present.  
Such level of attribution is impossible to achieve in the case of research organisation 
because of the very high level of mediation and multiplicity of policy signals. In other 
words, linking the changes to the specific signals of the ERC in this case is a bit like 
being in a room of distorted mirrors: there is an overall likeness but it is by far not 
certain. Although the impact mechanisms can be described it is not likely to be ever 
possible to claim that the ERC is the ‘cause’ of such change; more likely than not the 
ERC could be expected to be a catalyst of certain developments. 
Attribution is probably most problematic in the case of the changes at the European 
and national funding landscapes. Whilst these can be related to the ERC and its 
properties, the processes we found can be more appropriately described as ‘mutual’ 
adjustment’ rather than as impact. 
13.1.3	  Standardisation	  of	  the	  methodology	  
At this stage of research and testing, full standardisation of the methodology is 
somewhat problematic. We believe, that this would be easier to achieve after a Stage 
Two measurement has been carried out and the impact mechanisms have been 
empirically confirmed. 
Even at this stage, however, it is possible to use the survey questionnaire and results to 
develop a fairly light touch instrument for continuous data collection that will allow 
the ERC to monitor their selection and the difference(s) that the grants have made (are 
making) in terms of the ‘approach’ and ‘standing’ of grantees. 
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13.2	  Conclusions	  about	  empirical	  findings	  
Our empirical finding provide initial evidence that the ERC, through its ambitious 
objectives, practices of selection and the conditions its funding schemes create for 
research with particular properties (‘frontier’, risky, innovative) to be carried out, can 
be expected to generate impact (affect) the science system and its different aspects in 
variety of ways. Whilst the ERC has already come to be considered by researchers, 
academic leaders of research organisations and others as a marker of research 
excellence, it is still a very new organisation. This means that: a) the ERC and its 
funding schemes are likely to develop and change, indeed these have been changing; 
and b) that at the time of data collection most effects were either at a very early stage 
or had not even started to occur. 
Thus, in terms of researchers and researchers’ careers, whilst some early effects related 
to the ERC grants have been reported, it is far too early to be able to draw any definite 
conclusions regarding their spread and/or persistence. These effects can be broadly 
placed under three categories: a) resource related effects; b) symbolic effects; and c) 
career related effects. Our respondents reported that the ERC grant has allowed them 
to leverage research funding from other sources; that an ERC grant, or even a 
shortlisted application for one, has increased their visibility and reputation, prestige 
and recognition; and that researchers got promoted faster than typical for their 
research field and organisational environment, had greater than typical resource 
autonomy, ability to start a research group and more freedom to pursue more 
risky/ambitious research. There were some adverse effects reported mainly related to 
the mismatch between the organisational conditions of the researchers and the 
conditions necessary to accommodate the ERC grant and the research it supports. 
It is worth noting that these early impacts, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree, were 
reported also by respondents from our control group who were shortlisted for the 
award but did not get it. This may be an early indication that the ERC can be expected 
to generate impacts on the ‘approach’ and ‘standing’ of European researchers not only 
through the conditions for research that its grants afford but also through the 
reputation and visibility of the ERC as a funder. 
More importantly, our research shows that the ERC and its funding schemes, through 
their selection practices and the characteristics of the grants, have created conditions 
for impact to occur. Thus, we found that both, Starting grantees and controls are a 
fairly homogenous set of very highly qualified and productive researchers setting a 
very high benchmark for ‘early career’. At the same time, our analysis shows that the 
researchers supported by the ERC have space to develop. Whether they do, how and 
what extent this occurs, and to what degree this can be attributed to the ERC and its 
funding schemes can be discerned only after another measurement and further testing 
of the impact mechanisms at play. EURECIA prepared the ground for that by 
collecting ‘stage one’ data about ‘approach’ and ‘standing’, identifying nineteen 
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matching pairs for ‘stage two’ data collection and analysis, and developing a number 
of ‘types’ to be used to analyse ‘stage two’ data. 
We also found the ERC grants had an impact on the research of grantees and, 
potentially, of their communities, by a) funding planned scientific innovations, which 
we defined as research findings that affect the research practices of a large number of 
researchers in one or more fields (i.e. choices of problems, methods or empirical 
objects); b) funding planned answers to ‘big questions’, which we defined as questions 
that are significantly more general than  common research questions of the social 
sciences and humanities and need to be answered on an exceptionally broad 
theoretical, methodological or empirical basis; and c) funding research that would 
otherwise not be funded, or would at least have been difficult to fund from other 
sources. Most of the investigated projects had epistemic properties that required 
uncommon funding conditions. The time frame, amount of funding, and flexible use of 
funding provided by ERC grants as well as the explicit invitation to submit risky and 
unconventional projects made grantees perceive the ERC grants as the only possible 
source of funding for their projects. Some of the grantees turned ideas they had for 
quite some time into project proposals because with the ERC, they saw a chance of 
getting them funded for the first time. Others turned to the ERC after failing 
repeatedly with national research councils because their projects were deemed as 
being of high quality but too risky. Yet another group of researchers developed new 
ideas for their proposals to the ERC.  
Despite some reported early impact on careers we found that a) the most important 
effect, career change because of the results of the ERC funded research, is still ahead; 
and b) generally, there has been relatively little initial impact on careers because: 
grantees are already relatively autonomous and at a high level of their national career 
ladder; career systems are not sufficiently flexible to enable negotiations on the basis of 
the reputation of the grant (except possibly in the UK and the Netherlands); 
organisational mobility is constrained by factors such as family arrangements and 
costs of moving laboratories. 
We also found that the ERC and its funding schemes do not have (and cannot be 
expected to have) strong impact on top research performers and on research 
organisations that are lagging far behind these. More often than not, top performers 
are subjected to other pressures for change (national and global) and the ERC merely 
enhances and/or is used as part of rhetoric for particular developments. In fact, impact 
is most pronounced in the research organisations that are just below the top research 
performers since the existence of the ERC as well as attracting some grants is used to 
overhaul the organisation and develop and implement the practices conducive to 
research excellence. At the same time, ERC grants attracted by second tier research 
organisations can generate organisational imbalances. Although the change we found 
in different research organisations cannot be fully attributed to the ERC and its 
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funding schemes – it contributes to the speed and scope of the changes, in some cases 
crucially. 
Where changes of national research funders and funding spaces is concerned we 
found that: a) in state-led systems with no funding councils, the ERC provided a 
general model of funding body (Poland) and/or legitimacy for the creation of a 
funding council (France); b) the ERC provided an organizational model for the newly 
established research councils; c) the ERC reinforced the position of the Research 
Council systems in funding fundamental or bottom-up research or individual 
researchers; and d) the ERC provided a model for the support of highly innovative, 
risky research and, in some cases, reinforced the Europeanisation of activities. 
At the level of the European funding landscape the ERC has brought about a number 
of changes in the EU research funding policy. These include strengthening the 
importance of excellence in the ERA agenda, changes of traditional principles in EU 
support to research (support of individuals vs. organisations; no ‘just retour’; not pre-
allocation of funds to fields or specific areas; fundamental research  vs. targeted 
research), modification of the definition of European value-added in research support 
(in addition to international collaboration, competition at European level), and 
providing an important case, the only programme allocating EU money only, where 
strategy formulation and the implementation of the strategy has been delegated to 
external stakeholders. At the level of European research funding organisations, the 
ERC has brought about fewer changes. The ERC has been defined in such a way that a 
full overlap does not exist with any other funding organisation in strategy or funding 
schemes. Where there is overlap in instruments, as with the ESF-Eurohorcs EURYI, 
these have been withdrawn. There is no evidence that this has been necessarily caused 
by the emergence of the ERC. 
Most impact we found, or have serious grounds to expect, is still not stable and there is 
no certainty that it will occur. This is either because of inherent characteristics of the 
potentially affected area(s) of change or because of the multiplicity of intermediate 
factors that are outside the remit and/or control of the ERC. In other words, the highly 
innovative, risky and excellent projects supported by the ERC can fail exactly because 
they are highly innovative and the exceptionally high level of uncertainty that such 
research involves. Effects on research organisations can be overshadowed by policy 
developments at national and regional level and changes at national funding level can 
be slowed down, or for that matter cancelled, by broader economic and policy 
developments. 
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13.3	  Three	  key	  messages	  
There are three key messages that follow from our findings. These are: 
• First, although the ERC supports highly innovative projects (‘frontier’ potential) 
it could be difficult to fund only path breaking, frontier science and it may be 
more realistic to recognise that its schemes will contribute to at least three 
types of research: path breaking innovations, developing radically new 
innovations, and excellent work within established trajectories. 
• Second, national research systems variations affect how research organisations 
responded to ERC funding schemes, both in terms of hosting, enticing or losing 
grantees and indirectly as sources of prestige and finance. In many respects, 
though, the responses of senior administrative staff in PROs are probably less 
significant than those of practicing researchers, especially those leading teams, 
at least in the short to medium term. Given the limited strategic capability of 
most central managers of research organisations, and the lengthy period 
required for most resource allocation changes to take effect in them, the impact 
of ERC programmes on whole organisations will take some time to discern. 
Insofar as such managers do attempt to use these schemes for boosting their 
prestige and reallocating resources, it is quite likely that their efforts will be 
counterproductive. These points suggest that the ERC may be best advised not 
to concern itself overmuch with improving research organisations’ performance 
or strategic capabilities. 
• And third, our finding may have some implications for future evaluations of the 
performance of the ERC and its funding schemes. Their objectives, by their very 
nature, presuppose that their main intended impact is both very mediated and 
far into the future. In turn, this means that it is highly likely that conditions and 
factors outside and beyond the control of the ERC can interfere and influence 
the outcome. All that the ERC can do in this case is to ensure that the optimal 
conditions for impact have been created. In other words, it will be probably 
difficult to assess the work of the ERC by assessing the extent to which impact 
has really occurred (at least for some time). It may be more appropriate to 
develop evaluation techniques focusing, at least initially, on the conditions for 
impact to occur. 
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Annex	  1:	  EURECIA	  objectives	  
The overall aim of EURECIA (Understanding and Assessing the Impact and Outcomes 
of the ERC Funding Schemes) is to develop and apply a novel conceptual framework 
and methodology to measure, attribute and assess the impact and outcomes of the 
ERC funding schemes. More specifically, the objectives of the research project are to: 
• develop a conceptual framework to analyse the impact(s) of the ERC funding 
schemes in their interaction with existing national and transnational governance 
regimes; 
• develop a bespoke methodology for the identification and attribution of ERC 
impact; 
• apply this methodology, thereby both testing it and providing Stage One data 
on (a) the researchers, (b) research organisations, (c) research funding 
organisations, and (d) the wider context of national and transnational 
governance of science; 
• propose methodologies for discrete (panel) assessment of progress towards the 
ERC achieving its desired and expected outcomes and impact; 
• ensure that the framework for assessing outcomes and impact of the ERC 
incorporates a statement (and understanding) of its ‘added value’; and 
• provide output to aid ERC’s strategy (including scrutinising its objectives) in 
consultation with ERC key stakeholders. 
These objectives can be placed under three groups, namely to: 
• develop the conceptual framework for impact and a methodology for 
measuring and attributing the impact of the ERC; 
• apply this methodology thus testing it46 and providing stage one data on the 
different aspects of science; and 
• support the ERC to develop methodologies for discrete assessment of impact 
and provide input to support them in their strategy development. 
                                                
46 EURECIA proposed an overall approach to the study of impact that is a real-time, panel study consisting of two 
stage measurement (at the beginning of the allocation of ERC projects and five years after that). This is emphasised 
in the proposal and also means that during this study the methodology is only partially tested; it could be 
exhaustively tested only after the second stage of the study. 
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Annex	  2:	  Characterising	  the	  ERC	  as	  an	  organisation	  
The European Commission included the establishment of the ERC in its proposal for 
the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). Under this proposal the ERC was to 
implement ‘the Community activities’ in investigator-driven ‘frontier’ research at the 
European level within a dedicated Programme, namely the IDEAS Programme. The 
proposal was approved by Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament of 
December 18, 2006 (EP, 2006). Following that, the ERC was established with a 
Commission Decision of February 2, 2007 and the ERC Executive Agency was set up 
with a Commission decision of February 14, 2007 (EC, 2007). These documents 
outlined the rationale, activities, structure, operating principles, relationships with the 
EC and financial arrangements of the first pan-European organisation funding 
investigator-driven ‘frontier’ research in all fields of science. 
Furthermore, these documents set out the decision regarding the budget for the Ideas 
programme and the ERC. It was decided that the amount necessary for the execution 
of the Ideas programme, for the duration of FP7) would be EUR 7 510 million47. The 
Council decision also stipulates that the costs of the Scientific Council and the 
dedicated administrative structure cannot, combined, exceed 5% of this amount. 
This decision to set up a pan-European research-funding agency aiming to support 
investigator driven ‘frontier’ research based of scientific excellence has been 
interpreted in a number of ways. It has been discussed as part of the much broader 
objectives of the European Research Area (ERA) for further research integration 
(Nijkamp, 2003; Luukkonen, 2011, Luukkonen and Nedeva, 2010). Also, the story of 
the establishment of the ERC can be told through the content, structure and tensions in 
the European policy debate. These to a large degree shaped the organisation it is today 
(Gronbaek, 2003; Nedeva et al. 2003). More recently, Nedeva (2011) argued that the 
ERC was established as the next organisational step in the continuous attempts to 
alleviate the inherent tension between localised, mainly national, research spaces and 
global research fields.  
Here it suffices to note that the act of the establishment of the ERC was preceded by a 
decade of gradual change and by three years of intense politicking (2002-2004). It 
should be expected that the intensity of the debate and the need to accommodate large 
variety of diverse pressures, expectations and demands affected the way in which the 
objectives, legal status and key organisational practices of the new organisations were 
defined. Whilst the organisational contradictions that this may entail are important 
these are not part of the current discussion.  
                                                
47 There is a proposal for the next FP, Horizon 2020, for this amount to double. 
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Rather, in the context of EURECIA and the study of the impact of the ERC it is 
important to present its key organisational characteristics. These are its objectives, its 
principles of selection, its practices of accountability and reporting, its internal 
structure and the conditions of its funding schemes. 
Aims, objectives and remit of the ERC 
The official documents approved by the Council and the EC framed the rationale for 
the IDEAS Programme in general, and for the ERC in particular, in terms of the 
understanding that: (a) investigator-driven research is a key driver of wealth creation 
and social progress; (b) Europe is not making good use of its scientific potential and 
resources; and (c) an Europe-wide funding structure for ‘frontier’ research is an 
essential part of the ERA. 
Accordingly, the primary aim of the ERC and its funding schemes, as set out initially, 
was to ‘stimulate scientific excellence by supporting and encouraging the very best, truly 
creative scientists, scholars and engineers to be adventurous and take risks in their research. 
The scientists should go beyond established frontiers of knowledge and the boundaries of 
disciplines’.48  
This overall objective was to be achieved by developing and supporting European 
researchers (researchers based in European research organisations) and by supporting the 
research organisations of Europe (universities and research institutes) to develop their research 
strategies and priorities to become global players in research. Furthermore, the ERC had the 
ambition to ‘create leverage towards structural improvements in the research system of 
Europe’49 and to support research that can form the basis for new industries, markets and 
innovations. 
Reading through the official documents on the ERC three pointers emerge. First, its 
missions and objectives are still evolving as evidenced by sequential formulations. 
Hence, recently the core aim of the ERC was re-formulated as being ‘...to encourage the 
highest quality research in Europe through competitive funding and to support investigator-
initiated frontier research across all fields of research, on the basis of scientific excellence.’50. 
This is only subtly different in that the emphasis has shifted to properties of research 
(excellence and frontier), remit and operating principles (competition and excellence) 
rather than characteristics of researchers. Such continuous clarification and sharpening 
of the missions and objectives of the ERC should be expected since it is still a very 
young organisation and the process of its institutionalisation is incomplete.  
Second, a distinction between objectives-goals and objectives-means can be discerned.  
Objectives-goals relate to the support of research with specific properties, namely 
excellent, highest quality research beyond the existing frontiers of knowledge. Objectives-
                                                
48 See http://erc.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=12, accessed 11 Feb 2008, 
49 ERC Work Programme, 2008. 
50 See http://erc.europa.eu/about-erc/mission, accessed 15 Feb 2012. 
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means, on the other hand, refer to the social conditions that increase the probability of 
the objectives-goals to be achieved. These include selecting proposals with particular 
properties (risky, excellent, outside the mainstream) and researchers with specific 
characteristics (talented, creative, at particular stage of their epistemic and organisational 
careers), and enabling conditions conducive to carrying out the research and developing 
researchers in organisational environments (enable research organisations to develop 
strategies, mechanisms and structures to become global players).  
And third, these objectives are diverse and include sometimes conflicting demands. 
This is very likely a result of the compromises that had to be made were the ERC to be 
established. However, the missions and objectives combine ones targeting directly the 
content of research, researchers and research careers, ones aiming to enable 
transformation of research organisations which by its very nature can be only indirect 
and objectives expressing a more ‘standard’ for the European Union level research and 
innovation policy approach of aiming to meet the demands of the knowledge society, 
make economic and societal contribution and lead to the development of new 
industries. 
For the purposes of EURECIA, it is analytical useful to distinguish between three sets 
of objectives.  
Objectives related to researchers, content of research and careers 
In this respect the ERC aims to: 
• support the best of the best scientific efforts in Europe across all fields of 
science, scholarship and engineering. 
• promote wholly investigator-driven, or 'bottom-up' frontier research.  
• encourage the work of the established and next generation of independent top 
research leaders in Europe. 
• reward innovative proposals by placing emphasis on the quality of the idea 
rather than the research area.  
• harness the diversity of European research talent and channel funds into the 
most promising or distinguished researchers.  
• raise the status and visibility of European frontier research and the very best 
researchers of today and tomorrow.  
• put excellence at the heart of European Research.51 
Objectives specific to the StG scheme 
These include the provision of suitable resources and conditions for ‘up and coming 
research leaders...to establish or consolidate a proper research team and...start 
conducting independent research in Europe.’ 52 
                                                
51 See http://erc.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=12 (accessed 15 June 2011). 
52 See http://erc.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=65, last accessed 24 August 2011. 
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Objectives specific to research organisations 
Regarding research organisations, the ERC aims to ‘help universities and other 
research institutions gauge their performance and encourage them to develop better 
strategies to establish themselves as more effective global players. The ERC aims to 
stimulate research organisations to invest more in the support of promising new talent 
...’ 53 
Organisational practices 
 Selection practices 
The ERC has developed and instituted practices for the selection of proposals for 
funding using a two stage peer review process involving external referees. At the first 
stage of the peer review procedure consensual peer review is used to establish the 
ranking of the rated proposals; these rankings are agreed by a peer review panel. Each 
panel has a membership of about 10 scientists or scholars and a chair-person. Panel 
members review a certain number of proposals – the number of proposals does vary 
between panels but panel members report that reviewing takes on average about a 
week work54. Since there are two panels per research field (these work in alternate 
years) in case of overload it is possible to engender the help of the members of the 
alternate panel. Also where necessary, the panel members draw on the specific 
knowledge and expertise of external referees. There are currently 25 panels to cover 
the three domains of the ERC, namely social sciences and humanities, life sciences and 
physical and engineering sciences. 
According to the rules for peer review operated by the ERC each proposal is assessed 
by a minimum of three reviewers. Initially (step 1) all proposals are reviewed by panel 
members. In step 2 reviews are carried out by panel members (2-3) and include 
external referees (2-3). Each application is assigned to a lead reviewer who introduces 
it for discussion and is responsible for producing the feedback to the applicant. 
The formal instruction to peers provided by the ERC stipulate that each proposal 
should be assigned a mark between 1 (non-competitive) and 4 (outstanding) for the 
proposed research, the investigator and the host organisation. Reviewers are advised 
to reserve the top mark for the top 10% of the proposals, mark between 4.0 and 3.5 for 
the top 20% etc. The quality threshold is higher or equal to 2 (ERC Guide for Peer 
Reviewers, 2010). In reality, panels use their discretion and adapt these scales to the 
specific demands of the research field. 
                                                
53 Mission statement:  http://erc.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.display&topicID=12  
54 This section of the report draws on information collected by a research project funded by the Stiftelsen Riksbankens 
Jubileumsfond, Sweden and entitled  “Peer Review Practices and the Legitimacy of the European Research Council” 
(PEERS). This was carried out by Dr. T. Luukkonen and Dr. M. Nedeva. 
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Decisions regarding the ranking of research proposals are taken by consensus. In out 
interviews we explored this matter is some detail. It appears that there are two 
positions of discord in the individual assessment of proposals: one is when a panel 
member from a neighbouring research field has mis-understood a particular point (in 
other words, this originates in limited knowledge and expertise) and the other one 
develops in the ‘middle ground’ of decisions and judgment (different opinion). These 
are naturally resolved in different ways but here of particular interest is the discord 
founded in different expertise. 
ERC peer review panels are not discipline based but are formed around broader areas. 
In other words, these are by their very nature cross-cutting and include scientists and 
scholars from different albeit neighbouring research fields. In turn, this can provide 
the variety necessary to ensure that consensus does not select only proposals above the 
field’s norm but also proposals that are interesting from the perspective of different 
research fields (shift of consensus). 
Here we are not going to expand on the ways in which criteria and judgements are 
negotiated within the panels; a detailed analysis of that is provided by Luukkonen 
(2011). 
In a nutshell, the ERC’s peer review mechanisms focus on the assessment of the 
proposed research and on the potential of the applicant55. Only after that the other 
conditions for carrying out the research are examined. The peer review process is 
panel based and decisions are founded on consensus. 
Accountability and reporting  
Accountability and reporting practices are important at two levels of aggregation, 
namely the level of the ERC as organisation (this is about the accountability and 
reporting practices in which the ERC is involved) and the level of the ERC grantees 
(this is about the accountability and reporting practices that the ERC has introduced). 
Both sets of practices depend largely on the structural position of the ERC or, in other 
words, on the way in which the ERC is included in a number of relationships; most 
notable amongst these is the relationship between the ERC and the European 
Commission which manifests as ‘the issue of the autonomy of the ERC’. 
The issue of the autonomy of the ERC was a key point during the debate preceding its 
establishment. At the time, it was widely recognised, by scientists as well as policy 
operators, that the ERC would need a high degree of autonomy from the structures, 
requirements, mechanisms and rules of the EC which were regarded as restrictive and 
administratively cumbersome. In fact, the then Director of DG Research, A. Mitsos 
firmly stated that he ‘would not give an inch’ on the issue of the autonomy of the ERC 
                                                
55 Here the balance can vary depending on the research field. Panels in the life sciences, for instance, are more likely 
to accord primacy the applicant and their ‘career history’. 
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(THE, 2004). When the ERC was established, however, there were two legal choices 
entailing somewhat different levels of autonomy. These were either to establish the 
ERC as an executive agency of the EC or to set it up as an ‘article 171’ organisation. 
Whilst the latter option represented a higher level of autonomy it was decided that the 
ERC would have the status of an ‘executive agency’ of the EC. This has implications 
for the reporting and accountability rules that the ERC has to abide by and the ones 
that it could implement.   
This means that legally the Commission is responsible for the implementation of the 
Ideas programme and, by implication, for the work of the ERC. Furthermore, the 
Commission is to guarantee the Council’s autonomy by ensuring that it ‘acts in 
accordance with the principles of excellence, autonomy, efficiency and transparency’ 
(EP, 2006). Although the Scientific Council has full autonomy in developing the Work 
Programme the Commission ‘can abstain from following’ their position if it considers 
that the provisions of the programme have not been respected. In practice, the 
Commission annually adopts the Work Programme developed by the Scientific 
Council of the ERC and draws up an Annual Report to the European Parliament and 
the Council on its work. As one of our interviewees pointed out: 
“The ERC has a birth defect and that is the assumption, which is really wrong’ 
that you can separate scientific strategy from the administrative side...the 
Scientific Council...was given independence, in terms of scientific strategy 
matters...At the same time the administration was set up inside the Commission 
first and then the Executive Agency.’ 
There is a discrepancy between the autonomy of the Scientific Council to formulate 
and decide upon scientific strategy and the way in which this strategy is enacted 
through the rules of administration. The ERCEA has little discretion over the rules and 
mechanisms that it operates because of its legal status and the fact that it award public 
funding - in fact, according to an interviewee it is hard for the leadership of the 
Council to work for changing the financial rules under which they operate since they 
are not normally invited to the discussions and also carry little political clout.  
The ERC(EA) is embroiled in the strict and often cumbersome accountability rules and 
regulations of the European Commission and its performance is subjected to a number 
of formal and interim evaluations56. Furthermore, the legal status of ‘executive agency’ 
has clear implications for the reporting and accountability procedure involving 
grantees stemming from the fact that the ERC ought to operate under EU financial 
regulations. 
                                                
56 There have been two recent reviews of the administrative structures of the ERCEA – Review of the European 
Research Council’s Structures and Mechanisms and the European Council Task Force. The former made a number 
of suggestions regarding ways to bridge the divide between scientific and administrative governance of the ERC 
and the latter recommended that the ERCEA needs more autonomy. 
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One such implication is that formally the beneficiaries of ERC funding are not 
‘grantees’ but ‘contractors’ of the Commission with the ensuing requirements for strict 
and firm accountability and control. According to the relevant documents there are 
important differences between the grant agreement of the ERC (this is the document 
that sets out the conditions of the grant and reporting) and the general FP7 grant 
agreement (ERC, 2008). At a closer examination, however, most differences are a 
matter of reference rather than substance. However, one important difference is that 
according to Article 4 of the ERC MGA, reporting is done in two distinct streams: 1) 
scientific reporting which is less frequent and is done by the PIs at the end of each 
project ‘period’; and 2) financial reporting which is done by the host organisation and 
is done more frequently. 
In light of the overall objective of the ERC, the support of ‘frontier’, path-breaking 
research, it is important whether and how research plans can be changed. According 
to Commission rules any change to the Grant Agreement has to be officially approved; 
in the case of the ERC, however, the research plan can be revised and expenditure re-
allocated across budget lines without a request for official amendment – to the extent 
to which the research is still in line with the original scientific objectives. Until very 
recently, any change of the core part of the Grant Agreement – the Description of 
Work (DoW) – necessitated an amendment of Grant Agreement (ERC, 2008). Recently 
this was revised and formal amendment is required only when the tasks specified in 
the DoW have been changed and/or third parties have been included in the project. 
Whilst this is a move in the right direction, the DoW is still far too specific for the type 
of research projects (high risk, path breaking research) that the ERC aims to support.  
Another controversial part of the accountability practices of the ERCEA is that its 
grantees (or legally ‘contractors’) ought to submit timesheets for the duration of the 
project. Even assuming that completing time sheets may not be that unreasonable to 
expect, because of the strict rules on the number of hours that grantees are allowed to 
include, these cannot capture the obsessively long days. In other words, time sheets 
become a wasteful fiction rather than appropriate accountability tool. 
Organisationally, the accountability and reporting procedures (and practices) are the 
aspect where, as Luukkonen’s empirical investigation confirmed (Luukkonen, 2012 
WP report), it is particularly evident that the ERC is still caught up between two sets 
of, sometimes, contradictory demands. On one side is the existing accountability and 
reporting regime of the EC and on the other, the demands for a much more flexible 
approach generated by the objectives and remit of the ERC. These practices constitute 
an important part of the ‘signal’ that the ERC sends to the constituencies that it aims to 
affect. 
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Internal structure of the ERC 
This inherent contradiction between ‘autonomy’ and ‘control’ characterising the 
relationship between the ERC and the EC is reflected by its internal structure. At a 
general level the ERC consists of an independent Scientific Council (SC) and a cost 
effective implementation structure (ERCEA). The SC comprises leading members of 
the scientific community and its members are appointed by the Commission for a 
period of four years renewable once. The SC is responsible for the overall scientific 
strategy of the organisation and has complete authority over decisions regarding the 
type of research to be carried out (set out in the annual Work Programme). It also 
follows the establishment and work of the peer review process. The Chair of the SC is 
the President of the Council and is assisted by two Vice-Presidents. 
The implementation structure, the ERC Executive Agency (ERCEA) implements the 
peer review and selection process and carries out the financial and scientific 
management of the grants. The President is the official representative of the ERC with 
the EC and other bodies. He/she chairs the ERC Board meetings and the meetings of 
the SC. The ERC Board is the organisational platform for bridging the SC and the 
ERCEA and the space for the establishment of healthy working relationships between 
these. Membership of the Board consists of the following: the President and two Vice 
Presidents of the ERC, the ERC Secretary General and the Director of the ERCEA. The 
ERC Secretary General ensures the effective communications between the SC, the 
ERCEA and the EC and is appointed by the SC.  
Apart from that the ERC has a Steering Committee; a body designed to supervise the 
work of the ERCEA. The EC appoints the members of the Steering Committee for a 
(renewable) period of two years. Currently the Steering Committee consists of EC 
officials and members of the SC. 
ERC’s funding schemes 
To achieve its objectives, the ERC operates two funding schemes57. One of these, the 
ERC Starting Independent Researcher grant scheme (StG), targets researchers who are 
at a relatively early career stage and aims to enable them to transit into the highest 
echelons of their respective knowledge communities58. The second funding scheme 
operated by the organisation, the ERC Advanced Investigator grant scheme (AdG), is 
designed for stellar scientists and scholars and aims to provide support for highly 
innovative research ideas at the frontier of the respective research fields.  
                                                
57 Recently two additional funding schemes were added to the portfolio – the Synergy Grants and the Proof of 
Concept grants. These are not discussed in any detail here since the time reference for EURECIA is 2007-2008 when 
only the two initial schemes were operational. 
58 There have been several changes to this since the establishment of the ERC. The most recent guide for applicants 
distinguishes between ‘starters’ and ‘consolidators’ thus distinguishing between the early and mid-career stages. 
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The two funding schemes currently operated by the ERC differ somewhat in terms of 
their objectives. Whilst both schemes aim to support high quality investigator driven 
research, the primary focus of the Starting Independent Grant scheme is to provide 
opportunities to early and mid-career scientists and scholars whilst the Advanced 
Investigator scheme has predominantly cognitive dimension and aims to support 
highly innovative, frontier research projects (ERC Guide for Applicants, 2010). 
Both types of grant aim to support ‘frontier research’ which in the documents is 
defined as ‘the pursuit of questions at or beyond the frontiers of knowledge, without 
regard for established disciplinary boundaries.’ (ERC Guide for Applicants, 2010, p. 
12). ERC’s remit covers all fields of research, including social sciences and humanities. 
Support is relatively generous and successful StG and AdG applicants are awarded up 
to 2 and 2.5 million euro for up to five years respectively. All decisions are taken on 
the basis peer review using only criteria related to scientific excellence.  
Both schemes support research teams headed by a single Principle Investigator. It is 
important that the teams can be within a single organisation or transgress 
organisational and national boundaries – this is determined only by the nature of the 
research and the competencies, equipment and facilities necessary to carry it out. In 
other words, the ERC grants are not subject to conditions for international 
collaboration which often accompany research funding at the European level. To the 
extent to which the work is to be carried out in a research unit within EU or member 
states the PIs can be from any part of the world. Conditions regarding the status of the 
PI refer only to their career stage and/or their professional standing in knowledge 
communities.  
In addition, both types of grants are comparatively generous and provide support over 
a long(er) time period. 
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Table 19: ERC starting grant and ERC advanced grant schemes by key characteristics 
 ERC Starting Grant ERC Advanced Grant 
Objectives To provide adequate support to the 
independent careers of excellent 
researchers, regardless of 
nationality or current location, who 
are at the stage of establishing or 
consolidating their own 
independent research team or 
programme. 
To promote substantial advances in the 
frontiers of knowledge, and to 
encourage new productive lines of 
enquiry and new methods and 
techniques, including unconventional 
approaches and investigations at the 
interface between established 
disciplines. 
Eligibility • The PI can be any age and any 
nationality, who intend to 
conduct the research in EU MS 
and Associated Countries.  
• The PI must have been 
awarded his/her first PhD no 
less than 2 and no more than 10 
years prior to the publication 
date of the call for proposals. 
• The PI can be any age and any 
nationality, regardless of age and 
current location 
• The PI should have a track record 
of significant research 
achievements in the last 10 years. 
Type of 
research 
• 'Frontier research': the pursuit 
of questions at or beyond the 
frontiers of knowledge, without 
regard for established 
disciplinary boundaries, in any 
area of research (apart from 
nuclear fission and fusion).  
• Projects of an interdisciplinary 
nature which cross the 
boundaries between different 
fields of research;  
• Pioneering projects which 
address new and emerging 
fields of research;  
• Unconventional, innovative 
approaches and scientific 
inventions so long as the 
expected impact on science, 
scholarship or engineering is 
significant.  
• Aiming to broaden scientific 
and technological knowledge – 
so projects should not be linked 
to commercial objectives. 
• Substantial advances in the 
frontiers of knowledge, to 
encourage new productive lines of 
enquiry and new methods and 
techniques, including 
unconventional approaches and 
investigations at the interface 
between established disciplines.  
• Research that aims high, in terms 
of the envisaged scientific 
achievements as well as the 
creativity and originality of its 
approaches.  
• Pioneering and far-reaching 
challenges at the frontiers of the 
field(s) addressed, and involving 
new, groundbreaking or 
unconventional methodologies, 
whose risky outlook is justified by 
the possibility of a major 
breakthrough with an impact 
beyond a specific research 
domain/discipline. 
Size of grants Up to 2 Million Euro for up to 5 
years (pro rata for shorter projects).  
 
Normally up to 2.5 million Euro for up 
to five years pro-rata (can be up to 3.5 
million Euro if there is 'Co-
Investigator'; interdisciplinary; 
purchase of major research equipment; 
or PI coming from outside Europe). 
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Annex	  3:	  Measuring	  ‘approach’	  and	  ‘standing’:	  the	  DAS	  Framework	  
We developed a range of potential areas to measure by survey, drawing upon 
respondents’ opinions and recalled facts to be answerable within a reasonable time 
and without relying upon extensive memory recall or a need for respondents to seek 
information from sources outside of the survey (increasing the likelihood of non-
response): 
 
Table 20: Measuring ‘approach’ and ‘standing’ characteristics through a survey-based 
approach 
 
 
 Characteristics Possible researcher activity areas to measure 
Geographic, workplace and cognitive mobility (e.g. any 
atypicality, high mobility across countries, workloads and 
intellectual field) 
Mobility 
Educational/study track record (e.g. atypical number of 
degrees at various levels) 
Atypicality of overall research project funding track record 
(e.g. funded by unusual funding schemes?) 
Motivation to undertake a research project (e.g. 
organisational career progression reasons or intellectual 
reasons?) 
Degree of novelty or peripherality of their research projects 
(e.g. undertaking new, marginal lines of research in the eyes 
of their knowledge community?) 
Risk levels in research projects proposed to research funders 
(e.g. proposing research with no precedent or proof-of-
concept?) 
Risk levels for the success of research projects (e.g. chances of 
meeting minimum and exceptional goals?) 
Track record of 
funded 
research 
projects 
How immediately applicable were the outputs of their 
research projects, both to their knowledge community and 
beyond? 
In workplaces with low promotion prospects (e.g. due to 
otherwise desirable research-related conditions)? 
Urgency of next promotion 
Overall security of employment conditions 
Organisational 
career choices 
and ambitions 
Motivations for undertaking academic service tasks 
Workplace international reputation and scientific 
performance 
Research 
workplace 
features Own research team size 
Research output types compared to norms and expectations 
for research area (e.g. atypical?) 
Why did they consider their research outputs to be 
important? 
Approach 
Approach 
towards 
research 
outputs 
What strategies did they pursue when targeting journals to 
have their research outputs published and disseminated 
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Cont’d Characteristics Possible researcher activity areas to measure 
Ability to raise needed resources (e.g. availability of 
resources for international conferences and visits) 
Workloads and time for research; multiple appointments 
(reputational and network-bridging effects) 
Independence – autonomy over research direction, job 
security 
Personal funding situation, funded research project portfolio 
Organisational 
career 
Team size (absolute, relative to research area, growth over 
time) 
Number and prestige of academic services, and number of 
outputs (relative to own career stage and research field) and 
accolades 
Collaboration patterns – number, stakeholder types involved 
Knowledge 
community 
career 
Acceptance rates of outputs, chances of success of outputs, 
and applicability for academic and non-academics. 
Standing 
Research 
environments 
Workplace reputation and performance factors (e.g. best 
place in the world for the researcher’s work, having high 
scientific performance, having outstanding international 
reputation) 
 
These measures were translated into specific questions to provide data to characterise 
each respondent via our 23-part demographic-approach-standing (DAS) scheme 
(Table 21 below). For ‘approach’ and ‘standing’, the elements were scaled for ‘high’ to 
represent most/strongest ‘frontier-potential’; ‘low’, the least/weakest.  
Table 21: Overview of the 23-part, demographic-approach-standing (DAS) scheme 
used to profile the first cohort (2007 call) StG grantees and controls 
 Element name Description Values  
D1. Gender - 1=Female, 
2=Male 
D2. Age bracket* Respondent’s reported age as compared to the response 
distribution for their own ERC domain 
1=Below average, 
2=Average, 
3=Above average 
D3. Relationship/dependents 
status 
Combined measure of respondent’s reported long-term 
relationship and dependent caring responsibilities  
1=Low, 
2=Medium, 
3=High 
D
em
ographic 
D4. Research domain ERC research domain category 1=LS, 2=PE, 
3=SH 
A1. Geographic and 
workplace mobility 
Combined measure of number of countries, and research 
workplaces worked in, during respondent’s entire study and 
research career to date 
1=Low, 
2=Medium, 
3=High 
A2. Cognitive mobility Combined measure of reported number of significant changes of 
intellectual field during respondent’s entire study and research 
career to date, and atypicality of respondent’s study track record 
(UG, PG, PhD and more advanced degrees) 
1=Low 
2=Medium 
3=High 
4=Very high 
A3. Perceived research 
novelty and risks** 
Combined measure of perceived novelty and risk of respondent’s 
StG application, with reported research output success and 
applicability risks for their most important research project 
during past two years 
1=Low, 
2=Medium, 
3=High 
A4. Job security indifference Reported job security increase after respondent’s most recent 
research workplace move 
1=Low, 2=High 
Approach 
A5. Atypicality of project 
funding track record 
Divergence from typical pattern in overall respondent set for 
number of respondent’s research projects supported by national 
funding  
1=Low, 2=High 
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 A6. Atypicality of journal 
targeting approach 
Divergence from typical pattern when choosing in which journal 
to publish own research outputs (journal reputation and impact 
factor considered important but not essential) 
1=Low, 2=High 
   Organisational career 
S1. Ability to raise needed 
research resources 
Combined measure of respondent’s opinion on absence of 
internal and external research resource constraints, including 
those for essential international conferences and research visits 
1=Low, 2=High 
S2. Time for research* Percentage of work time available for research, compared to own 
ERC domain, and whether lack of research time was a reported 
constraint 
1=Low, 2=High 
S3. Long-term research 
direction independence 
Reported research direction freedom and job security sufficient 
for long-term research activity 
1=Low, 
2=Medium, 
3=High 
S4. Personal funding 
situation 
Opinion of own funding amount for most important research 
project of the past two years compared to peers and actual 
amount (in Euros) compared to overall respondent set 
1=Low, 
2=Medium, 
3=High 
S5. Own team size growth Growth in proportion own research team represents of the 
respondent’s overall laboratory/department size, after most 
recent research workplace move 
1=Low, 2=High 
   Knowledge community career 
S6. Amount of academic 
service tasks undertaken 
Combined measure of amount of professional associations 
joined, reviewing and editorial activities undertaken, funding 
and expert panels served on, conferences organised, and 
fellowships received, compared to the distribution for the overall 
response set  
1=Low, 
2=Medium, 
3=High 
S7. Prestige of academic 
service 
Opinion on how prestigious respondent’s reportedly most 
important academic service is perceived to be by peers 
1=Low, 2=High 
S8. Number of research 
collaborators* 
Absolute, and relative (self-reported, relative to peers), number 
of regular research collaborators 
1=Low, 2=High 
S9. Output productivity Overall output productivity (self-reported, relative to career 
stage and research field peers) 
1=Low, 2=High 
S10. Number of accolades Combined measure of number of patents (direct or indirect), 
prizes/special awards, and prestigious fellowships (or 
equivalent) compared to the overall response set 
1=Low, 2=High 
S11. Article acceptance rate* Percentage of articles submitted in the past two years to 
respondent’s own ‘first choice’ journal finally accepted, 
compared to own ERC domain 
1=Low, 2=High 
   Research environments 
S12. Perceived workplace 
reputation and performance 
Combined measure of respondent’s opinions on whether their 
research workplace is the best place in the world to do their 
research, and has an outstanding international reputation, and a 
ranking of its scientific performance 
1=Very low, 
2=Low, 
3=Medium, 
4=High, 5=Very 
high 
Standing 
S13. Assumed research 
performance/ambition of 
national setting^ 
Proxy classification based on nation’s GERD as a percentage of 
GDP in 2008, number of FTE researchers and 2008, and national 
success rates (up to 2010) in both ‘starting’ and ‘advanced’ ERC 
grant applications  
1=Low, 
2=Medium, 
3=High 
 
Notes: *=Element scaled for ERC domain specifics (i.e. LS, PE or SH); **=Sub-elements scaled by ERC domain; 
^=Non-survey data supplied by Dietmar Braun, within EURECIA, covering 93 percent (167/180, missing=4) of 
respondents’ reported current countries of residence. 
 
The survey provided sufficient data to characterise the survey respondents (only a 
proposed measure of multiple appointments was too indirect and had to be 
abandoned). In most questions we asked for ‘most important’ and recent project and 
outputs. This was to create a baseline from recent, significant information. When asked 
again (say, in five years time) this question structure will capture new information, 
meaning we will be able to determine actual changes, based on a comparison of two 
snapshots of the exact same respondents, rather than perceived StG impacts.  
Wherever possible, multiple questions were used so DAS elements could be built upon 
multiple sub-measures or else we could chose from the apparently most robust data. 
The questionnaire was ordered according to distinct aspects of research life to appear 
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relevant to respondents – research projects, research workplaces, research funders, 
research collaborators, and research outputs. A specific section was included on 
respondents’ ERC grant applications. Passport-type questions covered gender, age, 
country of residence and so on – for the ‘demographic’ component of the DAS-scheme. 
This left us with 86 final survey questions in total. 
Two versions of the questionnaire were used – to enable slightly different questions to 
the grantee and control respondent groups in the final section on their ERC grant 
applications (about alternatives to ERC funding). The two questionnaires were 
otherwise identical. The questionnaire sections and issues addressed are shown below: 
Table 22: Section titles and summary content of the online survey questionnaire 
sections of questions addressed to the first cohort (2007 call) StG grantees and 
controls 
 
Survey 
section 
Issues addressed 
1. About 
You 
Gender, age, relationship/dependent details, educational qualifications, geographical 
mobility, intellectual field mobility, reason for most significant intellectual and 
geographic moves, current country of residence, track record (number and types) of 
academic services 
2. Your 
Research 
Research project funding track record, most important recent (past two years only) 
research project features (name, duration, team size, budget), reason why project was 
the ‘most important’, time spent on work activities (research, teaching, supervision, 
admin), standardised career stage scale, and current promotion plans 
3. Your 
Workplaces 
Workplace mobility, details of current and previous workplace features, perceptions of 
current workplace performance, recruitment strategies and reputation, apparent 
workload constraints and research-related resources at current workplace 
4. Research 
Funders 
Perceived attractive features of ERC and other national and European research 
funders, perceived main evaluation criterion used by ERC and other research funders 
when deciding whether to fund research 
5. Your 
Collaborators 
Absolute and relative number of regular research collaborators, types of regular 
research collaborators (excellent researchers outside own lab/dept, excellent 
researchers outside own country, global leaders of research field, excellent industrial 
researchers, policy/government stakeholders, charity/foundation stakeholders) 
6. Your 
Outputs 
Number, types and importance of research outputs (single- and multi-authored journal 
articles, books, policy reports, other), output productivity (self-reported, relative to 
peers), number of accolades received (patents, prizes/special awards, prestigious 
fellowships), features of two most important recent (past two years only) research 
outputs, names of two most important journals in own research area (and why they are 
important), personal selection strategies for journal-based outputs, average percentage 
acceptance rate of own submissions to ‘first choice’ journals (past two years only) 
7. Your ERC 
Grant 
Application 
Prior submission of ERC grant application idea to another research funder, alternative 
ways of funding that project idea, changes made to project idea after not getting grant 
(control group only), research content features of ERC proposal, attractive features of 
ERC grants, perceptions about ERC application process (fairness, feedback quality), 
research workplace and other support received for ERC application (admin, 
intellectual), overall impressions about ERC application, overall perceived career effect 
of ERC application/grant, final impressions about the ERC’s grant schemes 
(recommend to others, apply again) 
 
To identify matching pairs it was necessary to aggregate to elements of the DAS 
framework even further. These are in Table 23 below: 
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Table 23: The reduced set of 11 DAS-scheme elements used to create the grantee/control 
matched-pairs 
 
Category Element name 
D1. Gender 
D2. Age bracket 
Demographic 
D4. Research domain 
A2. Cognitive mobility Approach 
A3. Perceived research novelty and risks 
   Organisational career  
S0. Researcher independence  
S2. Time for research 
S3. Long-term research direction independence 
   Knowledge community career  
S7. Prestige of academic service 
S9. Output productivity 
  Research environments  
Standing 
S12. Perceived workplace reputation and performance 
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Annex	  4:	  Research	  instruments	  
Survey	  Questionnaires	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Interview	  guide:	  ERC	  grantees	  
 
I  Former projects 
1. Before we come to the ERC project, I would like to know how your research developed. Let’s  
begin with your PhD Thesis. It has the title .................................... Which question did you answer 
with this project? 
2. Can you tell me how you arrived at this topic? 
- Has anybody else (your supervisor, colleagues) influenced the formulation of the topic?  
3. I would like to know how your research topics developed after the PhD. Therefore, I’ve 
collected information from the internet, that is your research (your publications) and your 
positions, and I’ve put them on a time scale. [show picture] How did your research continue after 
the PhD topic-wise?  
- In what way is this topic related to your PhD project – what remained the same, what is different? 
- Have the methods changed that you use?  
II   ERC project 
4. How is the ERC project rooted in what you have done before? 
- What has changed? 
5. To what extent do you need knowledge from other fields? 
6. To what extent could you fail? 
III   Collaborations 
7. You currently collaborate with ……………………. How did you find your collaborators? 
IV Positions 
8. You took on a position as ……………………………………. Why ? 
9. You could have gone somewhere else with your grant, however you stayed here. Why? 
V Research conditions 
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10. I would like to know something about your research conditions at these positions. Therefore I 
draw a second picture where I would like to reconstruct your discretion over time for research  and 
the availability of the resources you needed. Let’s begin with the time: During the last ten years – 
did you have other tasks than research? 
11. How has the time for research developed since then?  
- Which other tasks did constrain your research time most? 
12. Let us turn now to the funding. What do you need money for in your research? 
- Equipment? Consumables?  - personnel? - Conference travel? - rooms/ lab space? 
13. Did you have sufficient funding for that before the ERC funding started? 
14. How is your funding situation currently?  
- Is the ERC grant sufficient for your work? If not: how did you solve the problem? [additional 
sources] 
- Did you apply for the maximum amount of ERC funding? Why not? 
15. Did you consider alternative funding sources for the ERC project?  
- What would have happened if you didn’t get the funding? 
16. You are now a [    position     ]  at  [    university    ]. Are you happy with this position? 
VI  Intentions and plans 
17. Are there any research topics that you would like to work on but can’t? ( 
- If yes: Which ones? Why can’t you realise them? 
18. Do you already have an idea what to research after your current project?  
- Have you already a topic in your mind? 
19. You have now a considerable amount of funding. How do you intend to keep this level of 
funding? 
20. Which kind of position are you aiming for next? 
VII  Final 
21. Is there any aspect of your career and of the ERC project that we haven’t talked about and that 
is crucial in your eyes 
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Interview	  Guide:	  Research	  organisations	  
 
Preface: 
• We are approaching three different levels in our interview phase: top level, 
school/faculty level, lab level 
Note: We developed one core interview guide which is the same for all levels and 
additional modules which differ among the levels. To improve readability we finally 
produced this document, which lists three separate interview guides for each level, one 
after another.  
• We are doing qualitative interviews, i.e. the questions do not necessarily have to /will 
be asked in every detail. However, as a basis, we wanted to elaborate an as complete 
and precise interview guide as possible to catch the overall picture. This particularly 
seems important as different people are performing interviews.   
Further, an interviewing manual (i.e. briefing document), being developed on the basis 
of the pilot interviews (and – as we aim at methodology development - further 
elaborated along all our interviews) will finally provide further guidance for interviewers. 
• Note: In addition organisational factsheets and country factsheets will provide basic 
information and allow to properly prepare each individual interview.  
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TOP LEVEL 
  
Let us start with some general information… 
1. Please, shortly describe your concrete function at the [ … name of university/research 
organisation…].  
Particularly thinking of: responsibility and decision making power for basic strategies, 
competence, autonomy etc. as regards research (strategies/ competences regarding research, 
teaching, overall administration) 
2. How do you see the European Research Council (ERC)? What is the main difference and impact 
it can make both in general and for your organisation? 
3. At the level of the organisation: What is the general division of labour between the organisation 
and its sub-units? Who is responsible for...  
i) ... defining the mission, research direction, organisational re-structuring? 
ii) ... Human Resources issues, particularly thinking of recruitment, remuneration and promotion, 
requirements of staff, etc.? 
ii) ... steering issues, like internal performance measurement and incentives, re-allocation of 
funds?  
4. More generally: What do you consider the major pressures and ongoing transformations your 
organisation faces at the moment? 
  
  
Let's focus on research issues: strategies and content 
1. what kind of organisation? 
a. How would you position  [ … name of university/research organisation…] compared to 
others? What are the ambitions of the [ … name of university/research organisation…]?  
Thinking of: international profile, in which "league" does it aspire to play, international 
frontrunner, if so, in which areas, etc. 
b. What is the relative importance of research vis-a-vis teaching? Any other missions of 
your organisation? 
2. research strategies and content 
a. Is there an explicit strategy as regards research and research profiles? If yes, which? If 
no, how are research issues handled then?  
 
Who takes the decision for research strategies and profiles and on which levels? 
(individual professors, collectives?, top down vs. bottom up?) 
 
Can you explain how the organisation then implements the research strategy? 
Thinking of: formulation of strategy documents, control of progress, incentive structures, 
internal performance critria and assessment,  
b. What are the major changes as regards research at your university/ research 
organisation over the last years? What/who has triggered these changes?  
i) thinking of: trends towards stronger profiling, focusing on excellent areas, international 
benchmarking, competition for people / talents? etc. ‘local’ pressures vs. ‘European’ 
pressures? 
ii) thinking of content: Frontier research is often used as a term - what does it mean for 
you / in your organisational context? Are there any other shifts as regards content, you 
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would identify (eg. towards economic benefits)?  
Does the ERC play a role in all this? What kind of role? 
 
Does the ERC contribute to research content profiling, e.g. development towards more 
"frontier" research (discussion about the term: what is it for the interviewee) 
 
Is the ERC and the grants used in internal discussion around performance and 
governance? 
In case of grantees: Does the existence of ERC grantees trigger anything? 
3. funding issues 
a. What is the funding portfolio of  [ … name of university/research organisation…], 
particularly as regards research? 
What is the relative importance of grants/ programme funding? Any kind of important 
changes in the last years? 
b. How relatively important are international grants (at various levels), how important are 
ERC grants? What makes them important or not? 
4. focus on ERC’s impact 
a. Does the ERC, its existence or the fact that the organisation has at least one grant, have 
any impact on the organisation at your level at all?  
(no details here, just awareness and general “feeling”, almost in a “yes, very much, yes a 
bit, almost not at all, not at all – fashion”, to wrap up with the last two questions) 
b. Do you see the ERC and its funding schemes as triggering / being a catalyst for ongoing 
changes as regards the European/international research landscape?  
thinking of: European wide competion of organisations, benchmarking or proof of 
excellence, signalling excellence, competition for talent, content of resarch, etc. 
c. Do you consider the ERC and its funding schemes as triggering / being a catalyst for any 
internal change processes within your university/research organisation? Please explain 
how? 
thinking of: re-defining strategies (explitcit as well as implicit), discussions about 
autonomy and leadership, strategic decision making (e.g. more power to the 
faculties/schools), changing internal performance criteria (ERC grants as a benchmark), 
distribution of money and other resources (additional investments, new positions, 
signalling), responsibilities and additional support, etc. 
 
In case of grantees: What concrete difference does it make for [ … name of 
university/research organisation…] to have/to host ERC grantees?  
thinking of reputational efffect vs. monetary effect, how important is ERC money 
compared to other funding, national grants? 
d. Do you think the existence of the ERC and your way to deal with it can contribute to an 
improvement of … 
i) … your performance as an organisation? If so, please explain how. 
ii) … the attractiveness of your university/research organisation? Particularly thinking of 
competition for talent? 
  
  
Let's talk about attraction and support of talent, i.e. (potential) grantees: 
1. perceived attractiveness 
a. What do you think, how relatively attractive is the [ … name of university/research 
organisation…] compared to your main competitors for talents?  
Do you have any explicit  strategies or  targets as regards attraction of talents? Please 
shortly elaborate. 
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2. recruitment strategies 
a. Could you please elaborate your recruitment strategies at [ … name of 
university/research organisation…]? How is staff concretely recruited within your 
organisation? What are your strategies and criteria? 
 thinking of pro-active, re-active, internal recruiting, international recruiting, active 
recruiting of ERC grantees etc. ? 
 
b. Do you think the existence of the ERC and its funding schemes already changed or will 
change your recruitment strategies? Are their any current discussions to alter recruitment 
strategies? 
In case of grantees: What is different now? 
3. support measures 
a. What kind of mechanisms or measures are provided to support your staff in order to get 
an ERC grant? (thinking of administrative as well as strategic support) At which level are 
these designed and implemented (top level, school/faculty level, lab/institute level, 
individual staff)? Are these established organisation-related rules or principles? 
b. What kind of support do you provide in case of success? Are there any specific 
mechanisms or measures for ERC grantees to start their grant resp. during the duration 
of the grant?  
Thinking of: administrative support, incentives, additional ressources, different 
responsibilities (teaching, administrative work…), more autonomy etc. 
  
Summing up: General open questions on the relevance of ERC 
1. In which area does the organisation change most because of ERC, or does it make no difference 
at all? What do you consider the single most important impact/change (no matter what 
dimension)? How relatively important is this in relation to other changes you experience? 
2. Is this change an additional push to something already happening or is it an original impact? 
Or to put it differently: Is the ERC (as such or as regards specific grants already in your 
organisation) used for active change or does it DRIVE you in a certain direction? (proactive or 
reactive 
 
SCHOOL / FACULTY LEVEL 
  
Let us start with some general information… 
1. Please, shortly describe your concrete function at the [ … name of school / faculty …].  
Particularly thinking of: responsibility and decision making power for basic strategies, 
competence, autonomy, as regards research (strategies/ competences regarding research, 
teaching, overall administration) 
2. How do you see the European Research Council (ERC)? What is the main difference and impact 
it can make both in general and for your organisation? 
3. At the level of the organisation: What is the general division of labour between the organisation 
and its sub-units? Who is responsible for...  
i) ... defining the mission, research direction, organisational re-structuring? 
ii) ... Human Resources issues, particularly thinking of recruitment, remuneration and promotion, 
requirements of staff, etc.? 
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ii) ... steering issues, like internal performance measurement and incentives, re-allocation of 
funds?  
4. More generally: What do you consider the major pressures and ongoing transformations your 
organisation faces at the moment? 
   
Let's focus on research issues: strategies and content 
1. what kind of sub-unit? 
a. How would you position  [ … name of school / faculty …] compared to others? What are 
the ambitions of the [ … name of school / faculty…]?  
Thinking of: international profile, in which "league" does it aspire to play, international 
frontrunner, if so, in which areas, etc. 
 
Compared to other schools/ faculties at the [… name of university/resaerch 
organisation…]: Do you think [… name of school / faculty…] is different? If yes, please 
explain in what respect. 
b. What is the relative importance of research vis-a-vis teaching? Any other missions of 
your school / faculty? 
2. research strategies and content 
a. Is there an explicit strategy as regards research and research profiles? If yes, which? If 
no, how are research issues handled then?  
 
Who takes the decision for research strategies and profiles and on which levels? 
(individual professors, collectives?, top down vs. bottom up?) 
 
Can you explain how the organisation then implements the research strategy? 
Thinking of: formulation of strategy documents, control of progress, incentive structures, 
internal performance critria and assessment,  
b. What are the major changes as regards research at your university/ research 
organisation over the last years? What has triggered these changes? 
i) thinking of: trends towards stronger profiling, focusing on excellent areas, international 
benchmarking, competition for people / talents? etc.  
ii) thinking of content: Frontier research is often used as a term - what does it mean for 
you / in your organisational context? Are there any other shifts as regards content, you 
would identify (eg. towards economic benefits)? 
Does the ERC play a role in all this? What kind of role? 
 
Does the ERC contribute to research content profiling, e.g. development towards more 
"frontier" research (discussion about the term: what is it for the interviewee) 
 
Is the ERC and the grants used in internal discussion around performance and 
governance? 
In case of grantees: Does the existence of ERC grantees trigger anything? 
3. funding issues 
a. What is the funding portfolio of  [ … name of school/faculty…], particularly as regards 
research? 
What is the relative importance of grants/ programme funding? Any kind of important 
changes in the last years? 
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b. How relatively important are international grants (at various levels), how important are 
ERC grants? What makes them important or not? 
4. focus on ERC’s impact 
a. Does the ERC, its existence or the fact that the organisation has at least one grant, have 
any impact on the { organisational unit } at your level at all?  
(no details here, just awareness and general “feeling”, almost in a “yes, very much, yes a 
bit, almost not at all, not at all – fashion”, to wrap up with the last two questions) 
b. Do you see the ERC and its funding schemes as triggering / being a catalyst for ongoing 
changes as regards the European/international research landscape?  
thinking of European wide competion of organisations, benchmarking or proof of 
excellence, signalling excellence, competition for talent, content of resarch etc. 
c. Did the ERC and its funding schemes triggering any internal change processes within 
your organisation resp. school / faculty? Or did it enforce on-going change ? Please 
explain how? What level is affected most? 
thinking of: re-defining strategies (explitcit as well as implicit), discussions about 
autonomy and leadership, strategic decision making (e.g. more power to the 
faculties/schools), changing internal performance criteria (ERC grants as a benchmark), 
distribution of money and other resources (additional investments, new positions, 
signalling), responsibilities and additional support, etc. 
d. Do you think the existence of the ERC and your way to deal with it can contribute to an 
improvement of  
i) … your performance as an organisation and as a unit (faculty etc.)? If so, please 
explain how. 
ii) … the attractiveness of your university/research organisation (your unit)? Particularly 
thinking of competition for talent?  
  
5. impact of grantees – only if there are grants within the school / faculty: 
a. In case of grantees: What concrete difference does it make for [ … name of school / 
faculty…] to have/to host ERC grantees?  
thinking of reputational efffect vs. monetary effect, how important is ERC money 
compared to other funding, national grants? 
 
Do you think the ERC grantee/grantees improve the standing of your unit (or subunit) 
within the university / research organisation? In what ways does the grant support and 
raise the profile of the unit internationally? 
b. How does the research theme of the grantee fit into the existing profile? Is it 
complementary, same but better, entirely new area, new linkages between groups etc.? 
 
Does the ERC contribute to research content profiling, e.g. development towards more 
"frontier" research (discussion about the term: what is it for the interviewee) 
 
Is the grant part of a re-orientation strategy or an add-on to existing activities? Does it 
trigger a re-orientation (“frontier research”)? 
   
Let's talk about attraction, support and autonomy of talent, i.e. (potential) grantees: 
1. perceived attractiveness 
a. What do you think, how relatively attractive is the [ … name of university/research 
organisation…] compared to your main competitors for talents? Please shortly elaborate, 
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why your university /research organisation resp. school / faculty is / is not the most 
attractive place for a young talent? 
2. recruitment strategies 
a. Could you please elaborate your recruitment strategies at [ … name of 
university/research organisation…]? How is staff concretely recruited within your unit? 
What are your strategies and criteria, thinking of pro-active, re-active, internal recruiting, 
international recruiting, active recruiting of ERC grantees etc. ? 
b. Do you think the existence of the ERC and its funding schemes already changed or will 
change your recruitment strategies? Are their any current discussions to alter recruitment 
strategies? 
 
In case of grantees: What is different now? 
3. support measures 
a. What kind of mechanisms or measures are provided to support your staff in order to get a 
grant? (thinking of pro-active strategies from staff also) At which level are these designed 
and implemented (top level, school/faculty level, lab/institute level)? 
b. What kind of support do you provide in case of success? Are there any specific 
mechanisms or measures for ERC grantees to start their grant resp. during the duration 
of the grant?  
Thinking of: administrative support, incentives, additional ressources etc. 
4. researchers’ autonomy 
a. What is the level of autonomy granted to researchers at your school / faculty?  
Thinking of: possibilities to organise their individual research context, to create 
appropriate micro-structures, to influence recruiting decisions, to build up teams, to spend 
the money they have raised?  
b. Within the last years did you experience any changes in the way talent is provided with 
autonomy more generally? If so, did the existence of ERC resp. of ERC grantees at your 
institution play a role in this? 
   
Summing up: General open questions on the relevance of ERC 
1. In which area does the school / faculty change most because of ERC or is there no difference at 
all? What do you consider the single most important impact/change (no matter what dimension)? 
How relatively important is this in relation to other changes you experience? 
2. Is this change an additional push to something already happening or is it an original impact? 
Or to put it differently: Is the ERC (as such or as regards specific grants already in your 
organisation) used for active change or does it DRIVE you in a certain direction? (proactive or 
reactive) 
 
LAB / INSTITUTE LEVEL 
  
Let us start with some general information… 
1. Please, shortly describe your concrete function at the [ … name of lab/institute…].  
Particularly thinking of: responsibility and decision making power for basic strategies, 
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competence, autonomy etc. as regards research (strategies/ competences regarding research, 
teaching, overall administration) 
2. How do you see the European Research Council (ERC)? What is the main difference and impact 
it can make both in general and for your organisation? 
3. What is the general division of labour between the [ … name of lab/institute…] , the organisational 
top level and other sub-units? Who is responsible for...  
i) ... defining the mission, research direction, organisational re-structuring? 
ii) ... Human Resources issues, particularly thinking of recruitment, remuneration and promotion, 
requirements of staff, etc.? 
ii) ... steering issues, like internal performance measurement and incentives, re-allocation of 
funds?  
4. More generally: What do you consider the major pressures and ongoing transformations your [ … 
name of university/research organisation…] and particularly the [ … name of lab/institute…] faces 
at the moment? 
  
Let's focus on research issues: strategies and content 
1. what kind of lab / institute? 
a. How would you position the  [ … name of lab/institute…] compared to others? What are 
the ambitions of the  [ … name of lab/institute…]?  
Thinking of: international profile, in which "league" does it aspire to play, international 
frontrunner, if so, in which areas, etc. 
 
Compared to other labs/institutes at the [… name of university/resaerch organisation…]: 
Do you think the [… name of lab / institute…] is different? If yes, please explain in what 
respect. 
b. What is the relative importance of research vis-a-vis teaching? Any other missions of 
your organisation? 
2. research strategies and content 
a. Is there an explicit strategy as regards research and research profiles? If yes, which? If 
no, how are research issues handled then?  
 
Who takes the decision for research strategies and profiles and on which levels? 
(individual professors, collectives?, top down vs. bottom up?) Who implements control of 
progress, incentive structures, internal performance critria and assessment etc. ? 
b. What are the major changes as regards research at your lab/instiute over the last years? 
What has triggered these changes? 
i) thinking of: trends towards stronger profiling, focusing on excellent areas, international 
benchmarking, competition for people / talents? etc.  
ii) thinking of content: Frontier research is often used as a term - what does it mean for 
you / in your organisational context? Are there any other shifts as regards content, you 
would identify (eg. towards economic benefits)? 
Does the ERC play a role in all this? What kind of role? 
 
Is the ERC and the grants used in internal discussion around performance and 
governance? 
Does the existence of ERC grantees trigger anything? 
3. funding issues 
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a. What is the funding portfolio of  [ … name of lab / institute…], particularly as regards 
research? 
What is the relative importance of grants/ programme funding? Any kind of important 
changes in the last years? 
b. How relatively important are international grants (at various levels), how important are 
ERC grants? What makes them important or not? 
4. focus on ERC’s impact 
a. Do you consider the ERC and its funding schemes as triggering / being a catalyst for any 
internal change processes within your university/research organisation? Please explain 
how? 
thinking of: re-defining strategies (explitcit as well as implicit), discussions about 
autonomy and leadership, strategic decision making (e.g. more power to the 
faculties/schools), changing internal performance criteria (ERC grants as a benchmark), 
distribution of money and other resources (additional investments, new positions, 
signalling), responsibilities and additional support, etc. . (distinguishing b- if possible at all 
– between the ERC as such and the fact that they have a grant) 
b. Do you think the existence of the ERC and your way to deal with it can contribute to an 
improvement of … 
i) … the performance as an organisation? If so, please explain how. 
ii) … the attractiveness of your lab / institute?  
Particularly thinking of competition for talent, becoming a frontrunner/starting something 
new, etc. 
c. Do you see the ERC and its funding schemes as triggering / being a catalyst for ongoing 
changes as regards the European/international research landscape?  
thinking of European wide competion of organisations, benchmarking or proof of 
excellence, signalling excellence, competition for talent, content of resarch, etc 
 
  
Let's talk about the grantee / the grantees themselves… 
5. impact of grantees 
a. Please shortly explain the "story" of the grant. 
thinking of the application history (who pushed/decided on supporting the application, 
why), kind of research, position of the grantee, condition the grant offers 
b. What concrete difference does it make for [ … name of lab / insitute…] to have/to host 
ERC grantees?  
thinking of reputational efffect vs. monetary effect, how important is ERC money 
compared to other funding, national grants? 
 
Do you think the ERC grantee/grantees improve your standing within the university / 
research organisation? In what ways does the grant support and raise the profile of the 
unit internationally? 
c. How does the research theme of the grantee fit into the existing research profile? Is it 
complementary, same but better, entirely new area, new linkages between groups etc.? 
 
Does the ERC resp. the grantee contribute to research content profiling, e.g. 
development towards more "frontier" research (discussion about the term: what is it for 
the interviewee) 
 
Is the grant part of a re-orientation strategy or an add-on to existing activities? Does it 
trigger a re-orientation (“frontier research”)? 
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Let's talk about attraction, support and autonomy of talent, i.e. (potential) grantees: 
1. perceived attractiveness 
a. What do you think, how relatively attractive is the [ … name of lab / institute…] compared 
to your main competitors for talents?  
Please shortly elaborate, why your university /research organisation resp. school / faculty 
is / is not the most attractive place for a young talent? 
2. recruitment strategies 
a. Could you please elaborate your recruitment strategies at the [ … name of lab / 
institute…] ? How is staff concretely recruited within your unit? What are your strategies 
and criteria, thinking of pro-active, re-active, internal recruiting, international recruiting, 
active recruiting of ERC grantees etc. ? 
b. Do you think the existence of the ERC and its funding schemes already changed or will 
change your recruitment strategies? Are their any current discussions to alter recruitment 
strategies? 
c. Having an ERC grantee / x ERC grantee at [ … name of lab / institute…]: What is 
different now? 
Thinking of: changes in internal lab structure, ERC being primus inter pares or even 
privileged, level of internal competition vs. team approach etc. 
3. support measures 
a. What kind of mechanisms or measures are provided to support your staff in order to get a 
grant? (thinking of pro-active strategies from staff also) At which level are these designed 
and implemented (top level, school/faculty level, lab/institute level)? 
b. What kind of support do you provide to ERC grantees themselves? Are there any specific 
mechanisms or measures for ERC grantees to start their grant resp. during the duration 
of the grant?  
Thinking of: administrative support, incentives, additional ressources etc. 
4. researchers’ autonomy 
a. What is the level of autonomy granted to researchers at your lab / institute?  
Thinking of: possibilities to organise their individual research context, to create 
appropriate micro-structures, to influence recruiting decisions, to build up teams, to spend 
the money they have raised?  
b. Within the last years did you experience any changes in the way talent is provided with 
autonomy more generally? If so, did the existence of ERC resp. of ERC grantees at your 
institution play a role in this? 
  
Summing up: General open questions on the relevance of ERC 
1. In which area does the  [ … name of lab/institute…] change most because of ERC or is there no 
difference at all? What do you consider the single most important impact/change (no matter what 
dimension)? How relatively important is this in relation to other changes you experience? 
2. Is this change an additional push to something already happening or is it an original impact? 
Or to put it differently: Is the ERC grant used for active change or does it DRIVE you in a certain 
direction? (proactive or reactive) 
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Interview	  guide:	  National	  funding	  organisations	  and	  spaces	  
 
All questions in the following list are intended for representatives of the funding 
bodies. Questions marked with * are also for interviewees outside the funding agency, 
but, nevertheless, well-informed of the development of the funding agency. 
 
1. Background information* -­‐ When was the organization founded; if there have been any major 
reorganization, when did this happen? -­‐ What has been the development of the funds in the past few years? 
 
2. Current and future strategy of the organization within the national research 
system* 
a. How would you define the current role of the organization within the 
national research system? (e.g., is it the only or one among many funding 
bodies to finance basic or any other type of research) 
b. Has there been a recent change or are there any changes foreseen of this 
position in the near future? 
c. How autonomous is the funding organization vis-à-vis the government? 
i. Who formulates the overall strategy 
ii. Degree of independence in implementing the strategy 
iii. Composition and appointment of the governing board of council 
 
3. How important are the following principles in the overall strategy of the funding 
organization? For each principle, how recently were they adopted? 
a. Scientific excellence  
b. Frontier science/ground-breaking or path-breaking research  
c. Bottom-up  
d. Support of individuals vs. support of collaborations 
e. Support to specific socio-economically important research areas (or societal 
challenges; Grand challenges) 
f. Support to internationalisation 
 
4. What are the main funding instruments of the research council esp. with regard to 
funding of  
a. Excellent research 
b. Frontier science/ground-breaking or path-breaking research  
c. Grants to support individual researchers in their research careers 
d. Support to specific socio-economically important research areas (or societal 
challenges; Grand challenges) 
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e. Support to own institutes 
f. Support to internationalisation 
 
5. How recent are the previous funding tools? Did the funding organization adopt 
models from other respective organizations from another country or any other 
organizations (e.g., European-level funding bodies)?* 
6. How is the selection procedure organized, esp. on issues:  
a. Uniformity of selection procedures across organization / possibility for 
panels or others to deviate from procedures 
b. Use of peer review vs. quantitative indicators 
c. How is the peer review organized:  
- the use of international peers;  
- do the panels meet;  
- the use of remote evaluation;  
- one or two stages, where only short application in the first stage,  
- the use of interviews;  
- do the proposers obtain feedback etc  
d. Do the panels de facto select or just grade the applications 
e. When were the above-described procedures introduced 
 
7. Current and future strategy of the organization within the European Research 
Area. 
f. Can the organization award funding to researchers, or research teams in 
another country? If yes, how frequent is this and when did this become 
possible? 
g. Is the organization active at the European level? 
o in relation the Framework Programme (ERAnets, Joint Programming, 
other, e.g., the various public-private partnerships) (ask for the list 
mentioned in the data section) 
o in the European-level organizations of the research funding bodies? 
o collaboration with corresponding national councils  
 
8.  Relation between the role of the organization and that of the ERC* 
h. Is there any complementarity, overlap, competition between the organization 
and the ERC?   
i. Has the organization specific instruments and/or regulations in relation to 
ERC (eg grants for preparing ERC grants, complementary funding for ERC 
grantees, etc.) What is the rationale of these? 
 
9. What have been the three major changes in the organization since 2003? If any, 
can they to some extent be attributed to the ERC?* 
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Interview	  guide:	  European	  funding	  landscape	  
 
Aims and strategy of the ERC 
1. How do you perceive the overall aims of the ERC? 
2. How likely is it that the ERC will achieve its aims? What do you think ought to be 
changed if the ERC is to achieve its aims? 
3. How do you see the place of the ERC in ERA in general 
 
The ERC in the European and national-level funding landscape 
 
4. Are there overlaps between the ERC and your own organization? 
a) in terms of strategy and goals 
b) in terms of funding instruments 
c) in terms of procedures 
5. Are there overlaps between the ERC and other European or member state level funding 
organizations in terms of strategy, funding instruments and procedures? 
6. Do you consider the ERC to be a competitor for your organisation? Are there any 
complementarities? Is the ERC a competitor to other organisations? 
7. What are the changes in your organisation (strategy, governance, instruments, processes) 
in recent years (since the last study on the matter)? 
 a. What are the major divers for change? 
 b. Has the establishment of the ERC affected your own organization (strategy,    
 instruments, procedures, prestige, funding opportunities, other)? Do you expect it to 
 influence it in the long run? 
Position of the ERC 
8. In your estimation, will the ERC become an important European funding organization?   
What are the major factors affecting the development of its position? 
9. What is the prestige of the ERC? How can it maintain it (achieve if it does not yet have 
it)? 
 
 
©European Research Council President, Prof Helga Nowotny on the ERC’s mission and excellence: 
“ Excellence in science is the ultimate goal that every researcher aspires to obtain. Excellence is 
multidimensional. It fosters innovative new thinking, experimentation and the discovery of new 
solutions. It encourages variety and often flourishes at the interface of established disciplines and 
practices.”
“ The ERC’s mission is to find and fund the best researchers, through competition at the global level, 
who will conduct their frontier research projects in Europe.”
http://erc.europa.eu
Established by the European Commission
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